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ABSTRACT 
We now know that state formation experiences outside Europe were not merely 
attenuated or failed versions of the European experiences (Herbst, 2000; Hoffman, 2015; 
Johnson and Koyama, 2016). The diverse paths taken towards the modern state imply 
that existing knowledge on state formation processes can be enhanced by integrating the 
experiences of Africa and other developing regions. This dissertation investigates 
colonial state formation in the British Cape Colony from 1820-1910, a period which saw 
the consolidation of British rule as well as the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 
region. The history of the Cape Colony adds a new dimension to accounts of colonial state 
formation in the 19th century, which are usually based on the experiences of New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada rather than those of Africa and other developing regions. 
The history of how the Cape Colony coped with the opportunities and challenges of 
mineral discoveries also has wide implications for debates on the interaction between 
mineral resources and institutions. The literature argues that the existing institutional 
structure shapes prospects for either prosperity or decline in the wake of discovering a 
resource. The discovery of diamonds in 1867 occurred during the early decades of self-
governance at the Cape and the subsequent consolidation of political and economic 
institutions was heavily influenced by diamond mining as a major source of economic 
rents.  
Given that budgets are the ‘skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies’, as 
Goldscheid famously asserted, the study investigates the fledgling colonial state through 
the Cape Colony’s revenue policies, expenditure priorities and public borrowing patterns. 
The study contributes to the body of knowledge on the 19th century colonial state by 
presenting and analysing data on the revenue, expenditure and borrowing patterns of the 
Cape Colony (the data are contained in Appendices A, B and C). Further, it combines the 
quantitative data with archival records from the Cape Archives, South African Library, 
Stellenbosch Library and the British National Archives in Kew (United Kingdom). Budget 
speeches, debates, and other qualitative material help to contextualize trends in the 
quantitative data and make them intelligible. By combining these two types of discourse, 
this dissertation adds a new in-depth case study to research on South African economic 
history, African colonial states and imperial history in general.  
On the revenue side, the salience of customs revenue was established as a major form of 
indirect taxes. The second most important revenue item was railway earnings from the 
state-owned railway system. These two major sources of public revenue formed the 
backbone of the Cape Colony’s fiscal capacity development. The tax structure meant 
heavy burdens for the poor, mainly black Africans, while the available evidence suggests 
that private interest groups resisted taxes successfully. By the end of its existence, the 
Cape was in dire circumstances with high public debt and diminishing revenues. This was 
because the growing rivalry with neighbouring colonies meant that customs revenues 
and railway earnings dwindled in the Cape as trade was captured by other colonies. The 
expenditure side was dominated by the elite-driven railway construction that primarily 
served the mining interests at the expense of all other sectors. Education and other social 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 iii 
 
spending remained at the periphery of public expenditure while debt-driven and railway-
centred infrastructure development took centre stage from the late 1870s when the Cape 
had attained self-governance and responsible governance. The discovery of diamonds 
proved to be the major positive economic shock that pushed the Cape economy and 
therefore public finances to a higher equilibrium. The businessmen with mining interests 
steered the government towards policies or actions beneficial to their interests through 
legislation that prevented direct taxation on them. This group with mining interests 
steered the government’s public finance policies to revolve around mining promotion. 
This shaped what this study characterises as a minerals-railway-complex (MRC). The 
MRC encapsulates the nature of the state-business informal coalition that determined not 
only the public finance patterns but also the pattern of economic industrialisation during 
the Cape’s existence. The 19th century business environment, with weak state 
institutions, meant that public finance policies were distorted to serve the interests of the 
political and economic elite.   
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OPSOMMING 
Dat staatsvormingservarings buite Europa nie bloot verswakte of mislukte weergawes 
van Europese ervarings was nie, het onlangs erkenning verkry (Herbst, 2000; Hoffman, 
2015; Johnson and Koyama, 2016). Die verskillende roetes wat tot die moderne staat 
gelei het, impliseer dat bestaande kennis van staatsvormingsprosesse uitgebrei kan word 
deur die ervarings van Afrika en ander ontwikkelende streke in berekening te bring. 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek koloniale staatsvorming in die Britse Kaapkolonie van 
1820-1910, 'n tydperk wat die konsolidasie van Britse heerskappy sowel as die 
ontdekking van diamante en goud in die gebied ervaar het. Die geskiedenis van die 
Kaapkolonie voeg 'n nuwe dimensie toe aan verslae oor koloniale staatsvorming in die 
19de eeu, wat gewoonlik op die ervarings van Nieu-Seeland, Australië en Kanada 
gebaseer is, eerder as dié van Afrika en ander ontwikkelende gebiede. Die geskiedenis 
van hoe die Kaapkolonie die geleenthede en uitdagings van minerale-ontdekkings 
hanteer het, het ook wye implikasies vir debatte oor die interaksie tussen minerale 
hulpbronne en instellings. Die literatuur beweer dat die bestaande institusionele 
struktuur vooruitsigte vir welvaart óf agteruitgang in die nasleep van die ontdekking van 
'n hulpbron vorm. Die ontdekking van diamante in 1867 het gedurende die vroeë dekades 
van selfbestuur aan die Kaap plaasgevind en die daaropvolgende konsolidasie van 
politieke en ekonomiese instellings is wesenlik deur diamantmynbou as 'n belangrike 
bron van ekonomiese gewin beïnvloed.       
Gegewe dat begrotings, soos Goldscheid welbekend beweer het, die 'skelet van die staat 
is wat van alle misleidende ideologieë gestroop is', word die jong koloniale staat in die 
studie deur middel van die Kaapkolonie se inkomstebeleid, uitgaweprioriteite en 
openbare leningspatrone ondersoek. Die studie maak 'n bydrae tot kennis oor die 
negentiende eeuse koloniale staat deur statistiek oor die inkomste-, uitgawe- en 
leningspatrone van die Kaapkolonie te verskaf en dit te ontleed (Bylaes A, B en C bevat 
die statistiek). Verder kombineer dit kwantitatiewe data met argiefrekords vanuit die 
Kaapse Argief, die Suid-Afrikaanse Biblioteek, Stellenbosch Biblioteek en die Britse 
Nasionale Argief in Kew (Verenigde Koninkryk). Begrotingstoesprake, debatte en ander 
kwalitatiewe materiaal help om tendense in die kwantitatiewe data te kontekstualiseer 
en verstaanbaar te maak. Deur hierdie twee tipes diskoers te kombineer, voeg hierdie 
proefskrif 'n nuwe deurdringende gevallestudie by tot navorsing oor Suid-Afrikaanse 
ekonomiese geskiedenis, Afrika-koloniale state en imperiale geskiedenis in die algemeen.  
 Aan die inkomstekant is die belangrikheid van doeane-inkomste as 'n belangrike vorm 
van indirekte belasting bevestig. Die tweede belangrikste inkomste was die 
spoorwegverdienste van die staatsbeheerde spoorwegstelsel. Hierdie aansienlike  
bronne van openbare inkomste het die ruggraat van die Kaapkolonie se fiskale 
kapasiteitsontwikkeling gevorm. Die belastingstruktuur het swaarder laste vir die armes, 
hoofsaaklik swart Afrikane, beteken, terwyl die beskikbare getuienis daarop dui dat 
privaatbelangegroepe belasting suksesvol teengestaan het. Teen die einde van sy bestaan 
was die Kaap in ‘n haglike toestand met hoë openbare skuld en dalende inkomste. Dit was 
omdat toenemende mededinging met omliggende kolonies beteken het dat doeane-
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inkomste en spoorwegverdienste in die Kaap afgeneem het, daar handel deur ander 
kolonies oorgeneem is. Die uitgawekant is oorheers deur die elite-gedrewe 
spoorwegkonstruksie wat hoofsaaklik mynboubelange ten koste van alle ander sektore 
gedien het. Onderwys en ander maatskaplike besteding het aan die rand van openbare 
uitgawes gebly, terwyl skuldgedrewe en spoorweggesentreerde infrastruktuur-
ontwikkeling vanaf die laat 1870's die vernaamste posisie ingeneem het toe die Kaap 
selfbestuur en verantwoordelike bestuur verkry het. Die ontdekking van diamante was 
die belangrikste positiewe ekonomiese hupstoot wat ’n hoër mate van ewewig aan die 
Kaapse ekonomie en dus aan openbare finansies besorg het. Sakelui met mynbelange het 
die regering in die rigting gestuur van beleid of handelinge wat hul eie belange deur 
wetgewing bevoordeel het, en hulle van direkte belasting vrygestel het. Hierdie groep 
met mynbelange het die regering se beleid oor openbare finansies om 
mynboubevordering te draai. Dit het vorm gegee aan wat in hierdie studie as 'n minerale-
spoorweg-netwerk, ’n “minerals-railway-complex” (MRC), bestempel word. Die 19de-
eeuse besigheidsomgewing met swak staatsinstellings het meegebring dat beleid 
betreffende openbare finansies verdraai is om die belange van die politieke en 
ekonomiese elite te dien. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In contrast to a recent focus on the clinical role of economists in designing 
experiments that enable the evaluation of micro-level policy interventions, 
shifting the spotlight to state capacity obliges economists to engage with the 
wider concerns of social scientists in questions of state formation and political 
order, questions which are invariably illuminated by a knowledge and 
understanding of history (Johnson and Koyama, 2016, p. 3). 
1.1 Research background  
The dust has not settled as far as concrete conceptualisation of states is concerned. As 
Hoffman (2015, p. 303) put in: “We do not really understand how states arise in the first 
place and how they gain the ability to tax”. Although he referred to states in general, his 
statement is most relevant for the developing regions. Very little theorising has been 
done for these regions. As it stands, however, literature on state formation in developing 
regions can be divided into two broad strands. The first strand of literature focuses on 
the European states as ideal-types through which states in general can be understood 
(Bonney, 1999b; O’Brien, 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2016). The second strand 
acknowledges that the variants of states in the developing world should not be premised 
on the European archetypes but should be understood differently (Tilly, 1990; Herbst, 
2000; Hoffman, 2015; Johnson and Koyama, 2016). This implies that state formation 
processes in the developing world should be subjected to further investigation.  
Colonialism can be regarded as a shock, whether positive or negative, in the long term 
processes of state building in the developing world. This study directly deals with colonial 
states and confronts writings which downplay colonialism in the process of state 
formation in the long run. For instance Herbst (2000, p. 4) argues that “it was impossible 
for the Europeans to have changed everything in the few decades that they ruled Africa. 
They also had to take Africa’s political geography as a given because they were unwilling 
and unable to change the landscape.” This view contradicts writings which argue that 
colonialism altered the course of economic development in the developing world 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2012; Heldring & Robinson, 2012; Mamdani, 2005; 
Nunn, 2007; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). Hence, knowledge of the colonial period is 
essential for understanding state formation in the developing world. Slavery, occupation, 
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dispossession and many forms of exploitation (of people and resources) that took place 
imply that colonialism affected the formation and nature of the state that ultimately 
emerged.  In Africa, post-colonial states have been accused of being irresponsible and 
largely indebted because of a general lack of fiscal foresight and outright corruption 
(Bates, 2008). Other voices have argued that the colonial history and the process of 
historical change are important in understanding modern challenges and the prospects 
of states in Africa (Cooper, 2002; Mamdani, 2005; Mkandawire, 2010). This dissertation 
emphasizes, by focusing on the Cape Colony’s experience in the 19th century, that colonial 
history is fundamental in understanding long run state formation processes in previously 
colonised developing countries. 
By chronicling change over time the study overcomes pitfalls of broad historical 
comparisons in which many simplifying assumptions have to be made. As a complex 
phenomenon, state formation can be understood fully by building evidence through case 
by case analysis. For instance, after using a case by case approach to seek general trends 
in the evolution of state formation in Europe, Johnson and Koyama (2016, p. 15) argue 
that, “in order to fully understand the evolution of modern states and the relationship 
between state building and economic growth, ‘decompressing’ history is important.” The 
19th century Cape Colony was the most important  settler colony on the African continent 
(De Zwart, 2011; Gilbert, 1933; Marks, 1980). Given that the budget is the ‘skeleton of the 
state stripped of all misleading ideologies’, as Goldscheid has famously asserted, the study 
investigates the fledgling colonial state through the Cape Colony’s revenue policies, 
expenditure priorities and public borrowing patterns.  
1.2 Research agenda and contribution  
Historians have often dismissed the nineteenth-century Cape Colony as a mere garrison 
colony or half-way house to the East, servicing Britain’s commercial and imperial 
interests. This view reflected, at least in part, the tendency of British imperial authorities 
to treat the Cape Colony as a strategic outpost during early days of occupation. It 
inevitably filtered into the academic research over the years and, until recently, the 
understanding of the colony hardly went beyond its salience as a refreshment station on 
an important sea route. As a result, there are gaps in our knowledge about the British 
Cape Colony from 1806 to 1910. Under the Dutch East India Company, from 1652 to about 
1806 when the British took over, public revenue and expenditures largely served the 
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interests of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) (Fourie, Jansen, & Siebrits, 2013). Under 
British rule, however, its revenues grew rapidly. The development of such  ‘substantial 
permanent taxation’, a defining feature of state formation, over this period means that the 
detailed study of the colony’s fiscal history from 1820 to 1910 can provide valuable 
insights into the processes of state formation under colonial rule, with important 
implications for the international literature.   
Within South African economic history, diamond and gold mining were central to 
economic development in the nineteenth century (De Kiewiet, 1957). To understand state 
formation, however, it is important to consider the period prior to the discovery of 
minerals because state formation is a long process and initial conditions are important 
(Dincecco, 2015; Johnson and Koyama, 2016). For the Cape Colony, institutional 
antecedents from the pre-diamond discovery period are important for how the state 
became organised. There was immigration of about 4000 British settlers in 1820, the so-
called 1820 settlers, who, together with a garrison of about 5000 solders, joined the 
diverse population of the Colony, composed at that date of black Africans, coloured, Dutch 
settlers and other Europeans mainly from Germany and France. The arrival of the British 
settlers set in motion a state building process that eventually incorporated a democratic 
ethos after 1854 when self-governance was granted. The discovery of diamonds in 1867 
transformed the colony’s economy in a manner that the prevailing institutional structure 
permitted. Political changes became influential for fiscal policies pursued by the colonial 
state. This dissertation interrogates how the economic windfalls resulting from the 
mineral discoveries influenced the state formation process. This also has wider 
implications for literature on natural resources and institutions (Gelb, 1988; Mehlum, 
Moene, & Torvik, 2005; Torvik, 2001; Wenar, 2008). 
The discovery of diamonds, migration of settlers to the Cape and political transition make 
the Cape an interesting case with valuable lessons for understanding state formation and 
the implications of mineral discovery on existing institutions. Good (1976, p. 601), for 
instance, argues that the discovery of diamonds in 1867 changed the Colony from ‘a mere 
half-way house to India into a developing powerhouse and a true cornerstone of the 
empire’. Marks (1980, p. 1) argues that in the nineteenth century the Colony was 
“probably the most important, most populous and wealthiest British colony in Africa”. 
According to McCracken (1967, p. 8), the Colony’s administration and general 
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institutional configuration were modelled on developments in New South Wales and 
Canada and were very much in the same league as those of the main British dominions. 
This makes the Colony’s absence from many studies that group New Zealand, Canada and 
Australia as important self-governing colonies or dominions unjustifiable.1  
This dissertation provides, for the first time, comprehensive accounts of the yearly public 
revenues, expenditures and public debt of the Cape Colony from 1820-1910. Other 
colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as those in the Americas, New 
Zealand and Australia, have been well documented on the fiscal front. Sokoloff and Zolt 
(2007, p. 102), for instance, have shown that North America and Canada had high 
property taxes (for instance accounting for between 76 and 87% of total government 
revenue in Massachusetts) and that Latin America’s large farm-owning elites resisted 
property taxes. By revealing the full details for the Cape Colony (what was taxed directly 
and indirectly, and who was taxed, with the accompanying progressive or regressive 
implications of the tax system, and various expenditure outlays), this study makes it 
possible to determine per capita tax levels over time and to document the colonial state’s 
commitment to its various roles, such as public education, health and infrastructure.   
This study will directly contribute to what Lindert terms the “promising frontier effort of 
Kenneth Sokoloff’s unfinished work, with Eric Zolt, on how inequality of power has 
shaped the institutions of taxation” (Lindert, 2011, p. 369). Sokoloff, working with 
Engerman and Zolt, investigated in various studies how factor endowments and the 
concentration of political power created initial conditions that had a long-term effect on 
economic development in the Americas (Engerman & Sokoloff, 1994; Sokoloff & 
Engerman, 2000b; Sokoloff & Zolt, 2007). Their far-reaching general observation is that 
the British imperial authorities encouraged immigration into North America and Canada, 
while colonial authorities in South America, mainly in Spanish America, restricted 
immigration. According to Sokoloff and Zolt (2007, p. 86), North America and Canada 
                                                 
1 Colonial territories were divided into two main groups. This was aptly summarised by Accominotti et al. 
(2010, p.64) when they argued that “India, Ceylon, Jamaica and other dependent colonies were slave 
nations, owed nothing and did not grow. Australia, New Zealand and Canada were heavy borrowers, 
governed themselves and developed.” Responsible government was a step further from self-governing 
because the government became responsible and the top executive was answerable to the members of 
parliament and could be forced to resign in the event of misconduct or failure to uphold the constitution. 
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were unique in that “their factor endowments predisposed them toward paths of 
development with relative equality and population homogeneity”.  
The 1820 settlers make the Cape Colony a fertile ground for extending the studies by 
Sokoloff and his colleagues. The Cape Colony was the most demographically diverse of all 
dominions and when these settlers came, a modus vivendi had to be found for governing 
a colony where race and class antagonism were soon to be strong.2 As Sokoloff and Zolt 
(2007, p. 131) acknowledge, inequality amongst citizens makes progressive tax 
structures difficult to design. In the Cape Colony, inequality and social stratification were 
of a racial nature. When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, parliamentary 
institutions of the Colony were simply bequeathed to the union, with three-quarters of 
the legislators having served in the Colony’s parliament3 (Kilpin, 1930, p. 111). Thus, 
twentieth-century South Africa grew directly out of the state institutional antecedents of 
the nineteenth-century Cape Colony – antecedents which to date have been insufficiently 
studied. Compared to other African countries, the relative success of industrialisation in 
the first half of the 20th century in South Africa was built upon the 19th century 
developments of which the Cape was a major contributor.  
In summary, this study is important for three reasons. Most importantly, it will be the first 
study of pre-1910 South Africa on the fiscal front. Previous studies have focused largely 
on social history, from such perspectives as Afrikaner nationalism, British settlers or 
colonialism. In recent years, quantitative economic history research has achieved traction 
and various studies have explored different aspects of the Cape before it became a British 
colony (1652 to 1795) (Fourie, 2013, 2014; Fourie et al., 2013; Fourie & Van Zanden, 
2013). Secondly, this dissertation will illuminate the role of the biggest settler colony of 
the British Empire on the African continent. Most studies of fiscal history and colonial 
state formation in British and French colonies have not focused on the Cape Colony (for 
example see Frankema, 2011; Gardner, 2012; Frankema and van Waijenburg, 2014; 
Huillery, 2014; Van Waijenburg, 2015). These studies mainly focus on the 20th century 
                                                 
2 Visser (2004) argued that some scholars have told the history of South Africa as “the story of conflict 
between Afrikaner nationalism, on the one hand, and British imperialism and black barbarism (sic), on the 
other”. What embittered the Afrikaners was the fact that they felt they were regarded as an inferior race by 
the British authorities at the Cape; this would lead them towards a strong drive towards Afrikaner 
nationalism (Giliomee, 2014, p. 226). 
3 This is supported by Davenport (1978, p. 75) who argued that after the Union of South Africa was formed 
in 1910 “forms of government adopted by the union were a much closer reflection of British than the 
Voortrekker institutions”. 
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while the process of colonial state formation in the Cape Colony took place during the 
nineteenth century. Thirdly, this dissertation examines how British imperial policies 
influenced fiscal developments in its dominions in general. According to Davis and 
Huttenback (1986, p. 7), the Empire’s overseas territories developed largely in an ad hoc 
manner. This makes the neglected Cape Colony worth studying.   
It follows from these reasons that the study makes a contribution to debates emanating 
from three strands of literature. The first strand is on the role of institutions in the 
economic development of colonies with diverse natural resource endowments 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016; Engerman & 
Sokoloff, 1994; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000b).  Given the centrality of the diamond mining 
industry in the Cape economy, the study brings new insights into this broad literature by 
focussing on how public finance institutions evolved before and after the discovery of 
diamonds. Natural resource endowment has been recognised as central to how political 
and economic institutions evolve leading to favourable or unfavourable economic 
outcomes (Mehlum et al., 2005). In the wake of resources discovery, the prevailing 
institutions matter for the prosperity or decline of a nation. As a result, certain 
terminology was borrowed from this literature and the key phrases used when referring 
to institutions are ‘extractive’ and ‘inclusive’. According to Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012), extractive institutions are those that allow a small group of people to exploit the 
rest of the population in such a way that any economic gains accrue to them as a minority. 
Inclusive institutions means economic gains are distributed equitably to all citizens.   
The second literature to which the study contributes is that on African colonial public 
finances (Frankema, 2011; Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014; Gardner, 2012; 
Waijenburg, 2015). This is important given that the Cape is generally missing from 
accounts of African colonial fiscal systems despite having been the foremost settler colony 
on the African continent in the 19th century. Herbst (2000, p. 5) in his famous book on 
States and Power in Africa also omitted South Africa (and hence the Cape) because of “its 
different history”. This study reveals through an in-depth study, that when considering 
colonial states, South Africa, especially in the 19th century, should not be dismissed as it 
was a crucial component of African history. With the Cape’s public finances explored in 
this study, the information on African colonial states is becoming more complete. The 
larger number of settlers in the Cape differentiated it from other colonial states on the 
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African continent in the 19th century and made it a relatively sophisticated polity by the 
standards of that era.  
Narratives which only emphasise effects of other factors (such as population growth) err 
by underrating the crucial influence of colonialism on states in Africa (Mamdani, 2005; 
Robinson, 2002). For instance Herbst (2000, p. 3) rightly argues that “state formation and 
consolidation in Africa, and in many others parts of the world, proceeded in a radically 
different manner than it did in Europe” It is his notion that colonialism was irrelevant to 
the state formation process in Africa that is hard to justify. This may have been true for 
some territories in which indirect rule existed during the post Berlin conference period 
but this characterisation of colonialism is not complete, at least as far as this study posits.  
The third literature relates to the general understanding of state formation. The Cape 
stands in the league of the British dominions in terms of its status as a self-governing 
colony and eventually a colony with a responsible governance. From a developing world 
perspective, the study contributes to these relationships between imperial powers and 
colonies and their effects on long term state formation processes. Rich natural resources 
in the Cape were accompanied by a diverse population in which race and class featured 
more prominently than in the other dominions. The outcomes observed leaned more to 
the Latin American developments where the land owning elite controlled how 
institutions evolved (Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000b). At the Cape the parliamentary 
institutions were distorted by the elite who leaned more to private gains than to the 
equitable development orientation observed in Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(Greasley & Oxley, 1998).  
Using the three strands of literature to which the study contributes, a clear pattern of 
extractive oriented policies is observed. Elites (mainly mining interests) resisted taxes 
and set a wrong precedent for other sectors. This meant that the fiscal diversification 
process was stifled and expenditure priorities skewed to benefit those in power. The 
confluence of political and economic power, epitomised by Cecil John Rhodes entering the 
politics of the Cape, meant that de facto and de jure influence coincided to create strong 
extractive tendencies. In this light and through analysing revenue (chapter 4), 
expenditure (chapter 5) and public debt policies (chapter 6), the study posits that 
diamond mining and the construction of railways formed a ‘Minerals–Railways Complex 
- MRC’). This was an alliance between mining interests and a state-run railway system 
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and the phrase fully encapsulates not only fiscal history and state formation in the Cape 
Colony but the ‘soul’ that shaped the Cape’s economic progress. Parallels of such leading 
economic activities or coalitions include the ‘maize and gold’ alliance of Transvaal from 
the early 1890s, ‘iron and rye in Germany’ (Trapido 1971), Minerals-Energy Complex in 
20th century South Africa (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996) and even the American military 
industrial complex (MIC) during president Dwight Eisenhower’s era. These were defining 
activities of the economy at different phases of industrialisation that inevitably shaped 
fiscal policy priorities. Coalitions and interest groups which existed during these phases 
were influential in steering public policies in the direction of either inclusive growth or 
serving their private ends. For the Cape’s public revenue policies, expenditure priorities 
and borrowing patterns, there is a clear imprint of the MRC’s dictates through the 
informal alliances of politicians and businessman in and out of the state apparatuses. 
1.3 Research questions  
This study seeks to answer important questions relating to the 19th century Cape Colony’s 
public finances. As an in-depth case study that investigates the evolution of the fiscal 
institutions, the study goes beyond current approaches and studies which avoid nuances 
and themes that complicate research findings by concentrating on broad cross colony 
analysis of fiscal regimes. Because the research is foundational as the first study to 
provide a dataset of this nature, the questions are straightforward and allow the focus of 
the study to be clear. The study investigates the following research questions:  
 What were the major sources of revenue (distinguishing tax and non-tax revenue) 
of the Cape Colony throughout the period and why were these sources at the 
forefront? In other words, to investigate whether the main sources of revenue 
reflected the political economy of taxation or were merely a result of economic 
circumstances. 
 What were the colonial government’s expenditure priorities and changes thereof 
as the Cape Colony changed from being a Crown colony to a colony with self-
government and, eventually, responsible government? 
 What were the general determinants of the growth of public debt over time in the 
Cape Colony and its sustainability?  
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 Finally, the important question for state formation was: How did the interactions 
between the political institutions and economic institutions shape the emerging 
state with a particular focus on the role of the elite?   
Following similar research in the field of fiscal history (Ajam & Aron, 2007; Bonney, 
1999b; Brautigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008; Browne, 1983; Daunton, 2012; Fourie et al., 
2013; Gardner, 2012; Yun-Casalilla, 2012), the overarching approach used in the study 
was trend analysis and deep historical analysis. This means that the patterns and trends 
from the data obtained from the Blue books were analysed and complemented with a 
compendium of qualitative archival evidence. This helped to chronicle the evolution of 
the Cape’s fiscal history using quantitative and qualitative evidence. This has been 
successfully used by scholars of fiscal history and remains the most preferred approach. 
It does not impose simplifying assumptions nor try to impose anachronistic models of 
state formation such as the Schumpeterian views which have been found wanting because 
of their teleological simplifications (Yun-Casalilla, 2012). The warning of Botticini (2002, 
p. 595) who argued that there is a danger in economic history because there are 
“economists who like to be pseudo historians in their spare time and often propose 
brilliant theories but have never so much as glanced through a primary source” has been 
heeded.  
1.4 Research design, data and methods  
1.4.1 Why the Cape Colony? 
The changes in governance structure and discovery of diamonds make the Cape Colony a 
particularly interesting case for examining implications for fiscal development. Political 
change such as the granting of both self-governance and responsible governance by the 
British government was one of the key determinants of economic progress of colonial 
territories. The Cape experienced these political transitions in 1854 (self-governance) 
and 1872 (responsible governance). Such political changes caused changes in the fiscal 
institutions as well. As a crown colony, the Cape would have remained with fiscal 
institutions remotely controlled from Downing Street but these political changes brought 
autonomy to the Cape and enabled it to chart its own progress as desired by the colonial 
government.    
 A second important factor for the Cape was the discovery of diamonds in 1867 which 
occurred during the political transition. Both the political changes and the positive 
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economic shock in the form of the discovery of diamonds make the Cape an interesting 
case for analysing the relationship between institutional change (fiscal institutions) and 
the management of resource rents. These events inevitably shaped the type of state that 
was emerging in the Cape. In particular the Cape provides a case for understanding how 
existing institutions matter in the wake of a substantial economic windfall. The colonial 
state formation emanating from the Cape’s 19th century context is important for 
understanding broader processes of state formation in resource rich countries. Processes 
of state formation outside Europe were not simply attenuated or failed versions of the 
European experience (Tilly, 1990, p. 13). The ability of the state to handle economic 
windfalls such as oil continue to be influential for consolidation of state institutions and 
the economic progress in developing nations (Mehlum et al., 2005; Wenar, 2008). 
The justification for focusing on the Cape Colony is also important to highlight in terms 
of the 19th century South Africa. Up to 1910, when the Union of South Africa was formed, 
‘South Africa’ existed as two British colonies, Natal and the Cape Colony, and two Boer 
republics, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (ZAR). The natural 
question therefore is why this study focuses on the Cape Colony alone? The Cape Colony 
was the oldest colony formed in 1806 on the foundations of the VOC which had been in 
control since 1652 and the other three territories were established in the middle decades 
of the 19th century. Key public institutions were developed first in the Cape Colony 
because it was the oldest colony. Hence, fiscal institutions were more sophisticated at the 
Cape than in the other territories, which only caught up with the Cape towards the end of 
the nineteenth century. For instance, the entire revenue of Transvaal in 1872 was £73 
862, 4% of the Cape’s revenue that year, and the entire revenue of the Free State was £84 
282, 4.6% of the Cape’s revenue (South African Railway Report, 1947, p 15). Just before 
the formation of the union in 1910 Natal was raising about 50% of the Cape’s total 
revenue, Transvaal was raising 64% (the increase came due to gold mining which was 
taxed directly) and the Orange River Colony was raising merely 11% of the Cape’s 
revenue. Lack of consistent population numbers across all four territories make this 
comparison difficult to do in per capita terms but from this quantitative angle, other 
territories remained smaller fiscal states when compared to the Cape Colony.   
The status of the Free State and the Transvaal largely remained vague until they became 
British colonies after the South African war in 1902 (Denoon, 1983). According to Denoon 
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(1983, p. 92) the British continued to enjoy suzerainty over Transvaal and it was only 
made independent in 1884 but continued to operate with all the trappings of “a banana 
republic for most of its survival”. Pretorius (2014b, p. 239) supports this by arguing that 
prior to gold discovery, the Transvaal “led a somewhat precarious existence”. The Orange 
Free State was in many ways linked to the Cape Colony and much smaller than the 
Transvaal (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 11). The Cape Colony was made a self-governing colony 
in 1854 and obtained responsible government in 1872. This implies that as far as 
statehood and state autonomy were concerned, the Cape Colony was far more advanced 
than other territories. All these factors make the Cape Colony’s experience from the 19th 
century to the early 20th century a critical part of the broader process of state formation 
in South Africa. The British tradition was to keep records and so, compared to Boer 
republics, the Cape has systematic records kept consistently in the Blue books allowing 
easy access for this study. 
More generally, the dissertation focuses on colonial state formation and the South African 
Republic and the Orange Free State were not colonies except for a short period (1902-
1910) after the South African war. Hence, only the Cape and Natal were true colonies with 
the potential to yield lessons about colonial state formation. The handling of public 
finances and institutional progress in the Cape Colony and Natal was largely similar in 
that they adopted British practices (Davenport, 1978, p. 75). 
1.4.2 Research design  
This study will take the form of an extended case study aimed at providing a detailed 
historical analysis of the public finances of the British Cape Colony. Such an approach can 
yield a deep understanding when it comes to state formation and hence serves as an 
important complement to studies of multiple colonial fiscal systems (Bonney 1999). This 
makes the case study approach appropriate because it maintains a considerable degree 
of openness that allows various angles of state formation as a complex phenomenon to be 
explored4 (Morgan, 2012, p. 668). Austin (2008b, p. 1021) supports this by stressing the 
importance of “combining the cross-country, comparative statics, econometric approach 
with contextually-specific micro studies, as well as other forms of global historical 
comparison”. This suggests that each kind of study is relevant for the bigger picture to 
                                                 
4 Other benefits of the case study approach for state formation are that it allows dense evidential materials 
across a range of aspects and it is flexible to a range of methods and techniques to be used (Morgan, 2012, 
p. 668). 
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emerge and micro studies and case studies reveal important idiosyncratic features of the 
colonies to complement and bring nuance to cross country generalisations (e.g. Bonney, 
1999b; Subramanian and Roy, 2001; Nunn, 2009; He, 2013). Nunn (2009, p. 32) summed 
it up well by arguing that: 
 As studies become much more focused, evidence from complementary 
studies from other locations and times are also needed before one can assess 
whether specific results are part of broad systematic patterns that exist in the 
data or whether the results are specific to that environment. 
The ‘extractive vs inclusive institutions’ dichotomies have not been adequate for Africa 
because “in African settler colonies, extraction was more pervasive than in many of the 
non-settler colonies” (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014, p. 375). According to Bonney 
(1999b, p. 2): 
…without a study of the evolution of different fiscal systems it is impossible to 
determine whether there has been one path, or a few paths, that all pre-
modern financial systems have followed. 
The emphasis here is on understanding different stages of the evolving fiscal systems 
which were shaped by imperial ambitions, local colonists, as well as local colonial 
conditions. Comparisons of revenue and expenditure figures across colonies have limited 
value unless underpinned by an understanding of the processes shaping fiscal decisions. 
Mamdani (1996, p. 12) deplored these cross-colony snapshots by arguing that “they lift 
phenomena out of context and process by searching for the right analogy to fit Africa, an 
approach that privileges the European historical experience as a touchstone.” Austin 
(2007, p. 1) was in line with Mamdani when he argued that starting from the developed 
world, when theorising, “causes a conceptual Eurocentrism that stifles theorisations from 
Africa outward.”  
The British imperial projects had complex dynamics, the nuances of which can be 
understood through the processes of change in different territories over time (Davis& 
Huttenback, 1986; Edelstein, 1982). Although the imperial powers may have had generic 
aims in these colonial territorial ventures, local conditions often dictated the actual form 
of colonial states and fiscal systems adopted. This means that the colonial territories were 
diverse and can be clearly understood through in-depth historical analysis which 
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considers local context, imperial agendas, resistance from indigenous peoples, colonists’ 
interests and other factors unique to each colony.  
Case studies are not primarily used for theory testing in typical hypothesised 
relationships between variables but for discovery and evidence based conceptualisation 
(Morgan, 2012, p. 671). This requires flexibility in dealing with existing theories of state 
formation in a manner that seeks to “infirm” and improve rather than confirm them. This 
study will borrow from theoretical developments in the fiscal states in the metropolitan 
powers, and current nascent theories on the different types of colonial fiscal states 
(Bonney, 1999b; Booth, 2007; Frankema, 2011; Webber & Wildavsky, 1986). It is in line 
with that of Ellinwood (1998, p. 180), who argued that “our understanding of colonialism 
as a general phenomenon must be built up from individual examples as well as through 
theoretical concepts.”  
By opting for an in-depth case study, the study foregoes the alternative of a comparative 
analysis with other territories. According to Magee, Greyling and Verhoef (2016, p. 896), 
comparing colonies in different geographic regions with distinct institutions, ethnicities 
and political paths “…may not only be somewhat anachronistic, but obscure as much as it 
reveals about their performance.” For instance comparing the Australian colonies with 
the Cape and Natal entails comparing colonies which were different on many levels. For 
example, Australian colonies such as New South Wales and Victoria had relatively 
homogenous populations while the population of the Cape and Natal were markedly more 
diverse. By the time of federation in Australia the indigenous populations were almost 
non-existent (below 1% in both New South Wales and Victoria) while Natal and the Cape 
experienced more growth in the indigenous populations (Magee et al., 2016, p. 899). By 
1880s “virtually no Aborigines remained in Victoria and very few in New South Wales. 
They had passed beyond their nadir into oblivion” (Magee et al., 2016, p. 900). This is 
important for fiscal history because the level of inequality and social stratification in 
South Africa meant a different path in tax structures, politics, and legitimacy of the state 
to these different groups. That said, the dissertation contains many comparative 
references to other 19th century colonies and polities such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Latin America, Transvaal and India among others. Due to the availability of data, 
chapter 6 on public debt locates the Cape in a broader scheme of capital movements and 
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ability to borrow by colonies in the 19th century. This makes the chapter more 
comparative than the rest of the dissertation.  
1.4.3 Data sources  
This study would have been impossible had it not been for the commitment to recording 
by the British colonial governments. Over time colonial governors grew infamous for 
profligacy, wanton extravagance and mismanagement of public funds and the imperial 
authorities had to introduce record keeping to foster accountability (Gardner, 2015, p. 
10). The Cape was no different as Charles Somerset was an example of how advisory 
councils and records were needed in order “to enlighten head strong governors 
throughout the colonies” (Kilpin, 1930, p. 37). The library of Stellenbosch University 
holds all the Blue books of the British Cape Colony in which all public revenues and 
expenditures were recorded. While the Blue books contain vast amounts of information 
about, for example, rainfall, deaths, crime and other issues of interest to the Cape Colony 
Government from 1806 to 1910, the study will only use the government revenue, 
expenditure and public debt records.  
Besides the revenue, expenditure and public debt statistics from the Blue books, this 
research also heavily drew on primary sources concerning the affairs of the Cape Colony 
governance. This is an advantage that comes with a historical analysis of a single case. 
Various angles are crucial for understanding state formation as a complex phenomenon. 
Parliamentary debates were obtained from the South African National Library and these 
cover the entire period from 1820-1910 with House of Assembly budget debates which 
illuminate the contours of the evolution of fiscal institutions. The role of ‘actors’ was 
revealed strongly because public finance policies were shaped by various interest groups 
with representation in parliament. From the British National Archives other supporting 
primary documents were obtained. These include commissions of enquiry into public 
accounts, Acts of Parliament, petitions from citizens and business people, and 
correspondences between colonial governors and the imperial colonial authorities.  
These qualitative primary sources in the Stellenbosch Library, Cape Archives and the 
British National Archives in Kew (London) helped to corroborate figures that came from 
the colonial Blue books. This means that the general concerns about the Blue books being 
biased due to the local colonial authorities’ desire to portray a positive picture to the 
imperial colonial secretary were of less significance. A significant corroboration was 
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observed between the Blue books’ figures and yearly parliamentary speeches from 
successive governors which confirmed the bad or good financial position of the colony 
with figures.  
1.4.4 Data collection procedures 
The first phase of the research was the transcription of public finance data from the Blue 
books. Record keeping that spans close to a century poses a challenge of change in content 
and in terms of format. Attrition is another factor because in this period some revenue 
sources were abolished, and expenditure outlays stopped. Other items were also added 
and the degree of details provided concerning each source of revenue or expenditure item 
differed with time. Since the study focuses on state formation and its consolidation using 
revenues, outlays and public debt, the first goal was to get a consistent time series data 
as a building block to understand fiscal history. The strategy adopted was to start at the 
end of the period of study in 1909 to allow all relevant details to be captured and the 
assumption was that as time went back from 1909 the records would become less 
detailed. This allowed the capturing to be more exhaustive and more intuitive than 
starting with the early 1800 period which had skeletal records. Figure 1.1 below shows 
these changes in major categories of revenue and expenditure.  
Figure 1. 1 Cape Colony’s revenue and expenditure categories over time, 1830-1910 
 
Source: Blue books (1830-1910) 
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Figure 1.1 shows the growth of government expenditure categories as the economy 
progressed while revenue sources show a modest growth. This is unsurprising because 
revenue sources tend to be limited but expenditure outlays tend to increase as the state 
takes new responsibilities. These categories also confirm the notion of structural changes 
caused by the mineral discovery and political transition that changed the outlook of 
public finances as shown by a big increase of expenditure categories between 1870 and 
1880. With state ownership of railway systems and telegraphic systems in 1872 the 
expenditure outlays expanded significantly. The granting of responsible governance in 
1872 also entailed more autonomy for more government action in terms of public goods 
provisioning.  
Capturing the data from 1909 going backwards entailed that at the end aggregates were 
to be used instead of finer distinctions or more details. For instance, expenditure on 
public health was recorded in the 1900s in the form of salaries, transport and services 
while in the early 1800s it appeared simply as public health with a single corresponding 
amount. This means that public health consisted of capital investment and recurrent 
expenditure which cannot be separated for most of the period under study. Similarly, 
railway expenditure was recorded with sub categories such as maintenance, locomotives 
and relaying while in early years the figure was simply referring to expenditure on 
railways. For consistency purposes the aggregates were used in the study and they reflect 
the totals that went to each category or government department. It is only where the 
records were consistent that individual items are probed further. For instance, education 
as a category was recorded consistently under native education and non-native 
education5 and this allows further analysis to be done on the commitment of the state not 
only to education but the demographics of the education’s budget allocation.  
Further aggregation such as the one done for classifying public expenditures (table 6.4 in 
the appendix) or classifying revenue into tax or non-tax revenue (figure 4.4 in chapter 4) 
became important for certain arguments in the study. Currency was changed officially 
from rixdollars to the British sterling in the Cape Colony from 1826. Currency issues and 
the difficulty of reading the hand written 1806-26 records meant that data from 1827 
onwards are more reliable. Figures for the period before 1827 are provided only when 
                                                 
5 The use of the word native can be problematic and in the dissertation I have limited its use to instances where I 
use direct quotes and classifications from the colonial times. For instance, education was a key area divided by 
‘natives and non-natives’ categories 
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reasonably consistent and these include information on the pre-existing tax system 
bequeathed to the British era from the VOC period.   
It is necessary to clarify the use of nominal and real data. The period being covered was 
a period of relatively stable prices (1820-1910). The pound sterling was relatively stable 
during this period and prices were higher from the first WWI onwards and an attempt to 
express the data in real terms using the index from O’Donoghue et al. (2004) did not 
reveal any major difference. There was no major difference between the real and nominal 
figures after this change. It is important to also mention that the dissertation makes 
extensive use of direct quotations. This is because the dissertation relies on quantitative 
evidence as well as evidence from political and parliamentary documents. Budget and 
other debates in parliament are crucial for understanding choices made on revenue, 
expenditure and public debt.     
1.5 Structure and outline of the study 
Chapter 2 deals with general theories of state formation and the historical experience of 
a few selected cases which help in foregrounding the Cape Colony case. This chapter has 
a dual function of reviewing literature on various theoretical building blocks that have 
been employed in various studies of state formation and fiscal developments in colonies 
and non-colonies alike. The second function is to provide the basis for interpreting the 
Cape Colony’s experiences. The chapter emphasises that there is no single theoretical 
framework that is available yet that is universal in explaining colonial fiscal institutions. 
This is done while emphasising theoretical features which are applicable to the Cape 
Colony and explanations on why some theoretical frameworks do not fit the unique 
circumstances of the Cape Colony. General features of fiscal modernity are important but 
insufficient for fully understanding colonial state formation. Fiscal modernity is defined 
by the centralisation of government revenue, establishment of long term debt, 
commitment to welfare provision and the transition to a responsible, albeit limited 
government (He, 2013). These key tenets of the state are observed at different stages of 
the Cape Colony’s existence and they indeed differentiated the Cape from the Transvaal, 
Orange Free State and Natal.   
Chapter 3 explores the general economic and political developments as well as trends in 
the public finance figures with the aim of establishing salient features to be taken further 
in the subsequent chapters. Crucial for the modernisation and transformation of the state 
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was the formation of the 1830 legislative council meant for mitigating outright 
authoritarianism as experienced during the 1820s. This was followed by the increasing 
pressure from the separatists and anti-convict campaigns of the 1840s which led to the 
granting of self-governance in 1854 with consolidation of representative parliamentary 
institutions. The granting of self-governance in 1854 was the highest form of the limited 
democracy in the Cape Colony since the franchise requirement was set at a low level 
allowing access to Africans, although this was later changed. This was also mirrored in 
the public finances as accountability was fostered as well as various reforms in the way 
public finances were handled. These included reforms such as the Public Debt 
Consolidation Act of 1870 and the Audit Act of 1875. Key for the coming chapters is that 
this chapter establishes major features in the revenue, expenditure and public debt and 
establishes the basis for further investigation and focus in subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 4 investigates the revenue extraction by the central government with wider 
implications for fiscal capacity building, dependency on tax and non-tax revenue and the 
clear division between the farming and mining industry with the latter not paying its fair 
share into the government coffers. The main conclusion from this chapter is that the 
discovery of diamonds was a decisive factor in the evolution of the Cape Colony’s fiscal 
capacity building. It shifted the attention of the government into public infrastructure, 
mainly railway projects, whose earnings were substantial to the point of relegating the 
need to creatively improve and diversify the fiscal capacity over time. The whole tax 
structure of the Cape was skewed and favoured the mining houses at the expense of the 
agricultural sector which, through protests and petitions, unsuccessfully tried to induce 
the government to also impose taxes on the mining industry. Even up to 1909 the income 
tax (introduced in 1904) was heavy on other sectors save for the mining industry. This 
exposed the extractive nature of the mining-elite controlled state. Property taxes were 
not introduced in the Cape because they were heavily resisted by the mining houses who 
insisted on paying only licence fees. The resistance in the Cape differs greatly from the 
earlier American colonies in which more than 70% of revenue was from property taxes 
(Sokoloff & Zolt, 2007). The Cape was closer to Latin American tax structures which 
emanated from the stratified nature of Latin American societies. This institutional bias 
formed the foundation of the inequality as the ordinary people suffered under hut taxes, 
consumption taxes, excises and later income taxes while the mining houses forced their 
hand on being exempted.  
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Chapter 5 discusses the railway biased public expenditure regime which came as a result 
of the strong mining interest group in parliament. Revenue was a matter of what could be 
obtained from the politically weaker groups while expenditure was based on key 
decisions made on what the government was to prioritise. This again was induced by the 
diamond discovery which sparked a sudden rise in public expenditure as the government 
took ownership of key parastatals such as railways and the telegraphic system. All the 
expenditure categories as ratios of total expenditure show declining shares except for 
public works (mainly railways) which show an upward trend. At parliament, the salience 
of the mineral revolution to the economy was considered important while at the mining 
fields having the ‘right’ kind of parliamentarians, and hence policies, was critical for the 
continued profitability of the mining companies. Rhodes, Merriman, Robinson, etc who 
were linked both to the parliament and to the mining industry and could steer, sometimes 
with great difficulty, the Cape government towards heavy budgets on railway 
construction to link the Kimberley diamond mines and eventually the gold fields in the 
Transvaal. In other words, public expenditure was a ‘tool’ for private profit making 
because the political and economic elite could force the state to assume ‘its 
responsibilities’ in a manner that served private interests.  
Chapter 6 delves into public debt. This chapter is closely linked to the expenditure chapter 
because borrowing was initiated as a result of the projects the government wanted to 
embark on but could not finance with ordinary revenue. The growth of public debt was 
seen as inevitable if it was to finance capital investment such as railway construction, 
harbours and the telegraphic system. The argument was that these would pay for 
themselves after their establishment. The mineral discovery also acted as a big incentive 
for borrowing and the granting of responsible government gave much needed autonomy 
for the government to decide on priorities. At the end of its existence, the Cape had a huge 
accumulated debt relative to its dwindling revenues. It was only through unification that 
its financial difficulties could be resolved. Of course, the pride of the parliamentarians was 
strong and they were eager to retrench as much as they could to enter the union as “a self-
respecting man not as beggars or supplicants for financial favours …. and to avoid other 
states saying the Cape joined the union as a bankrupt state” (House of Assembly budget 
debates, 1909, p. 275). Chapter 7 will conclude the study by outlining key contributions 
and suggestions for future studies.    
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CHAPTER 2: DIVERSE PATHS TOWARDS THE MODERN STATE: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF STATE FORMATION. 
 
We continued, unthinkingly, to assume that European states followed one 
main path, the one marked by Britain, France, and Brandenburg-Prussia, and 
that the experiences of other states constituted attenuated or failed versions 
of the same processes. That was wrong (Tilly, 1990, p. 13). 
We do not understand how states arise in the first place and how they gain the 
ability to tax. There are numerous unanswered questions here that economic 
historians can profitably work on, and their research will be particularly 
valuable if they model the politics, gather data on taxation and spending by 
local and central governments and pay serious attention to the historical 
details and to political behaviour (Hoffman, 2015, p. 303). 
2.1 Introduction  
State formation remains a complex phenomenon that has received and will continue to 
receive attention from different academic fields. Wade (2004, p. 345) argued that the 
continuous debates on state formation as well as the role of the state demonstrate the 
“power of infinite repetition as an essential tool of modern scholarship”. This chapter will 
cover a range of issues concerning theory and a few historical cases of state formation. It 
will seek to do three main things: the first will be to show that there is a general story 
about the rise of fiscal states, based primarily on the European experience. Secondly, the 
chapter will investigate how colonial state experiences were similar or different from this 
general state formation narrative. The third role of the chapter is that it provides a context 
for interpreting the experience of the Cape Colony.   
The chapter also reviews the available literature on the evolution of fiscal systems and 
the theoretical lenses employed in the literature. It surveys the key historical 
developments in relation to state formation in Britain with brief reviews of how Britain 
differed from other European and Asian nations. It uses these histories to examine key 
theoretical building blocks of state formation, and therefore fiscal systems.  
Section 2.2 examines definitional issues in state formation and fiscal history literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses the evolution of the state in history using the main stage theories 
common in literature. Besides these theories, this section will also identify different 
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frameworks from institutional economics literature used to identify states in different 
epochs. Section 2.4 will briefly review aspects of state formation processes in history by 
focusing on England, France, British India, China and the North American experiences 
Section 2.5 focuses on colonial state formation and various approaches developed so far 
to understand fiscal developments and state formation in colonial Africa. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 States, coercive capacity and taxation 
2.2.1 Diverse roads to state formation  
While the history of the rise of fiscal states is a well-trodden area, there has never been a 
single general theory which provides a comprehensive explanation of how fiscal states, 
and therefore states in general, have evolved over time (Bonney, 1999b; Hoffman, 2015; 
O’Brien, 2012; Tullock, 2002; Yun-Casalilla, 2012). The body of evidence currently being 
used to understand the rise of fiscal states is comprised of a number of case studies from 
as far back as in the ancient regions such as Mesopotamia, Indus Valley, Nile Valley and 
China (Carneiro, 1970, p. 3; Tilly, 1990, p. 2; Wittfogel, 1957, p. 34). What these studies 
demonstrate is that ‘fiscal states’ emerged under diverse conditions and in response to 
different incentives and it is only towards the end of the eighteenth century that some 
form of convergence towards the modern fiscal state took place alongside the industrial 
revolution (Yun-Casalilla, 2012). Dincecco (2015, p. 12) argued that this long history of 
the evolution of fiscal regime was an outcome of difficult processes and that effective 
states should not be taken for granted. This explains why the term ‘fiscal 
regimes/systems’ is more applicable and often used for the period before the mid 
eighteenth century when the ‘fiscal states’ were in their rudimentary stages.     
If the history of the rise of states has not been explained by a universal theoretical 
framework, the theoretical explanations of ‘colonial fiscal states’ are at a formative stage 
(Frankema and Booth 2017). Fiscal states, and therefore fiscal institutions, in colonised 
territories developed under constrained economic and political conditions in which the 
fiscal discretion and autonomy was a subject of negotiations between colonial governors 
and the metropolitan centres (Offer, 1993, p. 230). Differences in local populations and 
economies contributed to the diversity of colonial fiscal systems. Confounding the 
understanding of colonial fiscal states, as has been emphasised by the critics of Acemoglu 
et al.(2001), is the fact that indigenous agency was important because indigenous peoples 
in these colonial territories played an important role in shaping the evolution of fiscal 
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states (Austin, 2008b, p. 1020; Austin & Broadberry, 2014). This is especially true for 
colonial territories in which the colonists did not settle in large numbers. Colonial 
territories were not simply recipients of the metropolitan blue-prints of fiscal systems 
even in the so called settler colonies but these institutions had to be adapted to local 
realities (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014, p. 378).  
While the colonial fiscal states cannot be understood simply as altered versions of the 
colonial masters’ fiscal regimes, it cannot be denied that metropolitan institutions were 
adapted and in some instances adopted (Yun-Casalilla, 2012, p. 32). After all, the colonial 
governors would not re-invent the wheel. The international commerce and the stock of 
knowledge in the 19th and 20th centuries meant that different forms of taxes were tried in 
the colonial territories, not only from the metropolitan centres but also from the rest of 
the world. The role of the Enlightenment period in Europe and the diffusion of knowledge 
and ideas are also relevant here (Mokyr, 2008). The role of cosmopolitan capital – the free 
multinational movement of capital – was crucial because “states were not closed 
laboratories for the formation of fiscal systems” (Yun-Casalilla, 2012, p. 19). Customs 
tariffs are the key example of how international trade and globalisation brought about an 
important source of fiscal revenue in colonies and non-colonies alike. This means that any 
attempt to form a theory of colonial fiscal systems should be undergirded by a full 
appreciation of the global context of fiscal developments as well as political, economic, 
social and cultural conditions in these colonial territories. To understand colonial fiscal 
developments and colonial state formation, general theories concerning the same in 
sovereign nations in history are also relevant because colonies adapted a lot from the 
metropoles.   
2.2.2 The nature of the state  
The Weberian definition of the state emphasises monopoly of the legitimate use of 
violence in a given territory. In historical research, this has been found wanting because 
history has many examples of entities considered as states that did not achieve a 
monopoly on the use of violence (Hoffman, 2015, p. 306). The Weberian approach also 
precludes ancient city-states because any fiscal legitimacy requires popular acquiescence 
of those governed (Levi, 1988) and the extension of the franchise is only a late 19th 
century phenomenon in Europe and mostly a late 20th century phenomenon in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa. For colonial states it is worth pointing out that some of the laws, such 
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as discriminatory laws, were legitimate in a circumscribed sense because democratic 
practices were not yet fully adhered to. In other words, laws and rules were legitimate in 
terms of the colonial governance structures, but not in terms of modern understanding of 
democratic legitimacy.  
According to North et al. (2009, p. 258), throughout history, states cannot be seen as 
specialists in violence but they “…evolved through protracted wars, coalitions and 
negotiations.” This means that any analysis of the state through the Weberian lenses 
cannot effectively deal with the most common problem of all societies in history, the 
management or containment of violence (North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2007, p. 41). 
The failure or success at management of violence led to some historical states becoming 
too small to survive or “…too large and heterogeneous to evolve into developmental or 
Weberian states” (O’Brien, 2012, p. 453). When it comes to understanding the rise of fiscal 
states, putting the legitimate use of violence as a key tenet of the state is tantamount to 
putting the cart before the horse. In any case for the colonial territories, legitimacy was 
circumscribed by widespread injustices (Heldring & Robinson, 2012).  
Various definitions which allow for historical analysis have been put forward and a few 
are worthy of highlighting as they capture the fundamental aspects of statehood 
throughout history. It is worth noting that literature uses the terms ‘state’ and ‘fiscal state’ 
interchangeably. It seems logical because in any state revenue mobilisation is one 
important aspect for the state to be able to embark on its projects.6 According to Tilly 
(1990, p. 2): 
States are coercion-wielding organisations that are distinct from households 
and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other 
organisations within substantial territories. The term therefore includes city-
states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of government. 
According to Carneiro (1970, p. 733), a state is: 
                                                 
6 There are dimensions of the state which have caused conceptualisation issues. It is incorrect to refer to 
"state capacity" as a single concept, because various types of state capacities can be identified (Levi, 1988). 
These include extractive capacity (ability to impose taxes, monitor people’s income and maximise revenue), 
coercive capacity (the ability of the state to preserve its borders, enforce policies and maintain order) and 
administrative capacity (mainly the ability to competently deliver services through a competent 
bureaucracy) (Hanson and Sigman, 2013, p. 4).  
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an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its 
territory and having a centralized government with the power to collect 
taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and enforce laws. 
Recently, Hoffman (2015, p. 307) argued that a better definition should have two basic 
crucial characteristics: 
First, it can employ violence, although it may not have effective monopoly 
over its use. Second, it can levy substantial permanent taxation …not just 
temporarily during emergencies but for a foreseeable future. 
The definition of the state for North (1973, p. 97) emphasises property rights and that 
any state that survives and enables economic growth has to be: 
an institutional arrangement that sells protection and justice to its 
constituents. It does so by monopolising the definition and enforcement of 
property rights over goods and resources and granting of rights to the 
transfer of these assets. In return for this service the state receives payment 
in the form of taxes.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2016, p. 34) seem to go back to the Weberian notion of 
monopolized violence when they argue that:  
States are identified with some basic components, the monopoly of violence 
in a well-defined territory, a centralized fiscal system and a bureaucratized 
administration, and state formation is measured by movement in any of 
these three dimensions. 
Save for North’s proposition, it is not a coincidence that these definitions avoided a 
functionalist definition, which often tends to be too systematic and inflexible for historical 
analysis (Miliband 1969, p. 46). Once a list of many characteristics are added to the 
definition of the state, many historical entities no longer meet the standard. The two key 
themes in all the above definitions are employment of violence or coercion (military or 
legal) and levying of taxes mostly in a centralised manner. This entails that even tribute, 
monetary or non-monetary, in ancient states are incorporated into these definitions. 
Often, brutal coercion was a crucial means to solicit tributes in such early periods, from 
French monarchs (Ormrod, 1999, p. 20) to African chiefs (Mamdani, 1996, p. 56). Thus, 
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the definitions allow historical analysis of how states have dealt with the scarcity of fiscal 
revenue from early city-states until public debt became a permanent part of the modern 
fiscal state. Besides being important for historical analysis, these definitions are also 
crucial for colonial fiscal systems in which taxation, property rights and justice were 
indeed contentious issues between the colonised and the colonists. For instance, in Africa, 
colonial governors were dealing with land issues, taxation and continued rivalry over 
natural resources and in most of these territories coercion became a key tenet of the fiscal 
apparatus (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010, 2012; Austin, 2008b; Gardner, 2012, 2013).  
2.3.3 Wars and the need for fiscal resources  
It has become a truism that wars made states (Bonney, 1999b, p. 10; Daunton, 2012, p. 
130; Isenmann, 1999, p. 26). Wars are important for how one understands colonial states 
because colonial defence was a contentious issue in the British Empire’s self-governing 
colonies. The imperial authorities wanted colonies to take responsibility for self-defence 
especially in all self-governing colonies but this proved to be difficult. This was one key 
way in which colonial states differed from sovereign states (see section 5.3.5). Tilley 
(1990, p. 72) was more blunt and succinct when he pointed out that, “coercion works; 
those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance, and from that 
compliance draw the multiple advantages of money, goods, deference, access to pleasures 
denied to less powerful.” What has not been stressed enough is the significance of the fact 
that the wars did not need to happen and mere preparation was enough for fiscal 
innovation to take place. This is why coercive capacity is more meaningful because it 
captures not only the wars which took place but threats of war as well. Coercive capacity 
building (encompassing wars and threats of wars) was critical for the fortification of the 
fiscal systems both for internal peace and external security. A qualification stressed by 
Carneiro is that while wars were critical in the development of fiscal capacity, many wars 
were fought which did not lead to the formation of the state (Carneiro, 1970, p. 5). It is 
thus clear that wars were essential but not sufficient for states to emerge as other 
ingredients and conditions were necessary.  
It is clear that wars became less frequent over time because of advances in political 
thought, military technology, international regulations and democratic constraints on 
rulers. It remains true that the fiscal boost emanating from wars was important and the 
causality could flow either way. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below show wars involving great 
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powers and the strength of the armies in major European countries. With the rise of 
military power, the corollary is that internal policing and law and order get strengthened 
as well, thereby making the state effective on the fiscal front too. States which were 
involved in external wars tended to have internal order exemplified by efficient property 
rights (Besley & Persson, 2010). Exceptions may be observed in the Soviet Union which 
had huge armies7 (see table 2.2) but the political logic of total power meant that the fiscal 
front was less developed and the ability to collect revenues limited (North, 2005).  
Table 2. 1 Wars involving great powers 
Century Number of 
wars 
Average 
duration 
(years) 
Percentage of years 
when wars were 
happening 
16th 34 1.6 95 
17th 29 1.7 94 
18th 17 1.0 78 
19th 20 0.4 40 
20th 15 0.4 53 
Source: Tilly (1990, p. 72)  
Table 2. 2 European men under arms 1500-1980 
Country 
Troops under arms (000) Troops (% national population) 
1500 1600 1700 1850 1980 1500 1600 1700 1850 1980 
Spain 20 200 50 154 342 0.3 2.5 0.7 1 0.9 
France 18 80 400 439 495 0.1 0.4 2.1 1.2 0.9 
England/Wales 25 30 292 201 329 1 0.7 5.4 1.1 0.6 
Netherlands   20 100 30 115   1.3 5.3 1 0.8 
Sweden   15 100 63 66   1.5 7.1 1.8 0.8 
Russia   35 170 850 3663   0.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 
Source: Tilly (1990, p. 79) 
The generic picture presented by table 2.1 shows how the incidence of wars increase as 
one goes back in history, at least until the 16th century. What is important to emphasise is 
that these were observed wars and the table excludes those which potentially could have 
taken place (see section 2.3.3). The implication is that the overall fiscal capacity is 
underestimated because situations of tension that gave rise to capacity-building are not 
included. The incidences of war gave rise to the increase in the sizes of the armies as 
                                                 
7 According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2016, p. 5) such powerful states end up being ‘Real Leviathans’ 
with prostrate civil society and although they may be able to provide some form of public goods, the logic 
of their operations will eventually lead to their demise.  
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observed in table 2.2 although population increases may have caused troops as shares of 
national populations to remain stable or decline.   
Table 2.3 shows that the Dutch Republic, for its small population, was very efficient in 
raising fiscal revenue compared to major European states and was the leader in Europe 
prior to the 1800s (Fritsschy, Hart, & Horlings, 2012; Hart, 1999; Pamuk, 2012). 
Table 2. 3 Per capital fiscal revenues in selected European countries (grams of silver) 
    1500/09 1550/59 1600/09 1650/59 1700/09 1750/59 1780/89 
Dutch Republic   76.2 114 210.6 189.4 228.2 
England  5.5 8.9 15.2 38.7 91.9 109.1 172.3 
France  7.2 10.9 18.1 56.5 43.5 48.7 77.6 
Spain  12.9 19.1 62.6 57.3 28.6 46.2 59 
Venice  27.5 29.6 37.5 42.5 46.3 36.2 42.3 
Austria      10.6 15.6 23 43 
Russia      6.3 14.9 26.7 
Prussia    2.4 9 24.6 53.2 35 
Ottoman Empire  5.6 5.8 7.4 8 9.1 7.1 
Poland   1.5 0.9 1.6 5 1.2 0.8 11.2 
Source: Broadberry (2013, p. 29) 
England on the other hand shows a persistent growth in fiscal revenue per capita and in 
contrast to most of the countries in the table never experienced a decline in revenue per 
capita. England’s rise and positive trajectory as the first modern fiscal state was indeed 
founded on its resilience in nurturing of fiscal institutions and consent for taxation from 
the citizens (see section 2.3.1). The civil war that took place in England played a huge part 
in this (Daunton, 2012).    
2.2.4 Traditional and modern fiscal states  
In addition to the fact that the Weberian definition of the state is too strong as highlighted 
in section 2.2, the difference between modern fiscal states and the traditional ones is not 
emphasised enough. In other words, the state has not evolved in a manner that allows it 
to be the same entity it was in the early 18th century but has fundamentally changed 
especially regarding its functions. He (2013, p.13) has argued that there is need for a 
differentiation between traditional fiscal states and modern fiscal states. The major 
difference comes in the fact that traditional states relied on taxes to merely meet current 
spending obligations while modern fiscal states use taxes as a “means to leverage more 
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financial resources through long term liabilities” (He, 2013, p. 13). The 1850s saw the rise 
of this modern state and since colonisation of Africa is generally a late 19th to early 20th 
century phenomenon, colonial states would take up some of the features of modern fiscal 
states and participate in the international monetary system (see Gardner, 2014). 
The modern fiscal state is thus defined by the capacity to centralise revenue collection, 
use of collected revenue to establish long term permanent debt, commitment to general 
welfare and some form of democratic representation (He, 2013, pp. 4–5). This modern 
state seems to differ from the traditional type in the establishment of long term debt and 
welfare commitments such as education and health while the traditional states 
experienced warfare much more often (Carneiro, 1970; Daunton, 2012; Tilly, 1990). 
Franchise expansion entails that modern states, at least the ideal types, have considerable 
degrees of legitimacy compared to the traditional types. These ideal types are what 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2016, p. 41) describe as the “basin of attraction” where the state 
and civil society coevolve in a synergetic or symbiotic relationship that produces inclusive 
political institutions. Dincecco (2015, p. 2) characterises these as states with strong veto 
players and parliamentary oversight and transparency. It is important to argue that there 
were no cut off points or clear cut transition from the traditional states to the modern 
states but the state evolved concurrently with other developments such as 
industrialisation and international monetary inventions such as the gold standard. This 
means that cases are crucial because each state changed when the conditions were ripe8 
into acquiring features of modern fiscal states.  
2.3 Stage theories, institutional frameworks, expenditure theories  
Various frameworks have been used to understand state formation throughout history. 
This section seeks to briefly review these theories and frameworks which are important 
for the discussion of the Cape Colony’s revenue, expenditure and public debt. The state 
can be explored from many angles and this section does not explore all of them but 
instead foregrounds the detailed account of fiscal development in the Cape Colony in 
chapters 3 to 6. Stage theories are important for the Cape because it went through many 
phases in the 19th century. Institutional frameworks are crucial to understand how the 
Cape handled the discovery of diamonds with its pre-existing institutional set up and the 
                                                 
8 These could be seen as the door step conditions identified by North et al. (2009) to explain transitions 
from limited access orders to open access orders.  
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effect this had on the further development of fiscal institutions. Public expenditure 
theories are also important in understanding general determinants of the growth in 
public expenditure and therefore what is applicable to the Cape case. 
2.3.1 Periodization and stage theories  
In a recent edited volume Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien (2012) have demonstrated through 
many cases of Eurasian fiscal history that a universal theory is impossible. What was 
logical in Asian fiscal regimes was not applicable to European regimes due to political 
realities and economic conditions. For some generic picture table 2.4 below does capture 
general features and trends endemic in different periods in the evolution of fiscal systems. 
Although stage theories are criticised they provide historical understanding of when 
states attained certain features. The transition from the traditional states to modern fiscal 
states becomes easy to observe when a general timeline of key developments is offered 
(Tilly, 1990). 
Table 2. 4 Evolution of fiscal systems 
Era/ Stage Period Characteristics  
Patrimonialism AD900- 1400 Urban militias, Feudal levies, 
Tribute to monarchies  
Brokerage 1400-1700 Mercenary forces, 
Independent capitalists 
provided loans, Tax farming  
Nationalisation  1700-1850 Mass armies and navies from 
nationals, Administrative 
structures, Fiscal 
centralisation, Limited 
independent contractors for 
fiscal and military purposes  
Specialisation  1850-2000s Bulk budgets for military and 
police, Strong division of 
labour, Representative 
institutions , Bigger role of 
state, e.g. education, health, 
judiciary, regulatory and 
adjudicative responsibilities  
Source: Tilly (1990, p. 29)  
This table does not capture all the dynamic history of fiscal systems and the paths of 
individual states varied. However, some common features do appear. Schumpeter, while 
investigating the end of the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire, argued that all states 
moved from a monarchical based domain state to a modern tax state in which 
governments focused on economic development while taxing citizens to obtain revenue 
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(Grant, 2013, p. 3). Building upon Schumpeter‘s work the Bonney-Ormrod model seeks to 
explain European history using a framework “of four prevailing types of fiscal systems, 
called tribute, domain, tax and fiscal state” (Bonney 1999, p. 13). These are stages which 
the states go through and Bonney and Ormrod simply added two more stages to 
Schumpeter’s two stage model. According to Bonney and Ormrod (1995), Schumpeter’s 
focus on the fiscal crises of states at the end of the First World War implied neglect of 
other variants of fiscal systems prevalent in Europe. Table 2.5 lists key features of each of 
the four types of fiscal states. 
Table 2. 5 Summary of the Bonney Ormrod model 
Characteristic  Tribute State Domain State  Tax State Fiscal State 
Public Finance  Plunder and 
extortion,  
Surplus produced 
by the colonised  
Surplus produced 
by domain or 
other regalia 
rights, 
Exploitation 
Increasing 
importance of 
taxation 
Precise planning 
of taxation with 
reference to the 
economy and 
public opinion 
Expenditure  Heavily related to scale of military efforts  Military efforts 
not dominant 
Reliance on booty and conquests to 
meet expenditure 
Increasing size of navies and armies, 
technological developments  
 Scaling down of 
household and 
military costs in 
relation to 
predicted income 
(except in 
emergencies). 
Escalating 
military costs 
during sustained 
warfare. Acute 
costs in debt 
servicing (other 
costs curtailed). 
Fiscal-military 
states, some gain 
super power 
status, Modern 
sophisticated 
states with 
considerable 
expenditures on 
health, social 
security, and 
other welfare 
related costs 
Source: Waris (2013, p. 34) 
What is clear from Tilley (1990), Bonney and Ormrod (1995) and even Schumpeter’s 
early work is that they were all agreeing that states evolve over time and take more 
responsibilities for more revenue raised. On the other hand, more responsibilities also 
caused the states to invest more in revenue capacity. According to Seligman (1895, p. 10):  
As long as the economic conditions are primitive, the social obligation to the 
ruling clan or state is conceived to be equal but as progress happens 
inequality becomes glaring and reform on taxation has to come in 
emphasising the ability to pay etc. 
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The rough equality which existed in the early hunter-gather societies was gradually 
replaced by a sophisticated capitalistic economic system which allowed some to go ahead 
while others remained behind. These stages are therefore useful in understanding what 
to expect in the structure of revenue and expenditure of the state. The finances of early 
colonial states such as those in North America differed from those of 19th century colonies 
let alone 20th century colonies (Webber & Wildavsky, 1986, p. 34). It would be unlikely 
that colonies would overtake the metropoles in terms of public finance institutional 
development. Certain taxes and spending items should not be expected in colonies before 
they were introduced in the metropoles.    
These different stages and periodization theories speak to the fact that what to expect 
from the state depends on the era in which that specific state was formed or existed. In 
trying to conceptualise the connection between political and economic development, 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) developed a framework that explains the institutional 
set-up of countries at different stages. They identified three main social orders namely 
foraging order (hunter-gatherer societies), limited access order and open access order. 
Limited access order or natural state refers to the time or period with a hierarchy of 
personal relationships among the powerful elite forming the basis of political 
organisation. Those outside the coalition only experience limited access to privileges, 
organisations and valuable resources (North et al., 2009). The open access order refers to 
the impersonal phase of economic and political developments when the opposite of the 
limited access order characteristics is true in typical advanced democracies. They argued 
that “Identity, which in natural states is inherently formed by interpersonal connections, 
becomes defined in open access orders by a set of impersonal characteristics. Impersonal 
categories of individuals, often called citizens, emerge. These categories allow people to 
interact over wide areas of social behaviour where none need to know the identity of their 
partners” (North et al,. 2009, p. 2).  
The limited access order is important for this study because the 19th century was 
dominated by personalist forms of public institutions. The state in this era with less 
competitive political systems was therefore not easily accessible even through 
impersonal merit based access. Cain and Hopkins (1986, p. 505) used the term 
‘gentlemanly capitalism’ to explain the importance of connections and coalitions which 
shaped economic progress. Cain and Hopkins’s arguments are similar to those of North et 
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al about the natural state or limited access order (LAO). Personal connections and class 
consciousness were key to the survival of gentlemanly capitalism and these attitudes 
were quite similar in the British colonies. Cain and Hopkins (1986, p. 504) argued that 
“the stress laid on the link between heredity and leadership … the prestige of birth, 
allowed an unusual degree of freedom of action and the landed elite had an authority 
beyond any precise professional or functional limits.” The authority of the elite and the 
underdeveloped market economy in the limited access order entailed that there were no 
strong countervailing institutions to limit privileges sought by the dominant coalitions. 
For instance writing on Transvaal’s gold mining-led economy in the late 19th century 
Denoon (1980, p. 119) argued that “the influence of capital continued to depend upon the 
mediating influence of individuals who had the ear (and the pocket) of decision-makers. 
If the buccaneering and personalist phase of mining capitalist development was doomed, 
it took a long time to disappear.”   
By limiting people with access to key organisations the limited access order reduces 
fighting amongst the few enjoying the economic rents. According to North et al. (2009, p. 
6), “Systematic rent-creation through limited access in a natural state is not simply a 
method of lining the pockets of the dominant coalition. It is the essential means of 
controlling violence”. The colonial territories were filled with people with a strong 
inclination towards rent seeking (O’Brien and De la Escosura, 1998, p. 98) who guarded 
and legislated the access to these economic rents. It is within this context of the 
importance of interpersonal connections and the buccaneering phase of capitalism in the 
19th century that state formation is to be understood. The discovery of minerals as a major 
economic windfall that coincided with limited access order institutions was important to 
the impetus towards either entrenching limited access or the transformation of the 
economy into an equitable one.  
The tenets of LAO are intuitive but applicability remains conceptually and analytically 
vague. For instance the proponents argue that “The limited access order appears to be the 
means by which all but a handful of societies have secured order and limited violence for 
the last 10,000 years” (North et al., 2007, p. 6). This means that only a handful of countries 
have moved out of the LAO phase and the broad application of the framework entails that 
one has to identify unique features which depicts LAO arrangements. For a colonial setup, 
it is almost a given that LAO arrangements prevailed and this study demonstrates this 
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through a) the mining magnates’ resistance of direct taxes thereby setting a precedent for 
the colony, b) the control of the mining regime by the elite to manage the resource rents, 
c) the continuous efforts to disenfranchise the black Africans thereby narrowing the 
responsibility of the state to a few and d) the hierarchical society based  on class and race 
creating a permanent  class abyss that persists to modern South Africa. Yet there are other 
angles which other theoretical lenses illuminate better. This study reveals that the 
complexity of state formation processes makes the different theoretical frameworks 
discussed above non-mutually-exclusive for explaining the Cape’s fiscal evolution. 
Theories of government expenditure and stage theories also have explanatory power and 
complement the LAO. Writings on the links between endowments and institutions are 
also important due to the centrality of diamond mining in the Cape. The next section 
briefly considers this literature.  
2.3.2 Resource endowment and institutions  
The Cape Colony’s diamond discovery provides a case where the nexus between resource 
endowment and institutional development can be explored. The brief analysis of these 
issues here foregrounds our analysis of the Cape in later chapters. The discovery of large 
deposits of mineral resources played an important role in the institutional development 
of many colonies. The timing of the discoveries was also important because discoveries 
which coincided with inclusive institutions often led to production friendly paths while 
discoveries which coincided with poor institutions tended towards grabber or extractive 
friendly paths (Mehlum et al., 2005). In the wake of discoveries of resources, the 
prevailing institutions matter for the prosperity or decline of a nation. This is what has 
been referred to as a ‘conditional resource curse’ and has been linked to reasons why 
nations fail (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The state is central to the long term 
economic development of any nation through ways in which it handles resource 
endowments among other roles. This is more applicable in colonies where sovereignty 
was negotiated and those colonies which managed to attain self-governance sooner were 
more able to use mineral discoveries to leverage their prosperity.   
The central thesis of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) is that that political institutions 
determine economic institutions by conferring de jure political power. Natural resource 
endowments have an indirect impact on the economy via institutions and it matters, 
therefore, whether a colony was a settler or non-settler colony (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
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2001). Prevailing political institutions determine the nature of resource and rent 
distribution. Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) argued that Latin America had huge-scale 
farms and minerals with weak institutions prone to abuse by the elite. This was contrary 
to North America where there was no tendency towards large farm ownership and where 
settlers were disposed toward equality in resource distribution. In many developing 
countries the discovery and handling of natural resources is often cited as the key 
example of poor economic performance emanating from poor institutions (Mehlum et al., 
2005). Examples include Nigeria, Bolivia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Zambia and Chile 
where resources have been shown to lead to suboptimal economic performance (Auty, 
1994; Gelb, 1988).  
Resource rich countries have also been linked to the ‘Dutch disease’ as a common 
explanation of why the countries experience economic stagnation or slow growth post 
mineral discovery. The Dutch disease phenomenon means that potential revenue and 
rents in the resource sectors lead to under-investment in other sectors (Torvik, 2001). 
During the nineteenth century, natural resource sectors were the driving sectors of most 
economies but the periphery countries, most of which were colonies, mainly produced 
resources for the industrialising core (see section 6.5 in chapter 6). The diversification 
away from extractive industries such as mining was in most cases slow and, given the 
centrality of resource exports, many of these countries experienced immiserating growth 
(Bhagwati, 1958). Given that rents were concentrated in the resource sectors, the states 
had to define property rights in a way that allowed them to obtain revenues. In most cases 
it was the rudimentary regulatory environment that shaped the exploitation of the 
natural resources in a biased manner (Davis& Huttenback, 1986). North (1981, p. 28) 
argued that efficiency in property rights is good for economic growth but leads to lower 
income for the ruling elite because of costs involved in “metering and collection of taxes” 
while granting a monopoly right reduces these costs drastically and is revenue 
maximising to the ruling elite.  
The public finance institutions are particularly important when considering the impact 
of discoveries of natural resources. In the presence of weak parliamentary institutions, 
political institutions are easily distorted to benefit the minority and an institutionally 
weak state cannot overcome this challenge. In fact, it is the weak state itself which can be 
the source of struggle for control of the resources rents, especially when it has failed to 
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define and protect property rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North, 1981). Mark 
Dincecco in The rise of effective fiscal states in Europe differentiates between ‘the old 
regime’ and the ‘effective states’ (Dincecco, 2015). The key features, fiscal centralisation 
and parliamentary oversight of what he referred to as effective states, are that they can 
implement a uniform tax system throughout their territories and that a veto player exists 
within the national government so that the gathered revenues are channelled efficiently 
without waste or corruption (Dincecco, 2015).  
Resource endowments and institutions were crucial for how revenue and expenditure 
policies led to specific development paths in colonial states. Extraction or grabber 
friendly institutions were found in some of the settler colonies which normally should 
have had inclusive institutions (Frankema and van Waijenburg, 2014). Chapter 6 reveals 
that through foreign borrowing the colonial state inevitably ‘served mammon’ because 
foreign capital and local businesses were the minority benefiting from the resources of 
the Cape and later from Transvaal’s gold fields. The underdeveloped institutions and the 
buccaneering and personalist phase of mining capitalism meant that a few individuals 
could be in control of the entire industry (Denoon, 1980). Cecil Rhodes’s De Beers 
Company and his agricultural interests were key examples of how a very large part of the 
economy could have been in the hands of a few during specific phases of the development 
process. The gold-maize alliance later in Transvaal (1900 onwards) was another example 
of elite control of major sectors of the economy (Trapido, 1971). Patronage relations 
within the ruling elite often meant that tenders were allocated to colleagues and private 
interests could be pushed in government policy through irregular means (Mosley, 1983). 
When key economic sectors such as mining are controlled by a minority, the development 
outcomes are favourable for those with access to state power. Mineral extraction took 
place before political institutions were fully developed in the colonies. In the face of such 
vulnerable political institutions, mineral discovery led to extractive growth (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2016). For instance, property rights development in the early colonial era 
was prone to capture by those in business who caused the defining of these rights to be 
beneficial to their private interests (Davis& Huttenback, 1986; North, 1989). 
2.3.3 Theories of growth in government expenditure  
Various stylised facts and theoretical explanations have been put forward to understand 
the growth in government expenditure. According to Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, p. 6), 
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government expenditure grew in the developed world from an average of 10% in the 
1870s to about 45% of GDP in 1996. This mirrored the evolution of economic thought 
from the classical thinking in the second half of the 19th century to the post WWII era, 
during which European countries were heavily influenced by social-democratic ideas. 
Government expenditure growth came from the growing belief that redistribution of 
wealth was supposed to be part of the legitimate function of the government (Tanzi & 
Schuknecht, 2000, p. 5). The social spending in the post-WWII period was also crucial 
because of the aftermath of the war destruction. Government expenditure is a key area of 
state formation because it is what the state does with the gathered revenue that partly 
determines its legitimacy. The size of the state itself is often measured by the scope of its 
responsibilities on public goods provisioning as well as the public wage bill.  
Putting war as the common cause of increase in government expenditure, Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961b) argue that the use of violence towards the establishment of external 
and internal order is a key leading determinant of rising government spending. They 
argue that large scale events such as wars leave governments with no option but to spend 
more and hence to mobilise more revenue. This is again in line with the truism that war 
made states. Peacock and Wiseman (1961b, p. 14) argue that “governments like to spend 
more money while citizens do not like to pay more taxes, and that governments need to 
pay some attention to the wishes of their citizens.” In their theory, there is no consensus 
about a desirable level of government expenditure and the limits of taxation. Nonetheless, 
there is an equilibrium until a disturbance occurs which can be any huge scale social 
disturbance such as a war (most common driver of increase in expenditure in history) or 
other natural disasters. Such large-scale social disturbances cause ratcheting-up of 
government expenditure onto a higher level that entails the emergence of a new level of 
tolerable taxes. Mkandawire (2010) argues that this is fiscal inertia, when taxes outlive 
their initial reasons, and it brings the government to a higher permanent level of 
expenditure.   
A key outcome of the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis is the social expenditure 
implications of major social disturbances. Once the war is over, the need for war 
reparations, war pensions and debt servicing is realised and through the “inspection 
effect” citizens start to tolerate higher taxes as they see the government put priority on 
social issues (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961, p. 14). The dynamics in the colonies were 
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slightly different because the metropolitan centres took responsibility for the financing 
of these huge scale social disturbances. For colonies and other countries on the periphery 
there was a type of ‘demonstration effect’ in operation: once rich-country governments 
started providing education and health care, spending on such items became more 
acceptable and more strongly demanded in developing countries as well. It also goes 
without saying that once a state is formed, what remains is growth of government which 
is primarily defined by the size of the bureaucracy and the level of public expenditure 
shares in GDP.   
The government expenditure trends in Britain, the USA and Sweden have often been used 
to demonstrate the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis. It is clear that the world wars had 
demonstrated similar effects on these nations’ respective levels of expenditure as shares 
of GNPs (Tullock, 2002, p. 1). The British case illustrates the Peacock and Wiseman 
hypothesis clearly because both WWI and WWII ratcheted government expenditure to 
new levels and in both cases it never went below its previous levels (figure 2.1). The US 
and Swedish cases also portrayed the same upward ratcheting spikes and stabilised levels 
different from the previous ones (Tullock, 2002, p. 1). According to Rowley and Tollison 
(1994, p. 127), the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis has never been falsified in about 
thirty years of research up to 1994. This is due to the fact that the hypothesis depicts the 
nature of public expenditure growth in a dynamic way. The Peacock and Wiseman 
hypothesis is powerful because it captures historical events as they are without 
attempting to make history linear (Rowley & Tollision, 1994, p. 125).  
Underlying the work of Peacock and Wiseman was the earlier work by Adolf Wagner. 
Wagner also explained the growth of government expenditure by stressing the law of 
increasing state activity. His central argument was based on the fact that among 
progressive peoples:  
Central government and local governments constantly undertake new 
functions, while they perform both old and new functions more efficiently 
and more completely. In this way economic needs of the people to an 
increasing extent and in a more satisfactory fashion, are satisfied by the 
Central and Local Governments (Vinod Sen, 2015, p. 19) 
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Figure 2. 1 British government expenditure as shares of GNP, 1870-2003 
 
Source: Tridimas (2014, p. 2)  
Wagner’s law time series analysis has been done for many countries and the approach 
has not been very useful because such studies simply focus on whether Wagner’s law is 
observed in a given country. Peacock and Scott (2000, p. 1) argued that much of the 
testing shows ignorance of Wagner’s original formulation “leading to misspecifications 
and obscure objectives in hypothesis testing”. The general argument of Wagner 
concerning the growing government expenditure has become a stylised fact and this 
study does not test it empirically because the general rise in government expenditure has 
been a norm in history.  
The expansion of the franchise has been decisive throughout history for the increase in 
government expenditures. Voters’ interests and demands compel political leaders to 
‘deliver’ their electoral promises when they enter office. Formally this has been analysed 
by Meltzer and Richard (1981). Their key argument was that:  
The size of government is determined by the welfare-maximising choice of a 
decisive individual. With majority rule the voter with median income among 
the enfranchised citizens is decisive. Voters with income above the decisive 
voter desire lower taxes and less income distribution. The spread of 
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franchise in the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries increased the 
numbers of voters with relatively low income. The position of the decisive 
voter shifted down the distribution of income, so taxes rose (Meltzer & 
Richard, 1981, p. 924). 
Thus, unlike Wagner, Meltzer and Richard (1981) emphasised inequality as the important 
factor rather than absolute poverty. The more people have incomes below that of the 
median voter the more pressure government receives for redistributive expenditure. The 
colonial franchise in the 19th century was limited but the limited democracy which 
prevailed began to push the governments towards the wishes of those who had voting 
rights. With the franchise limited to the minority, the growth of government expenditure 
was limited to their needs. With regards to 20th century Africa, Mkandawire (2010, p. 
1651) spoke of a ‘racist welfare state’ for most of African colonies in the 20th century as 
they considered only the welfare of the white settlers and ignored the black African 
majority. The 19th century Cape Colony’s franchise legislations formed the foundation of 
this racial stratification of South Africa which culminated in the 20th century apartheid 
(see section 3.4).  
2.4 Europe, Asiatic and North American experiences in the evolution of states  
With the acknowledgements of diversity in the paths to modern fiscal systems in 
literature (Bonney, 2012; Yun-Casalilla, 2012), it is important to briefly review key 
aspects of state formation in a few countries. England is a key example used in state 
formation literature but for this study it is important since it was the metropolitan centre 
for the Cape Colony. Using the existing literature, this section covers some aspects of state 
formation and more details on England than other cases is warranted since developments 
there were crucial for its colonies. Other cases will illustrate the diversity of the state 
formation processes at the same time showing that, over time, convergence on key 
aspects of the state such as permanent public debt was achieved (He, 2013). The need for 
self-defence and security is illustrated by all the cases discussed in this section as 
fundamental in the state formation process.  This is where colonial state formation 
appears to be different since the imperial authority financed the defence of the colonies. 
If public debt became a permanent feature of the state because of war related expenses 
in Europe different mechanisms worked to generate public debt in colonies.  
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2.4.1 England as the leader of state formation  
This section discusses England as a prime example or leader in the consolidation of 
desirable state institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016). What stands out is the strong 
legitimacy that emerges because of the co-evolution of state and society in an interrelated 
progression. To use Evans’s phraseology, the state was autonomously embedded within 
the society (Evans, 1995). The composition of state revenue, expenditure and public debt 
will be briefly discussed because England was crucial to the Cape since the latter was part 
of the British Empire. The anticipation is that the Cape will portray similar trends and 
patterns in its public finances since most of its state institutions had the British character. 
The section will start by looking at state elements identified in the definitions before 
moving to the composition of revenue and expenditure. 
Between 1272 and 1307, under Edward I the increasing costs of war meant that public 
taxation had to be the key source of war expenditure outlays (Ormrod, 1999, p. 20). There 
was a shift as the monarch stopped relying on his own resources such as accumulated 
treasures and agricultural income. While the English fiscal state sought legitimacy 
through consent during  the Middle Ages in the era of the charters initiated by Magna 
Carta (Daunton, 2012, p. 116; Ormrod, 1999, p. 25), significant revenue was obtained 
through coercive means from the tallages of Jews. The Jews suffered coercive revenue 
extraction practices since the purely British civil society was resistant and was avoided 
by the monarch. For instance, the royal demands upon Jews grew from £13 333 in 1241 
to £40 000 in 1250 and Jewish expulsion in 1290 also meant a loss of this fiscal revenue 
(Ormrod, 1999, p. 25). While these tallages were not exclusively directed to war 
expenditure, substantial amounts went into extractive capacity building such as the 
tallages imposed for King John’s expedition into Ireland in 1219.  
According to O’Brien and Hunt (1999, p. 55) the period before 1660 can be referred to as 
the period of fiscal pluralism in England because there was no single authority accounting 
for and receiving the king’s revenues; this was done by boroughs, shires and cities. The 
era of a centralised fiscal system, a critical feature of fiscal states, had not arrived but war 
related needs had to be met. The driving force for some form of accountability by close 
monitoring and assessing revenue was the need to cater for the kingdoms’ armed forces 
(O’Brien & Hunt, 1999, p. 55). According to Daunton (2012, p. 116) the parliament started 
meeting every year from 1688 and England was the first nation to make its financial 
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statement publicly visible. This had far reaching consequences because the monopoly on 
the use of violence, to use the Weberian formulation, was established earlier in England 
with considerably more legitimacy than anywhere else.  
The fiscal capacity building from 1688 to 1815 continued to be “overwhelmingly military 
in form but devoted in large part to defence of the domestic economy from external 
aggression and to securing colonies and markets overseas for British industry and 
commerce” (O’Brien & Hunt, 1999, p. 65). Taxes alone were no longer sufficient for 
England’s imperial ambitions and another key feature of fiscal states had to be devised – 
public debt. The coercive capacity had to be strong not only for the English economy but 
also for the defence of its overseas territories whenever the need arose and the 
importance of public debt and even external loans became apparent. Ormrod argued that 
going back to the 1340s the English Crown depended on a series of Italian merchant banks 
and the large scale nature of these loans meant that they were out of proportion to the 
real value of the taxes (Ormrod, 1999, p. 36). Daunton (2012, p. 125) argued that the core 
strength of the developing British fiscal system in its early phase was the ‘miscible’9 
collaborations between the landed and moneyed interests (i.e. merchants, traders and 
industrialists). These could easily veto the state during parliamentary sessions against 
defaulting on its credit because any fall in the state’s credit worthiness often spilled over 
to them as well since they also relied on debt.  
With the limit of borrowing and the extraordinary revenue requirements which were 
realised during the height of the Napoleonic wars, England under William Pitt introduced 
the income tax in 1799 (Atkinson, 2004, p. 125; Daunton, 2012, p. 130). This has been 
termed the ‘tax that beat Napoleon’ and while this may be exaggerating, the income tax 
combined with internal and external borrowing was a major reason England was 
triumphant. Daunton (2012, p. 128) stressed that Napoleon distrusted debt and never 
managed to successfully impose extraordinary taxes and as a result “ England out-taxed, 
out-borrowed and out-gunned the French during the wars.” Although it was introduced 
as an extraordinary source of revenue for the war, the income tax came to be the key 
feature of the British fiscal state from 1842 onwards and it became desirable for other 
reasons such as its progressive nature compared to other taxes such as excises which 
were falling heavily on the working class and producers (Daunton, 2012, p. 130). Out of 
                                                 
9 In the field of chemistry, any two liquids are miscible if they completely dissolve in each other.  
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the need for war financing, in other words through coercive capacity building, a key 
feature of the Britain’s modern fiscal state was discovered – income tax.  
Overall, major tax revenue (table 2.6) in Britain from the 18th and 19th century was 
comprised of customs, excise, stamps, post office and land related taxes among others 
(Daunton, 2001, 2012; Hartwell, 1981; Tames, 2005). These are shown in table 2.6 below 
with the respective percentage shares of total revenue.  In many instances no systematic 
data are available to cover the period of interest, 1800-1900. However, key trends are 
observable with the available figures in table 2.6. The prominence of the customs and 
excise taxes is clear from the table and as percentages of total tax revenue these two 
sources never declined below 45%. Unlike other nations in Europe, the British wages 
were comparatively higher (Allen, 2011; Goldstone, 1996) from the late 18th century to 
the early 19th century making such a reliance on excises feasible. The advent of the 
Napoleonic war caused the customs and excises as major tax revenue sources to decline 
from 65 % to about 58% but from the 1820s after the war these two sources rose to 71% 
(Atkinson, 2004; Hartwell, 1981). 
 Table 2. 6 England’s public revenue sources, £ millions (1790-1909) 
Year  
Customs 
and 
excise 
(£) % 
Land 
and 
assessed 
taxes (£) % 
Property 
& income 
taxes (£) % 
Death 
duties 
(£) % Rest (£) % 
1790-9 13.7 65 3.6 17 0.2 1   3.5 17 
1800-9 29.6 59 4.9 10 5.6 11   10.2 20 
1810-19 40.8 58 8 11 11.1 16   10.3 15 
1820-9 41.2 71 6.5 11     10.5 18 
1830-9 38.2 74 4.7 9     8.7 17 
1840-9 37.3 68 4.4 8 3.3 6   10.1 18 
1850-9 39.3 63 3.6 6 8.8 14   10.5 17 
1860-9 42.4 62 3.3 5 8.6 12   14.4 21 
1870-9 46.1 61 2.7 4 6.7 9 5.4 7 14.1 19 
1880-9 45.8 53 2.9 3 12.3 14 7.3 9 17.8 21 
1890-9 51.5 49 2.5 2 15.2 15 12 12 23.1 22 
1900--9 68 45 2.6 2 31.1 21 18 12 30.9 20 
Source: Tames (2005, p. 124) 
The reliance on customs and excise taxes also confirm that the British economy was 
heavily reliant on its growing trade and the booming manufacturing industries which 
employed more and more people implying higher yields for excise taxes. This was not 
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different from the colonial experiences as the Cape Colony reveals in chapter four. Even 
up to 1875, the dominance of customs and excises is evident when the introduction of the 
death duty took place.  
Over time, the burden of insufficient revenue was ameliorated by the ability of the British 
government to borrow especially for its extra ordinary demands during the war periods. 
The public debt system had already been institutionalised through the parliament before 
the 19th century in Britain and borrowing played an important role in the British fiscal 
system. The end of the Napoleonic war marked the end of the incessant rise of debt 
(Daunton, 2012, p. 128). An interesting feature of public debt is the sense that it 
continuously increased and with more wars came more debt as it was the only means 
available for such extraordinary war circumstances. In eighteenth century England, debt 
servicing and military spending absorbed more than 80% of public expenditure (table 2.7 
below), leaving the remainder for civil government expenditure (Webber & Wildavsky, 
1986, p. 289).  
On the expenditure side, the industrial revolution in Britain had the consequence of 
bringing people into towns, initially dominated by ramshackle housing prone to health 
hazards due to poor sanitation. The 1831-32 cholera epidemics in England were 
important in bringing consciousness of and the need for public health programmes. This 
led to the formation of the Public Health Act of 1848, which was a milestone in proactive 
rather than reactive public healthcare provisioning (Fee & Brown, 2005, p. 866). The 
corollary of this Act was that the government had to commit to the creation of a 
permanent department of health that required fiscal commitments each year. According 
to Chantrill (2015), healthcare expenditure rose dramatically from 1865 onwards. Table 
2.7 shows the general patterns of England’s public expenditure. 
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Table 2. 7 England’s expenditure patterns, £ millions (1790-1909) 
Year  
National debt 
(cumulative)(£) 
Debt 
servicing 
(£) % 
Military 
expenditure(£) % 
Civil 
government 
(£) % 
Education 
(£) % 
1790-9 426.6 11.6 35 19.4 58 1.9 6   
1800-9 599 20 33 35.3 59 4.6 6 0.1 0 
1810-9 844.3 28.5 35 47 58 5.5 7 0.2 0 
1820-9 801.3 30.4 59 15.7 30 5.6 11 0.1 0 
1830-9 788.2 28.9 58 13.1 26 4.9 10 0.1 0 
1840-9 794.3 29.2 57 15.1 30 6.1 12 0.3 1 
1850-9 808.8 28.4 47 21.9 37 7.9 13 0.7 1 
1860-9 751 26.6 41 26.7 41 10.7 16 1.3 2 
1870-9 736.1 26.2 40 24.3 37 13.5 20 2.6 4 
1880-9 623.8 27.7 36 28 37 18.7 24 4.9 6 
1890-9 598.7 23.6 26 36.4 40 20.2 22 9.2 10 
1900-9 716.1 23.2 16 79.1 55 30.2 21 14.9 10 
Source: Tames (2005, p.124) 
The expansion of public expenditure was driven by various needs and the availability of 
resources as the economy grew. The steady rise of education and civil government 
expenditure is evident in table 2.7 above as government activities expanded towards the 
end of the 19th century. Education, as a key category of social expenditure, did not receive 
much attention in the first half of the nineteenth century. From 1833 the central 
government only made grants which were meant to help and encourage voluntary church 
schools to keep operating. It was only in 1856 that the department of education was 
created (Abramovitz & Eliasberg, 1957, p. 15). Before 1890, as long as the education 
expansion was dependent on government, it remained limited to elementary schooling – 
secondary and technical education only came after 1890 (Abramovitz & Eliasberg 1957, 
p.15). West (1975, p. 3) argued that Gladstone, chancellor of the exchequer, was 
concerned about the possibility of extinguishing private effort in educational advances by 
using the exchequer to fund public schools. Hence, he resisted the introduction of public 
school funding. In general the approach to state expenditure tended to be more 
reactionary than proactive. Even the introduction of the national health insurance system 
in Britain after the Second World War reflected the extent to which war-time bombing 
had brought society to accept hospital services as a necessity of life (Peacock & Wiseman 
1961, p.XVIII).  
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In the welfare sector of British expenditure, poor relief became the main social security 
spending aspect in the nineteenth century and can be regarded as the expanded “ancestor 
of modern welfare” (Lindert, 2004, p. 34). In the very early years of poor relief, it was the 
responsibility of churches to cater for the poor through alms and the state had no role in 
mitigating the condition of the poor. According to Lindert (2004, p.41), England instituted 
laws against “…vagabonds, rogues, disorderly and idle people and the state prohibited 
beggary…” This is confirmed by Gardner (2012, p. 33), who argued that the British state 
had a minimal role to play on the welfare front under the Victorian norms of political 
economy and the thrifty Gladstonian ideas concerning the public finances. Besides steps 
to introduce poor relief, the British system remained a minimalist state in the 19th 
century.  
2.4.2 France as a less successful case compared to England  
The major difference between England and France is the issue of legitimacy which was 
crucial not only for types and levels of taxes imposed but spilled over to the public 
borrowing reputation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016; Bonney, 2012; Johnson and Koyama, 
2016). France had the largest population of tax payers in Europe but it had the most 
frequent fiscal bailouts of all European powers – France’s fiscal paradox10 (Bonney, 2012, 
p. 93). Venality of office (tax farming and outsourcing of revenue raising) was a main 
source of the French revenue, peaking between 1620-1634, and this became pervasive 
because most officials managing the king’s finances during war became holders of these 
offices wielding unchecked powers (Bonney, 1999b, 2012). The tax farming done through 
these former military chiefs meant that there was no trust built between the state and the 
society over a long time because the tax system leaned towards repression. These local 
power holders had a huge negative influence on fiscal centralisation in France. Without 
revenue centralisation, a key component of state formation, the French state remained 
legally and fiscally weak for a long time. In support of this, Johnson and Koyama (2016, p. 
5) argued that “the French experience of state building differed from the English 
experience. In the face of far greater resistance from local power holders, it was 
significantly more protracted and drawn out”.  
                                                 
10 According to Johnson and Koyama (2016, p. 5) France was large with heterogeneous areas and 
fragmentation of political voice whereas England as a small area “was able to develop fiscal capacity in such 
a precocious manner due to the relative homogeneity of its people and geography. Where there was more 
initial heterogeneity, the state building process developed very differently. England was able to successfully 
build state capacity in part because of its higher level of initial cohesion.”  
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The exigencies of wars and threats of wars were also a crucial factor for France’s fiscal 
system. The army grew from a mere 10 000 men in 1610 to about 400 000 men in 1690 
mainly “because of the need to fight in several European theatres of war simultaneously” 
(Bonney, 2012, p. 98). According to Henneman Jnr (1999, p. 101), state finances in France 
before 1789 generally were royal finances and the medieval monarchy was only part of 
many entities which existed with rudimentary state-like features. Coercive capacity 
building thus was more crucial in a place of so many competing jurisdictions and the area 
under the royal control kept expanding and contracting (Henneman Jnr, 1999). External 
threats such as the capture of John II in 1356 had a huge effect on coercive capacity 
building because the indirect means of soliciting revenue was replaced by a regular and 
direct permanent form of taxation (Henneman Jnr, 1999, p. 112). The reason for this was 
that the king had to be ransomed often and there was need to finance defensive wars. 
Royal ransom taxes were the heaviest form of tax imposed in the French kingdom over a 
long time (Henneman Jnr, 1999, p. 117). A general point to be made, even shown by table 
2.3, is that in the 16th and 17th century France, “armies expanded and became businesses” 
(Tilly, 1990, p. 79). With mighty armies and lack of fiscal capacity due to political 
fragmentation the French state building was unbalanced because of poor fiscal resources 
and lack of access to public borrowing.  
The wars from Charles V to Charles VIII and the decision by Charles VIII to invade Italy in 
1494 were facilitated by the development of an entrenched fiscal state and the state army 
on full salary (Henneman Jnr, 1999, p. 120). According to Bonney (1999b, p. 162) the 
finance ministry in France was only a seventeenth century phenomenon and the “motor 
of fiscal change in France, as for all main European monarchies, was expenditure on war.” 
Like the income tax in Britain, Louis XIV had promised that extraordinary taxes, mostly 
direct taxes  “were a temporary measure for the war but when faced with huge debt and 
interest payments he declared in 1715 that the new taxes had to be continued until the 
debt was paid” (Bonney, 1999a, p. 132). Unlike England, France’s finances were chaotic 
and the first public financial statement made in 1781 was met with disbelief and 
scepticism (Daunton, 2012, p. 116).  Henneman Jnr (1999, p. 108) argued that, due to the 
lack of transparency, the French people resisted taxes except for the times of outright 
wars when they saw the need. By contrast, England had an orderly and legitimate fiscal 
system for a century before 1781.  
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The failure to consolidate fiscal capacity in France was partly because of the failure by the 
state to create a positive reputation on public debt as well as general mistrust from the 
French people. Bonney (2012, p. 99) argued that internally, instruments of credit were 
underdeveloped and the money in circulation did not increase. This points to the fact that 
the French had not only difficulties in borrowing from the outside but also their financial 
and monetary systems were under-developed. According to Daunton (2012, p. 121), 
France was regarded as a risky nation and it paid a default premium on its borrowing and 
this was justified by “partial defaults in 1720, 1759, 1770, 1788 and 1789.” Financial 
crises were endemic both in France’s ancient-regime and in revolutionary France. Debt 
rescheduling operations had a long history as well and this is shown by the operations of 
1598, 1634, 1648, 1661, 1720, 1770 and 1797 (Bonney, 1999a, p. 162). These financial 
difficulties forced France into pervasive coercive means such as forced loans, selling of 
offices and brutal tax farming which contributed to the resistance from the nobility and 
tax payers (Daunton, 2012, p. 114; Hart, 1999, p. 309). In pursuit of coercive capacity in 
the face of financial crisis, France entered into an alliance with Spain. As a result of this 
alliance the British navy disrupted the Atlantic trade which was crucial for France’s 
customs and other remittances from America (Gelabert, 1999, p. 237). Showing the 
importance of the trade and remittances from America, Webber and Wildavsky (1986, p. 
271) reported that between 1500 and 1650 “ France imported 180 tons of gold and 16000 
tons of silver.” Without such a crucial source of fiscal revenue later in the late 1700s, 
France’s Napoleon could not stand against Britain which was strengthening and 
monopolising trade with its colonies (Engerman, 2007, p. 42).  
Fiscal strength strengthened the Bourbon monarchy for the first time since the Bourbon 
Restoration (1814) and the main taxes levied were indirect taxes. This was mainly 
because Louis XVIII kept his promises made in the Verona Declaration which stressed 
that no tax was to be established unless it had gone through the votes of the chambers 
and was allowed by the king (Bonney, 1999b, p. 166). A crucial aspect of this was that the 
King had to instil trust and loyalty to the officeholders, nobles and higher clergy who were 
a significant part of the fiscal capacity building.  
Napoleon Bonaparte distrusted debt and had a very strict monetary policy. He rejected 
paper money during the Revolution in favour of traditional rectitude (Bonney, 2012, p. 
106). According to Daunton (2012, p. 130), Napoleon “thought that Britain’s reliance on 
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debt was to be its downfall – a gnawing worm which will lead to disaster and he regarded 
financiers as the scourge and lepers of the nation.” Indirect taxes, unlike direct taxes, 
played an influential role in state revenues during the Napoleon wars because they could 
be manipulated without parliamentary controls. In the 19th century, the fiscal regime 
went through changes because the political realm changed three times; “three 
Revolutions, two coups d’etat with three types of regimes being monarchical, imperial and 
republican” (Bonney, 2012, p. 107). Fiscally, from 1815 to the 1830s, a key development 
was the growth of public debt which quadrupled from 1.272 million livres to 4.627 million 
in 1830. This period shows that France was catching up to other fiscal states such as 
Britain which had had public debt as a permanent feature of its fiscal system more than a 
century back. France’s example, compared to Britain, shows that when a state evolves 
without trust from the citizens, it encounters more difficulties and it becomes difficult to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of the fragmented civil society.11 
2.4.3 The Moghul Empire and British India  
The Moghul Empire existed in India between 1500 and 1757 when it got weaker and 
therefore was replaced by the official rule of the British East India Company (BIEC) which 
ruled India from 1757 to 1858. The British crown took over the rule of India from 1858 
until its independence in 1947. The Moghul Empire and British India (under the company 
and Crown) offer an important case of how fiscal capacity building changed when the 
British took over from the Moghul imperial system. It is also important in the sense that 
it offers an example of how fiscal and coercive capacity was built under colonial 
conditions (both company rule 1757-1857 and crown rule, from 1858 onwards) and 
hence provide an important case of some form of colonial fiscal capacity building.  
The Cape Colony having been under the Dutch company and later the British authority 
mirrors the Indian development because the BIEC relinquished power to the British 
authorities. At the crucial time of its existence, 1850-1914, the British Empire was 
dominated by India (85% of the Empire’s population) in terms of demographics (Offer, 
1993, p. 227). According to Richards (2012, p. 410) there was a continuity between the 
Moghul fiscal system and the British system under the company and imperial rule. 
                                                 
11 The term ‘embedded autonomy’ was used by Evans (1995) and is useful in thinking about such state-
society coevolution which led to institutionalisation of channels of policy negotiations between the state 
and society. State-society co-evolution also allows a culture of negotiations that makes a virtuous circle of 
broad coalitions possible (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016, p. 42). 
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Tribute, in the form of coins, was the central form of taxes and all the Moghul Empire’s 
subordinate principalities had to pay it. This differentiates the Mogul empire from 
Tokugawa in Japan and the Ming and Qing dynasties in China which relied heavily on taxes 
paid in kind (Ellinwood, 1998; Richards, 2012).  
Territorial aggrandisement was the key source of revenue for the Moghul Empire and at 
its peak in the early 18th century it grew from 150 million people in early 1800 to about 
193 million people in 1859 (Richards, 2012, p. 411). The productivity of the Indian 
agriculture spurred each successive regime due to high levels of surplus until the late 19th 
century when Malthusian constraints started to set in. The British conquest, under the 
auspices of the British East India Company, between 1757 and 1859 put India on a form 
of fiscal militarism which was a strong form of coercive capacity building (Ellinwood, 
1998). Military needs drove much of taxation and were the greatest part of public 
expenditure. Until 1833, profit-maximisation was the key goal for  the BIEC while a great 
army secured the territory from external threats (Richards, 2012, p. 439). The period 
between 1757 and 1859 has few years in which the British East India and the British 
armies did not engage in “internal pacification campaigns or external wars” (Richards, 
2012, p. 417). Ellinwood (1998, p. 179) emphasises this extra-ordinary need for a strong 
fiscal military state by arguing that the Indians were perceived to be unreconciled with 
the notion of British domination.  
Under the British East India Company, profits and shareholder dividends drove the logic 
of the fiscal state which was very minimal and extractive in nature. Offer (1993, p. 228) 
attested to this when he argued that “Britain kept the Indian market forcibly open for 
certain classes of British exports. India ran a chronic trade deficit with Britain, which 
made a big contribution to Britain's balance of payments”. This was against the backdrop 
of India bearing the cost of the British rule in the Indian territories. India subsidised the 
British Empire by paying for Indian and British troops on campaigns to keep India and 
the outlying territories in check (Offer, 1993). With no significant investment in 
infrastructure the Indian economy remained a wealth extraction enclave for the British 
Empire.  
All fiscal resources secured through various taxes were meant for security and defence. 
The Sepoy Mutiny (an uprising against the British rule) in 1857 was, among other causes 
such as those of a religious, political and cultural nature, partly caused by unfair and heavy 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
 
taxes being charged on land by the British East India Company. This was against the fact 
that the BEIC officials and military officers were well catered for in terms of higher 
salaries while surplus revenue was extracted from all territories (Richards, 2012, p. 439). 
Offer argued that with respect to heavy taxes and heavy expenditure on military, “An 
independent India might have spent the same or more, but it was not independent, and 
had no liberty to defend itself. It paid to support an alien sovereignty” (Offer, 1993, p. 
228). It was only in the post Sepoy Mutiny period that normal government expenditures 
such as observed in non-company governments were increased and for the first time an 
increase was made towards public buildings, roads, bridges and public works in general 
(Richards, 2012, p. 441). These major changes were brought because the British crown 
was trying to avoid further insurrections and to bring legitimacy to their rule after a 
century of extractive BIEC practices.  
2.4.4 China from 1300-1911  
The Ming dynasty fell around 1645 after its rule from the 1300s and paved the way for 
the Qing dynasty which ruled until 1911. Before  the 1850s the state, under both the Ming 
and Qing, was able to supply security and order to a place as large as Europe (Wong, 2012, 
p. 354). The coercive capacity of the Chinese dynasties was centred on the contributions 
from peasants both in monetary form and in kind through army recruits and labourers 
recruited from the country side. According to Deng (2012, p. 339), the Qing dynasty soon 
after taking power linked all previously existing walls into one line of defence making 
China the only walled empire in history. While not many great wars were fought, the 
Chinese empires were kept together by threats of nomadic invasion and raids and the 
peasants were fully aware that they had to support the state in terms of tax (mostly in 
kind with items such as clothes and food for the army) (Deng, 2012, p. 340). Wittfogel 
(1957) in Oriental despotism highlights the importance of agriculture for the hydraulic 
state12 in the Asiatic world, of which China was a dominant player, with the extreme level 
of power that entailed that citizens who did not serve as bureaucrats were merely slaves 
of the state.  
Besides the need for external security, the fiscal systems of the Chinese dynasties were 
driven by the need to constantly expand the empire in all directions, collecting revenue 
                                                 
12 Wittfogel (1957) argued that societies under this system were controlled by the manipulation of water 
supply and despotic states held absolute power by controlling the water sources. 
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mostly in kind from its huge population (Deng, 2012, p. 342). Army food and supplies 
received the lion’s share of these collections while the rest went to the bureaucratic 
system which was vertically integrated and efficient for administering the affairs of the 
state (Wong, 2012, p. 376). The coercive capacity in China’s dynasties was remarkable 
but it came at the cost of a proper strategy for economic progress and tended to be inward 
looking (Landes, 2006). In contrast Japan, after the Meiji restoration and after its victory 
over Russia, moved quickly to secure international capital, mainly on the London capital 
markets, which supplemented and altered the history of its meagre income from taxes 
(Nakabayashi, 2012, p. 379). 
According to Vries (2001, p. 432) upward social mobility was impossible and there was 
no increase in demand for status goods in China as compared to Europe. This was further 
compounded by the fact that Chinese dynasties up to 1911 had no Chinese mercantilism. 
The Chinese did not have overseas territories and colonies and “In the 19th century the 
Chinese would live to regret that” (Vries, 2001, p. 439). Landes (2006) aptly summed it 
up by arguing that when the Chinese saw Europe growing and industrialising, “At first 
China was unbelieving and contemptuous. Later it became increasingly anxious and 
frustrated.” Broadberry (2013, p. 2) also emphasised the importance of capital 
accumulation in Europe rather than in the Asian countries, China in particular, as a key 
determinant in the great divergence narrative.  
Key features of the Chinese state were the institutionalisation of the low per capita tax 
regime, bias towards balanced budget, sophisticated bureaucracy and Confucian values 
(Deng, 2012, p. 349). These created a politically strong coercive capacity but the economic 
and therefore fiscal capacity was limited in the long run. It would seem that China’s great 
empires quickly faded into primitiveness, “mere succession of ephemera and indifference 
to science and technology” (Landes, 2006). There was economic stagnation, mostly driven 
by rural industries (Pomeranz, 2008, p. 84) compared to the fast growing and 
industrialising Europe. According to Goldstone (1996, p. 3) the Chinese technological 
adoption was behind the Japanese one by half a century and Confucian customs kept 
women at home while their counterparts in Europe worked in cotton factories. This laid 
bare the long term deficiency of China’s total power as a coercive apparatus that lacked a 
long term economic strategy for the globalising world. Considering Tilly’s title Coercion, 
Capital and European States, the Chinese fiscal system did not get the Capital aspect right 
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while they had coercion in the extreme cases only paralleled by the Soviet Union during 
its feudalistic ‘golden era’ (1600-1800).  
Despite being a strong coercive system, the Chinese state was politically inflexible and 
economically it remained primitive for a long time. In his Understanding the Process of 
Economic Change, North (2005) emphasises the need for flexibility in the institutional 
framework – adaptive efficiency. The Chinese system locked itself into a low and inflexible 
“equilibrium between the elite and the peasants, national defence and political legitimacy, 
between rent seeking and Confucian self-discipline” (Deng, 2012, p. 349). The reality of 
this is that with reliance on taxes in kind, fiscal capacity was limited because the bulk of 
rural peasants were not part of the cash economy and this made it difficult for the state 
to collect revenue. In his general formulation North (1981, p. 28) argued that efficiency in 
property rights is good for economic growth but leads to lower income for the ruling elite 
because of costs involved in “metering and collection of taxes” while granting a monopoly 
right reduces these costs drastically and is revenue maximising to the ruling elite. The 
Chinese empire’s ruling elite amassed wealth but at the expense of efficient property 
rights and economic growth. 
2.4.5 Colonial states as ‘artificial states’ – American example  
The ‘natural states’ were identified by North et al. (2009) as the very first states to 
develop limited access order institutions. I use the term ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’ in a 
different way here. The fact that colonial states did not occur naturally as in sovereign 
territories entails artificialness in some sense. The colonial state was imposed and the 
logic of its operations was limited by local resistance, an imperial agenda and the desires 
of the colonists. To the indigenous people it was an ‘alien state’ (Booth and Frankema 
2017, p. 14). The colonial state was thus not ‘organic’ and the North American example 
shows that the features of the colonial state were an outcome of negotiations between 
the settlers and the mother country. In essence, the colonial state was an outcome of trial 
and error as interests of the settlers collided with those of the Imperial authorities and 
local resistance from the original peoples.  
The central argument about colonial institutions and therefore fiscal institutions is that 
territories with benign disease environments became settler colonies in which good 
institutions were established. While the non-settler colonies have been regarded to have 
extremely extractive fiscal institutions, the recent debates have focused on the fact that 
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even some of the so called settler colonies did not have benign institutions after all 
(Austin, 2008b; Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014; Huillery, 2014). Good institutions, 
those promoting equality, property rights and economic growth, have been found mostly 
in dominions namely New Zealand, Australia, the United States, Canada, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 1376). The dominions were not perfect but they had 
characteristics which propelled them in directions with positive effects on long term 
economic development. Another key difference in certain colonial territories is whether 
a company was responsible for a particular colony and this was important for the 
institutional outcomes and long run development. Examples of these companies were the 
Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company. Companies had 
monopolistic and profit orientation while colonies with established colonial governments 
could focus on local development on a broader scale (Fourie et al., 2013; Richards, 2012).  
The present study is on the Cape Colony as a British dominion and hence the focus 
towards British colonies and towards their fiscal institutions is inevitable and justifiable. 
American colonies are highlighted here as illustrative of a negotiated fiscal terrain 
between local colonial leaders and the British colonial office. The stark difference 
between Latin America and North America, in terms of fiscal systems in particular and 
the overall institutional framework in general, depended on the fact that the British 
favoured their home grown approaches to public finance (Grafe & Irigoin, 2006, p. 46). 
Engerman (2007, p. 42) supports the general institutional transplantation when he 
argues that:  
Most of the settlers of northern American colonies were originally from the 
British Isles. The proprietors from the British Isles were used to enjoying 
advanced institutions of property rights, functional money markets, banks 
and paid labour. As a result, they were keen to transform the colonial 
institutions towards modernity… For instance, the English common law was 
established in the colonies by the time of the revolutionary war. 
While the British authorities did impose taxation on British America, the colonists 
themselves, with their provincial and local governments, did  impose higher revenue 
producing taxes amongst themselves, and even imposed greater property rights 
restrictions, in order to allow themselves some form of fiscal autonomy (North, 1989, p. 
1329; Sokoloff & Zolt, 2007, p. 87). Restrictive fiscal institutions, which included heavy 
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import duties in the Townshend Acts, were thus another pushing factor in the American 
Revolution since colonists resented control from the British authorities (Rabushka, 2008; 
Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000a). This tallies with Adam Smith’s view that while the 
“American colonies were an asset, governing them from London was folly” (quoted in 
Offer 1993, p.215). This is so even when considering the fact that British authorities 
encouraged people to move to the new American colonies giving these territories better 
bargaining power against the British authorities and a tendency towards desire for self-
governance and fairer institutions. This is in sharp contrast with Spanish America in 
which immigration was tightly controlled and as a result powerful elite with large scale 
farms emerged with proclivities towards inequality enhancing institutions (Engerman & 
Sokoloff, 1994). 
Factor endowments such as fertile soil and mineral resources, meant that the North 
American colonies became evenly populated (Engerman, 2007; Engerman & Sokoloff, 
1994; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000b). Initial geography mattered, not regarding how and 
where people settled, but only because of  its impact on institutions (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). This is a crucial factor for the development of fiscal institutions both at local and 
central government level. Unlike the American colonists who were establishing 
themselves, the Dutch East India company and the British East India Company tended to 
treat their territories as wealth extraction enclaves or rentier capital outposts (O’Brien, 
1988, p. 181). The small number of settlers in Spanish America meant that there was no 
strong voice for representative institutions and the elite-peasant/slave divide kept 
increasing (Alston & Ferrie, 2007).  
Trade taxes could have been a very important source of fiscal revenue in the American 
colonies but this was hindered by the monopolisation of colonial trade by the British 
colonial office (Smith, 1777). The colonies played a significant role in aiding this 
mercantilist aspiration by being forced to export cheap raw materials to Britain. 
According to Engerman (2007, p. 42), the Navigation Acts sought to restrict trade 
between Britain and its colonies from 1651 onwards. This was not beneficial for the 
American colonies, which had access to resources such as fertile land, but were hindered 
as far as manufacturing was concerned by the restrictive effects of the Navigation Acts on 
capital movements. Engerman (2007) argued that, while British manufacturing boomed, 
the colonies took very long to switch from extractive activities to manufacturing and this 
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may have been what Britain had wanted in order to avoid competition in value adding 
activities. Table 2.8 below tries to summarise Britain’s heavy handedness on the 
American colonies when it came to issues of fiscal autonomy and revenue generating 
activities. It would seem, considering these various Acts affecting revenue, expenditure 
and debt, that the fiscal regime of colonial America would have developed better with 
more discretion. This does point to the fact that even though the North American 
experience was better than the Latin American colonies due to their institutional setup 
(Engerman & Sokoloff, 1994), imperial authorities still had a bearing on the liberty of the 
North American colonies before the latter’s independence. 
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Table 2. 8 Tax laws imposed on the American colonies 
Time Line and Acts  Description  
1651-1663. The Navigation 
Acts 
These were mainly for controlling colonial trade so that 
England collected all the duties. This caused the colonies to 
delay manufacturing and rely on agriculture. 
1673. Plantation Act Plantations were supposed to trade exclusively with Britain 
while redirecting revenue to Britain. Huge resentment led 
to the Culpeper rebellion in 1677  
1696. Salutary neglect  British policy to give colonists some degrees of freedom in 
economic matters.  
1699. Wool Act Prohibition of cloth made in the colonies 
1733. Molasses Act High taxes (imports) on sugar from West Indies to America 
and thereby forcing colonists to buy expensive sugar from 
Britain. 
1764. Currency Act Restrictions on paper money in circulation by the British 
authorities. 
1765. The stamp Act Stamp duty was imposed on most items such as 
newspapers, legal papers, pamphlets etc. Heavily opposed 
and led to its removal. 
1765-75. Non-importation 
agreements  
Boycotting of English goods due to newly imposed taxes. 
1767. Townshend Acts  Import duties imposed by the British parliament on the 
colonies on glass, paper, tea, paints, etc. Heavily resisted and 
repealed eventually.  
1773. Tea Act Law allowing the British East India Company to sell its low 
cost tea in American colonies. This undermined the tea 
merchants in the American colonies and led to the Boston 
Tea Party.  
1774. Coercive Acts A reprisal aimed at containing the Boston Tea Party and 
reasserting the British control over its colonies.  
1775-1783. American 
Revolution  
The end of British rule over American colonies.  
Source: Rabushka (2008, pp. 325–437)  
There are three points to take away from this brief history of fiscal development in the 
American colonies. The first is that the metropolitan powers did not have a static agenda 
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but a dynamic one in which some goals were rescinded when causing dissent. The second 
is that the imperial project was not a certain venture but the imperial powers were 
learning by doing. The last point is that each colony served a unique purpose in these 
imperial projects which defined the bargaining power between the imperial authorities 
and the colonial governors.    
2.5 Understanding African colonial states  
In the colonial era, the African continent has been mainly under the British and the French 
authorities. A major question regarding these has been about how one can understand 
what shaped the evolution of colonial fiscal institutions in these diverse colonial 
territories. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) have been heavily criticised for 
‘compressing history13’ and imposing western colonial experiences onto the 
understanding of these African territories (Austin, 2008a, 2008b; Mamdani, 2005). The 
evidence suggests that the colonies did not simply copy the fiscal institutions of the 
metropolitan powers, because where conditions were similar the fiscal institutions in 
both French and British Africa were found to be similar (Frankema & van Waijenburg, 
2014). How revenue was raised and spent in these territories has been a subject of these 
recent debates including what local conditions, human or non-human, influenced the 
shape of fiscal institutions. It is important to point out that much of the literature 
discussed here for African colonies mostly covers the 20th century while the Cape was 
mainly a 19th century colony. Although the literature on colonial Africa might have limited 
relevance for interpreting the experience of the Cape Colony in the 19th century, this 
study uses the literature to build expectations of what the Cape’s fiscal patterns would 
look like. 
In Taxing Colonial Africa, Gardner (2012) emphasises diversity in how revenue was 
raised and how local political dynamics and resource availability played a key role in 
British colonies. The priority of the British imperial authorities was that colonies should 
be self-sufficient and any grant in aid was given usually in the early colonial period of any 
given territory and when extraordinary military needs arose (Gardner, 2012). Huillery 
(2014) supports this notion by arguing that it was similar in the French colonies as well. 
                                                 
13 The explanation of this term was given by Austin (2008a, p. 998)) who argued there is a problem with 
“comparing two moments, nearly half a millennium apart (1500 and 1995). Quite simply, there was so 
much history between the two that the identity of the actors and categories in the analysis—the content of 
‘colonial rule’ and ‘property rights’, for example—is far from stable across the era(s).”  
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She argued, for instance, that French West Africa was largely developed from the 
proceeds of local taxation rather than any aid from France. She concludes that “…many 
Africans believe they owe French colonizers for their schools, hospitals, roads, harbours, 
railways, and various other infrastructures. Yet they financed 98 percent of the cost of 
running and developing French West Africa with their own resources” (Huillery, 2014, p. 
34).  
Taxation served various purposes besides financing government expenditure. According 
to Bush and Maltby (2004, p. 25), taxation was imposed to ‘educate’ Africans into Anglo-
Saxon values and economic values. In some instances, as argued by Frankema (2011), 
there was no real effort to maximise revenue by the colonial authorities in these 
territories. This gives some validity to Ronald Robinson’s notion that in many instances 
the British colonial administration in the early phases of African colonialism was a mere 
“…gimcrack effort run by two men and a dog” (Gardner, 2012, p. 35). For instance in 
Nigeria, Lugard (Governor General of Nigeria from 1912-1919) did not expect approval 
from the colonial office to be allowed to have many political officers and these hardly 
exceeded 40 between 1903 and 1919 (Kirk-Greene, 1980, p. 26). Besides the revenue and 
civilising mission, labour shortages brought about taxes which coerced Africans to 
engage in wage employment. Besides wage employment for raising tax payment money 
the colonial states also relied on corvee labour which was a practice of using labour for 
little or no pay often used as a form of taxation for those who could not afford to pay taxes. 
Relying on actual monetary taxes raised by colonial governments underestimates the in-
kind assistance the black African people contributed to the colonial state (Waijenburg, 
2015). The scarcity of labour contributed to the removal of Africans from their producer 
roles into workers in order to control labour supply. Taxes such as the hut tax and poll 
tax were crucial in achieving this goal (Austin, 2008a, p. 619, 2008b, p. 318). Even the 
Berlin conference Act alluded to tax collection from the indigenous people as part of 
“effective occupation, administration and legitimisation of power” (Alexopoulou & Juif, 
2017, p. 220). 
The nature of colonial rule has been crucial in determining the type of fiscal institutions. 
Lange (2004) in former British colonies found a negative and robust relationship 
between indirect rule (the system of relying on indigenous chiefs to collect tax revenue 
and govern parts of colonies), and political stability, effectiveness of bureaucracy and rule 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 59 
 
of law. This is supported by Mamdani (1996, p. 49) who argued that the British 
authorities realised the authoritarian possibility for decentralised despotism through 
African chiefs who were each armed with ruthless control systems of tribute to subjugate 
the indigenous people. Mamdani (1996, p. 56) argued that: 
With the administrative chiefs in charge of tax collection, revenue hunger 
was pervasively increased by the introduction of performance appraisal of 
the chiefs based on the amount they raise in tax rather than the number of 
people they controlled. Chiefs ruthlessly took cattle, goats, crop produce … 
Those who failed to raise taxes such as widows were forced to cultivate the 
chief’s land. 
This is where the generic picture of settler colonies having good institutions ceases to be 
useful in understanding African colonial territories. Mamdani is in line with Austin (2007, 
p. 1) who argues that starting from the developed world, when theorising, causes a 
‘conceptual Eurocentrism’ that stifles theorisations from Africa outward. The pervasive 
machinery employed by the British system of indirect rule erases all benefits or positive 
attributes assumed to be in settler colonies. Justifiably, Heldring and Robinson (2012, p. 
28) argued that the African colonial institutions had immiserating effects on the 
Indigenous people because the “European brought racism, discrimination, inequality and 
seriously warped institutions.” With reference to these warped institutions in the post-
colonial period Mamdani argued that it was not just the post-colonial state collapsing 
(Bates, 2008) but “… it is specifically what remains of the colonial state in Africa that is 
collapsing” (Mamdani, 2005, p. 3). Cooper (2002, p. 4) also emphasised this by arguing 
that the move from colonial to post-colonial state brought with it continuities and 
discontinuities because “colonialism was not turned off like a light switch”. The main 
argument, therefore, is that colonial institutions affected African countries after 
independence because some endured in the post-colonial period while some had long 
lasting effects.  
The dilemmas of conceptualising the colonial state  
Following AJR’s settler and non-settler colony dichotomy there has been an increase in 
studies trying to understand colonial fiscal systems through typologies (Lange, 2004; 
Booth, 2007; Frankema, 2011; Heldring and Robinson, 2012; Fourie, Jansen and Siebrits, 
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2013). The literature tries to classify colonial states into different categories such as 
direct vs indirect rule (Lange, 2004), colonies which coincided with centralised pre-
colonial states , those of white settlement and the rest (Heldring and Robinson, 2012) and 
a typology on an extractive, night-watchman, benevolent and developmental state 
(Booth, 2007; Frankema, 2011). Tripartite periodization has also been applied to African 
colonies differentiating pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases in order to 
understand institutional configurations of these phases (Austin, 2008a; Jerven, 2010). 
Cooper (2002) emphasised all colonial states were ‘gatekeepers’, a rather broad label for 
colonial states. He argued that: 
Colonial states had been gatekeeper states. They had weak instruments for 
entering into the social and cultural realm over which they presided, but they 
stood astride the intersection of the colonial territory and the outside world. 
Their main sources of revenue was duties on goods that entered and left its 
ports … But the post-colonial gatekeeper, lacking external coercive capacity 
of its predecessor, was a vulnerable state (Cooper, 2002, pp. 5–6). 
Lange investigated 33 former British colonies and distinguished between direct and 
indirect rule. His findings are that the British colonialism left favourable political legacies 
in some countries while negative in others depending on the extent of direct or indirect 
rule (Lange, 2004, p. 917). He argued that the analysis finds that “the extent of indirect 
colonial rule is strongly and negatively related to several different indicators of 
postcolonial political development while controlling for other factors.” Where indirect 
rule was absolute, post-colonial institutions were found to be weak. 
Heldring and Robinson divided the colonies into three categories, those of white settlers, 
those which coincided with centralised pre-colonial states and the rest (Heldring and 
Robinson, 2012). They conclude that in cases where colonisation coincided with 
centralised pre-colonial states colonialism retarded economic growth. This was the same 
in the settler colonies as well. The rest of the cases were ambiguous but the general 
observation is that it is difficult to construct an argument that colonialism benefited 
postcolonial development in Africa (Heldring and Robinson, 2012, p. 28). 
Another strand of literature tried to theorise the colonial state by formulating typologies 
of colonial states. This literature also partly borrows from earlier work such as that of the 
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German philosopher, Ferdinand Lassalle, who in 1862 criticised liberal regimes’ roles for 
being equivalent to a night watchman assuming very limited roles. Chalmers Johnson’s 
developmental state is also invoked (C. Johnson, 1982) as well as work on extractive 
institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). These types are extractive, night-watchman, 
benevolent and developmental state (Booth, 2007; Frankema, 2011). Figure 2.2 below 
captures the essence of this recent literature that tried to understand the colonial state 
by analysing how revenue was raised as well as the expenditure priorities. 
Figure 2. 2 Colonial state typology  
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Source: Frankema (2011, p.138) 
The night watchman state is a minimal state which has been categorised as comprising of 
a gatekeeper state with a minimalist approach to governance (Cooper, 2002). It merely 
spends money on colonial rule and order without burdening citizens through high 
taxation. It also neglects social spending aimed at human development as well as 
infrastructure. The key feature of the night-watchman state was control over 
international trade and this makes it close to the extractive state in which control of 
natural resource and its trade is important. The extractive state literally extracts revenue 
from the citizens but does not justify this by generously investing in human resources 
and infrastructure; instead it spends only a little to maintain some minimal level of order. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 62 
 
The developmental state14 charges high taxes but invests in human development and 
infrastructure. The most generous of all is the benevolent state which, even without 
imposing a high tax regime, sources funds elsewhere to invest in human resource 
development.  
It is clear from the above that there has been a development from dichotomising states 
to the above four quadrant approach. This approach has its limitation in that, instead of 
dichotomies, a few more categories are being added and it thus suffers from the same 
limitations. While these categories have shaped how one can possibly understand 
colonial fiscal regimes, there remains huge value in case by case analysis. This approach 
does not approach colonial fiscal systems with a ready-made framework but builds cases 
in a bottom up approach and reflects on similarities between colonies. The focus should 
not be so much on labelling the state as ‘developmental’ or ‘extractive’ but to understand 
what shaped and constrained the colonial government in different stages of political and 
economic development in Africa (Austin, 2008). One should be cautious with labels such 
as ‘developmental’ because for most of the African experiences the state’s developmental 
endeavours were biased to serve white minorities (Heldring & Robinson 2012, p. 10).  
In trying to move away from typologies and introduce nuances instead, Booth and 
Frankema (2017), analysing colonial states in Asia and Africa, used four criteria from He 
(2013). They argued that these factors, key for conceptualising the colonial state, “are 
revenue centralisation, debt creation, welfare spending and limited government” (Booth 
and Frankema 2017, p.12). The problem with this approach is that it again tends to move 
towards privileging the European metropolitan experiences as its touchstone by 
prioritising features of the state realised first in European countries. He (2013) used 
these factors to characterise the state formation and modernisation in England, Japan and 
China. The applicability of this approach for Africa has to remain flexible because the path 
to fiscal modernity in the colonies and developing regions was not similar to the 
European experiences.  
                                                 
14 Words such as ‘development’ can be problematic because their meaning change over time. The 19th 
century ‘development’ differed markedly from 21st century ‘development’. In this regard, words such as 
development are to “be considered as pervasive metaphors, which should not be confused with the social 
reality which they illuminate” (Denoon, 1983, p. 7). In this study a developmental state is used to describe 
‘development’ oriented government policies such as expenditure on public infrastructure but as qualified 
throughout this study, not all 19th century public outlays on infrastructure were for the public benefit.  
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Research on the formation of fiscal states is starting to move away from typologies and a 
culture of theoretical monoculture of trying to explain everything by one theory. This is a 
fruitful approach in colonial fiscal states as well since it complements the cross colony 
econometric studies (Austin, 2008b). How fiscal institutions evolved and how internal 
and external changes affected the trajectory of colonies is important. This is in line with 
Jerven (2010, p. 128) who stressed that, rather than seeing African growth or stagnation 
as caused by one historical root, such as the slave trade (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011), 
processes are important rather than the static outcomes. Some colonies moved from 
being governed by chartered companies to settler societies with colonial governance, 
some colonies adopted representative institutions while others did not, some colonies 
benefited hugely from trade taxes due to their strategic positions (coastal or inland) in 
the world trade routes and global value chains and some colonies had huge reserves of 
natural resources such as fertile soils and mineral resources and others did not. 
Contextually relevant analysis will help advance knowledge on colonial states. Compiling 
multiple datasets for different colonies has its space as well, these two approaches should 
work in a synergy.  
2.6 Conclusion  
State formation and fiscal history are areas in which simple questions are not very 
beneficial. Some of these questions for this study include: Was the Cape Colony extractive 
or inclusive? Was it a developmental state and for whom? Did it become a modern fiscal 
state? Was its fiscal capacity better than other African colonies? What shaped its public 
expenditure regime? Was the Cape overburdened by public debt? These are some of the 
type of questions which the historical analysis of the evolution of fiscal institutions as an 
approach inevitably answers directly or indirectly. This study however, goes beyond 
them by tracing the changing context and terrain as dictated by metropolitan 
developments as well as purely local factors. This chapter has demonstrated diversity in 
state formation and this was done in order to avoid pigeonholing the Cape Colony’s 
history in one set of theories or paths. The Cape’s beginning went through different 
phases which no single theoretical lens can explain. The aim with this dissertation is to 
allow the Cape case to be explained through various angles from this broad domain of 
state formation literature. Chapter 3 will discuss the general developments in the Cape 
Colony with particular focus on those which affected the public finance terrain. Political 
transition (from a crown colony to a self-governing colony and responsible governance) 
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and economic developments (led by the discovery of diamonds) shaped the state 
formation process. The last part of the chapter will dwell on broad trends in the revenue, 
expenditure and public debt of the Colony and salient features will be identified which 
will inform the direction of the rest of the chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE CAPE COLONY’S ECONOMY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
BROAD TRENDS IN PUBLIC FINANCES 
 
“Now honourable members must never forget that this country has 
depended almost entirely upon one industry, namely the diamond industry, 
and that too a very precarious industry” – Mr Merriman. Mr Upington with a 
contrary view responded that “Even without the diamond industry the 
country would continue to progress in the future. Why should it go forth that 
this colony should be bankrupt if there were no diamonds in this country?” 
(House of Assembly budget debates, 1887, p. 189-199) 
3.1 Introduction  
The Cape Colony’s reliance on the diamond mining industry was a reality which the 
parliamentarians realised and became the basis of policy antagonism between 
agriculture and mining as key industries of the colony. The economic progress of South 
Africa in the 19th century and 20th century was reliant on minerals, mainly diamonds and 
gold. De Kiewiet (1957, p. 89) summarised it famously for the entire South Africa by 
arguing that, “South Africa has advanced politically by disasters and economically by 
windfalls”. While political developments were not heavily linked to the economic 
conditions in the first half of the 19th century Cape, the discovery of diamonds drew the 
political and economic institutions closer and the coevolution of these two shaped the 
progress of the colony (Verhoef, 2014, p. 205). For instance, the interests in the mining 
industry convinced Cecil John Rhodes and business colleagues to venture into politics. 
Once in parliament they eventually drafted the Diamond Mining Act and many other 
pieces of legislation that shaped the mining-led economic expansion. Chapter 2 revealed 
the key features of modern states (central revenue, permanent debt, commitment to 
welfare –though circumscribed - and limited democracy) and the Cape attained these 
from the 1870s onwards.  
 This chapter traces the general trends in the economic and political progress of the Cape 
Colony. A holistic view is taken in this chapter to give context because the fiscal history 
of any country or colony is very much a political, social, and economic history. These are 
not mutually exclusive and any grasp of fiscal history also entails a grasp of the political 
and economic aspects. Section 3.2 delves into the changing fortunes of the Cape Colony 
settlers when the colony passed from Dutch company rule to British rule. Section 3.3 
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traces the broader economic trends of the Cape Colony under British rule since economic 
progress and growth meant more revenue accrued to the state. This is in line with history 
because “states reigning over pauperdom were, throughout history, the foremost 
paupers of those nations” (Goldscheid, 1958, p. 211). The political developments are 
pursued in section 3.4 with emphasis given to major political developments such as 
representative governance starting in 1854 and responsible governance from 1872 
onwards. Section 3.5 establishes the broad trends and patterns of public finances by 
briefly discussing the key issues such as major revenue sources and expenditure 
priorities. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 The Cape Colony’s shift from Dutch company to British rule 
A huge difference existed on the fiscal front between settler and non-settler colonies, 
directly and indirectly ruled colonies, colonies under company rule and those under 
normal colonial governance. For instance, from the 18th to the 19th century  the colonies 
under chartered companies such as India under the British East India Company (BEIC), 
Nigeria under the Royal Niger Company and the Cape Colony under the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) demonstrated limited presence of the state, proclivities towards profit-
making and limited desire for extending public works (Berger, 2009; Fourie et al., 2013; 
Gardner, 2012; Richards, 2012). According to Gardner (2012, p. 19), “For such companies, 
the establishment of administrative control was a means to an end, rather than an end in 
itself”. There was no strong reason why a company that had a primary goal to satisfy its 
shareholders would concern itself with the provision of public goods save for those that 
were connected to its profitability such as harbours, lighthouses and wharfs.15 
The Cape Colony was governed by the Dutch East India Company or Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie (henceforth VOC). The VOC was granted a charter in 1602 by the 
States General of the Dutch Republic to be its representative in overseas ventures (Fourie 
et al., 2013, p. 51). The VOC governed the Cape Colony from 1652 until 1795 when its 
economic power declined (Marks 1980, p. i).  As a company, the VOC was mainly profit-
oriented and the Dutch Cape Colony functioned primarily as a refreshment station for 
ships on their way to the East Indies (Fourie, 2014; Fourie et al., 2013). There was, 
however, a small group of free burghers at the Cape who were released from the service 
                                                 
15 The fate of the colonies under company rules were summed well by Adam Smith when he argued that “Of 
all the expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new colony that of an exclusive 
company is undoubtedly the most effectual” (Smith, 1777, p. 464). 
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of the company from 1657. These burghers began to farm in the surroundings of Cape 
Town and were allowed to supply only the VOC. Sadie (2002, p. 1) argued that the 
movement into the interior had the major ‘push’ factor which was the restrictive 
monopolistic trade policies of the VOC while the ‘pull’ factor was the availability of open 
spaces. The open land constituted an abundant factor of production and natural 
resources requiring only labour to be used for extensive agricultural production even 
without much capital, technology and advanced entrepreneurship. Pastoralism and 
extensive subsistence farming were the most common forms of farming as the free 
burghers moved to the interior (Sadie, 2002). Being a monopsony (sole buyer) the 
company offered very low prices to the burghers and did not allow them to trade 
externally in the global economy nor engage in any form of manufacturing (Fourie & Van 
Zanden, 2013). This entailed that anything that the company could not buy had to be 
consumed by the farmers themselves or go went waste (Wickins, 1983, p. 4). 
When the British took over from the company in 180616, the nature of the Cape Colony’s 
administration changed gradually but the changes altered the economic fortunes of the 
residents of the colony. According to Marks (1980) it was in 1814 that the British 
governance of the Cape Colony became official through the Convention of London made 
with the Dutch government. According to De Villiers (2014, p. 80), the British imperial 
authorities took over the Cape Colony through an effective strategy and fire-power but 
winning the support and hearts of the conquered residents proved to be a more difficult 
task. Giliomee (2014, p. 224) argued that once the British authority was established at 
the Cape the administrators and governors were “ready to improve and refine the Cape” 
but events would prove that this was easier said than done. The Cape residents had not 
been accustomed to heavy-handed governance and were usually used to paying “little 
heed to government” (Wickins, 1983, p. 5). The dismal outcome of the change in land 
policy from the freehold loan farm system to perpetual quitrent was a key example of 
many issues the British colonial governors and their administrations grappled with 
(Duly, 1965). The Anglicisation of the Cape was not going to be a smooth process, 
especially with the white Afrikaners who perceived that they were subjugated and 
treated as second class citizens (Giliomee, 2014; Pretorius, 2014a; Sadie, 2002). 
                                                 
16 From 1795 to 1806 the Cape was under the Batavian Republic after the French defeated the Netherlands 
and took over its colonies.  
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The British dominance was given a boost in 1820 with the arrival of the settlers from 
England which was reeling in high unemployment and the after-effects of the Napoleonic 
wars. The Imperial Government in 1819 granted £50 000 for settlers to be shipped to the 
Cape Colony and the English language was heard for the first time in farmhouses and 
villages throughout the eastern parts of the country after this emigration process (Theal, 
1900, p. 155). The Cape Colony had various complexities that shaped the developing civil 
society, including the heterogeneity and the wide dispersal of the population (McCracken, 
1967, p. 24). Hence, the British Government saw the value of increasing the number of 
British settlers. This meant that British institutions had to be established (such as the 
legal system and parliament). For these settlers the Cape Colony gave the prospect of a 
rosy livelihood compared to Britain and they gave a permanent English character to the 
Eastern part of the Cape Colony (De Villiers, 2014, p. 104). These settlers speeded up the 
Anglicisation process of the colony and brought their liberal views and would eventually 
question the government’s tendency towards autocratic rule.  
The next fundamental change was the abolition of slavery in 1834 at the Cape which 
brought significant changes to the way of life of the original free burghers. It was in the 
slave emancipation that the British rule affected the fortunes of the original Boers in a 
significant way and in 1832 about 2000 slave owners gathered to protest (Grundlingh, 
1937, p. 35). Slaves, being important in a labour scarce environment, were the essence of 
the productive lives of many farmers. For instance, a life of an Overberg farmer was 
described as ‘lui en lekker’ (lazy and pleasurable) because virtually all work was done by 
slaves – ‘tame huisdieren’ (tamed household animals) (De Villiers, 2014, p. 89).  
Even the Great Trek was largely influenced by this slave policy that touched 
fundamentally on the trekkers’ way of life (Wickins, 1983, p. 5). About 20-29% of the 
Cape Afrikaner inhabitants were prepared indeed to lose their “current European life and 
they lost the economic habits of the nations from which they had sprung” (Sadie, 2002, p. 
7). Giliomee (2014, p. 226) argued that what embittered most of the original Afrikaner 
colonists at the Cape was that the government treated them with a cold indifference while 
upholding everything British. The British governor at the Cape, D'Urban, understood 
their importance but could not imagine that they would in two decades form two 
independent republics in the interior of South Africa. He argued in a letter to England that 
“a large number of the Boers who left the colony were members of the oldest and most 
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respected families, and that the departure of those fearless, patient, industrious, law-
abiding and devout people was an incalculable loss to the Colony” (Sadie, 2002, p. 8).  
At first, the British governance at the Cape seemed to be a mixed blessing to the black 
Africans because the British settlers seemed sympathetic to the black Africans. The de 
facto progression of events shows that black Africans became worse-off. Slavery was 
brought to an end but the process of trekking into the interior and the expansion of the 
Cape borders entailed that black Africans were affected greatly and mostly negatively. 
The trekking Boers often clashed with black Africans, e.g. the 1838 battle of Blood River, 
and occupied territories originally occupied by black Africans. Ross (1986) gives a 
revealing insight for the Khoikhoi people as anexample: 
As European farmers drove deeper into the interior of the Cape Colony, they 
brought about the steady impoverishment of the Khoisan of each successive 
region. Stock was lifted, grazing land and water holes were expropriated, 
game was exterminated and life in any other status than as labourers for the 
whites made impossible. 
Even the British colonial government itself, although it demonised the Afrikaners for 
slave holding, did not see the black Africans as anything beyond labourers for the white 
populations. Mr T.H. Bowker, prominent settler in the Eastern part demonstrated that the 
British settlers were not saints when compared to the Afrikaners when it came to the 
black Africans when he argued that “the appearance of the country is fine. It will make 
excellent sheep farms … far too good for such a race of runaways as the kaffirs” (Ross, 
1986). The imperial authorities seemed to be indifferent and arguably complicit 
concerning some of the actions of the governors affecting the black Africans (De Villiers, 
2014).  
The British occupation brought better fortunes to the English settlers but it was 
unsettling to the original Afrikaner colonists and increased the rate of impoverishment 
of the black African populations – everyone’s fortunes changed. Political and social 
positions changed reinforcing a hierarchical structure to the society and far reaching 
racial biases and prejudices. These changes were to be cemented as the Cape economy 
developed giving the government stronger fiscal muscle with which to give the state all 
its fiscal levers to shape various policies. Any ambitious government programmes and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 70 
 
state funded projects depended largely on the economic fortunes of the colony as a whole. 
The trends in economic development are therefore crucial factors in understanding the 
Cape Colony’s fiscal developments. The next section turns to the broad trends in the 
economy itself so that public finances will be discussed and understood within a broad 
context of the 19th century economy of the Cape.  
3.3 Economic developments 
3.3.1 The company logic  
The Dutch East India Company had crippled the Cape Colony’s economy by its illiberal 
monopolistic policies till the end of the 18th century. Burman (1984, p. 11) argued that 
the pace of development of South Africa was “of necessity the pace of an ox”. The Dutch 
company had no incentive to establish roads penetrating the interior. The farmers had no 
incentive to produce surplus because the company could only buy limited supplies for the 
ships. The pace of fiscal developments was therefore hamstrung by the sluggish economy 
under the company rule. Fourie et al. (2013, p. 58) summed it up well: 
Three principles guided the VOC’s commercial policies, and hence its 
economic policies as agent of Dutch activities at the Cape and in the East: 
“Monopoly”, “Maximum profits” and “Short-term profits”. In addition, 
whenever a particular activity seemed profitable, the Company would 
prohibit colonists from participating in it and claim it as their own. 
Such an extreme focus on the profit motive meant that the wider economy was at the 
mercy of the company and fiscal developments were given less attention. This is 
supported by Fourie et al. (2013, p. 65) who concluded that the public finances of the 
Dutch period at the Cape were in a poor state due to “poor tax collection, tax evasion and 
corrupt officials”. There was no incentive for fiscal capacity development and for 
developing a proper functional government under company rule giving some validity to 
the notion that under company rule the Cape tended to be a mere refreshment outpost 
and an enclave to the few burgers released from company service. This did not mean 
release from the shackles of VOC control of the economy because whatever profitable 
economic activity the burgers would initiate, the company would take over.   
3.3.2 The first half of the 19th century  
It has become common among scholars of South African history to dismiss the first half 
of the 19th century of South Africa as uninteresting and jump to the diamond and gold 
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period (Ross, 1986). The quantitative economic history drive in recent years has also 
brought this neglect of any period for which data are not available. For fiscal history, 
however, understanding what shaped the colonial state’s decisions before and after the 
discovery of minerals is important. Ross (1986) captured this well when he argued that 
“it would be wrong to begin to study South African economic history with Barney Barnato 
and Cecil Rhodes.”17 Farming in the Cape was already capitalistic and as Ross (1986, p 
30) argued “…agricultural expansion was steady rather than spectacular and the absence 
of towns did not mean absence of commercialisation”. The earlier agricultural production 
relations became fundamental as the bedrock of subsequent production relations in the 
mining industry. For state formation, the disenfranchisement of the blacks was 
predicated on the need for labour and the production relations from the first half of the 
19th century were crucial.   
What stifled progress in other non-agricultural sectors was that there were remnants of 
the VOC practices which Somerset’s conservative approach did not remove. According to 
Peires (1989, p. 492), “the VOC confused the business of government with a business of 
private gain” and the institutional setup created a culture of organised looting (as 
opposed to one of isolated acts of criminality). There was “a tight oligarchy of 
businessman closely linked to their official patrons through ties of friendship, family and 
reciprocal financial obligations”(Peires, 1989, p. 492). The commission appointed in 1822 
to inquire into the governance of the new found British territories, the Cape, Mauritius 
and Ceylon, was crucial in ending the Somerset regime as well as dismantling the 
mercantilist and monopolistic trade regime at the Cape.  The Cape had to be integrated 
into the liberal political and economic order of the 19th century British Empire.   
What the British did well for the economy from the 1830s was to liberalise trade so that 
the colonists could trade with the outside world freely (Peires, 1989; Trapido, 1980). As 
early as 1811 governor John Cradock abolished export duties to enable the colonists to 
export their produce to the British markets more easily. The most important commodity 
exported by the Cape between 1815 and the 1840s was wine. Wool overtook wine after 
the 1850s when the British tariff policies on wine changed (Ross, 1983, p. 248). Freedom 
to trade with Britain in the first half of the 19th century was a great start although the 
                                                 
17 Barney Barnato was a landlord who controlled the diamond mining industry from 1870s before his 
mining company was consolidate into the Rhodes DeBeers Company in 1888. He also became influential in 
gold mining in the South African Republic later.  
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colonies were still prevented from trading with other nations. The establishment of the 
British garrison of 4000-5000 men on the Eastern frontier also caused an increase in local 
buying power and the demand for commodities such as wheat, wine and meat increased 
(Schumann, 1938, p. 64). Table 3.1 below gives a broad overview of the Cape’s 
agricultural output while table 3.2 gives stock numbers for the same period. What is clear 
is barley and oats/rye production were stable but had not been increasing steadily, at 
least not since 1828. Wheat production, too, was rather unstable before 1838 while 
production of wine and brandy did not show these increases. According to Ross (1993, p. 
134), the emancipation of slaves contributed to the marked decreases in the outputs of 
wheat, barley, oats and rye in 1838.   
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Table 3. 1 Production of agricultural commodities (1828-1854) 
Year 
Wheat 
bushels 
Barley 
bushels 
Oats/Rye 
bushels 
Wine 
leggers* 
Brandy 
leggers 
1828 322,635 351,188 329,928 20,405 1,413 
1829 520,768 300,625 321,570 15,539 1,060 
1830 410,472 224,676 283,785 14,977 1,845 
1831 433,693 271,147 282,182 18,467 1,382 
1832 306,063 282,380 275,106 16,973 1,394 
1833 528,147 286,197 237,012 14,501 1,207 
1834 540,528 257,602 276,553 12,005 1,075 
1835 NA NA NA NA NA 
1836 NA 218,490 241,185 16,693 1,282 
1837 494,280 220,534 211,535 18,103 1,373 
1838 463,691 180,847 187,860 21,915 5,846 
1839 395,329 203,323 185,759 22,899 5,861 
1840 433,454 244,600 197,663 20,229 6,190 
1841 471,804 295,718 215,006 25,312 6,161 
1842 592,054 271,983 286,075 18,299 1,653 
1843 705,647 242,662 392,672 13,426 1,386 
1844 771,760 293,569 419,587 16,412 2,075 
1845 650,849 262,912 436,526 17,156 1,996 
1846 579,421 180,856 350,159 18,640 2,069 
1847 NA NA NA NA NA 
1848 516,219 233,667 248,615 10,308 1,671 
1849 585,325 265,663 249,307 19,943 2,151 
1850 NA NA NA NA NA 
1851 NA NA NA NA NA 
1852 721,755 244,432 451,981 16,261 2,418 
1853 864.272 302,753 846,520 23,705 3,393 
1854 1,012,488 424,134 925,235 23,088 3,891 
1855 994,273 400,237 2.308,777 23,640 3,797 
Source: Ross (1993, p. 135), * A legger consists of 152 gallons, or 680 litres  
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Table 3. 2 Stock numbers in the Cape Colony (1828-1853) 
year Oxen 
Other 
cattle 
Wooled 
Sheep 
African 
Sheep* 
1828   357,531   2,181,952 
1829   322,021   1,839,402 
1830   311,938   1,905,728 
1831   315,355   1,087,614 
1832   334,907   1,923,132 
1833   343,644   1,960,886 
1834   312,569   1,919,778 
1835    NA   NA  
1836    NA    NA 
1837   279,818   1,923,082 
1838   266,255   2,030,142 
1839   306,809   2,339,191 
1840   334,201   2,456,176 
1841   377,803   3,008,613 
1842   451,852   3,706,791 
1843   452,852   3,949,354 
1844   471,635   4,513,534 
1845   466,558   4,557,227 
1846 122,720 210,082 1,502,611 1,740,835 
1847 NA  NA NA  NA  
1848 169,877 249,189 2,093,074 2,042,767 
1849 198,899 390,485 2,283,232 2,114,919 
1850 NA  NA NA  NA  
1851 NA  NA  NA  NA 
1852 203,058 291,600 2,651,136 1,679,941 
1853 198,542 273,112 3,476,209 1,528,386 
1854 NA  NA NA  NA  
1855 157,886  292,142 4,827,926 1,625,857 
Source: Ross (1993, p. 136), * Until 1846 no distinction was made between oxen and other forms of cattle, 
nor between merino (wooled) and indigenous Cape sheep.  
The separation of indigenous and merino sheep in the records from 1846 onwards allows 
one to observe the rising prominence of wool as the main export commodity. There were 
no particular increases observed for the rest of the stocks. The Cape Colony’s expanded 
production only partially satisfied the growth in demand. Hence, imports also increased 
(Schumann, 1938). Farmers could not meet the new demand and therefore began to 
produce more. The industrial revolution in England meant that the colonists had access 
to a secure export market after satisfying local demand (Ross, 1983, p. 249). During the 
greater part of the first half of the 19th century imports were greater than exports (Figure 
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3.1). The data in figure 3.1 are for South Africa as a whole but the Cape was the leading 
colony in South Africa. The data were logged in order to make the difference between 
exports and imports visually clear. The increasing imports had the effect of increasing the 
revenue accruing to the government through import tariffs and harbour dues.     
Figure 3. 1 South Africa’s exports and imports, 1807-1910 
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Source Schumann (1938, p. 44) 
The dominance of imports over exports is clear from the above graph and up to 1870 the 
imports were decisively above exports. In terms of value the Cape exported only about 
45% of what it imported causing the balance of trade to be in the negative to the value of 
more than half a million British pounds. Agriculture defined the economy in every aspect, 
while manufactured goods were largely imported. In terms of secondary industries, soap 
was made from local sheep and soda from salt plants, the profitable home industries of 
the time, before the 1820s when cheaper imports came (Wickins, 1983, p. 56). From the 
state revenue perspective, the exports were no longer taxed but imports brought 
significant revenue to the government, enabling it to begin some form of public goods 
provision. Most of the public goods outlays had to be met at local level with taxes such as 
commando taxes, vestry church taxes, kloof toll tax, tax on felled timber and many other 
such user charges (Commission of inquiry on public finances, 1826, p. 191). 
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As a predominantly agricultural society, hence economy, facing high demand for its 
produce, the Cape had a precarious production side. While the abundant factor was land, 
technology was still limited and labour was problematic after slavery was abolished in 
terms of availability and skills levels. The emancipation of slaves was a difficult process 
since the farmers could not simply let go of their slaves and many slaves were inextricably 
tied to their masters as ‘apprentices’. According to Ross (1993, p. 132) the promulgation 
of Ordinance 50 of 1828 caused the Cape former slaves’ de facto positions to be different 
from their previous position as slaves only in that they could not be sold. This was 
worsened by the near-monopoly which the farmers were able to maintain on the colonial 
land excluding the labourers’ access to land for them to grow their own food and keep 
their livestock (Ross, 1990, p. 149). The black Africans were thus forced to work on the 
farms for the greater part of the year. Even after the waning of slavery, labour remained 
a problem in the Cape Colony. Black African labourers moved between their Transkeian 
homes and farms in the Cape Colony harvesting crops and sheering sheep (Goodfellow, 
1931a, p. 75).  
As wine was becoming less economically  important in the 1840s in terms of exports the 
economy became more and more a wool-based economy (Houghton & Dagut, 1973, p. 22; 
Ross, 1983, p. 248). In 1845 the export of wool exceeded, for the first time, that of wine 
and was valued at £176,741 which amounted to 41% of the total exports of the Cape 
Colony (Ross, 1990, p. 150). This wool boom strengthened Port Elizabeth since most wool 
production took place in the eastern region rather than at the Cape where wine was 
predominant.  
3.3.3. From 1850s to 1910. 
From the 1850s to 1870, when diamonds became important, wool was the mainstay of 
the Cape economy. The 1854 Namaqualand copper boom was short lived when compared 
to the impact of wool, or the later discoveries of diamonds and gold. The Cape benefited 
from wool which was also significant in New Zealand and Canada and thus the period 
1850-70 may be called ‘wool years’ at the Cape since wool was comprised of 68% of total 
exports (Inggs, 1982, p. 65; Schumann, 1938, p. 105). The Cape governor, Sir Phillip 
Wodehouse’s view in 1867 was testimony to the dominance of wool in the Cape Colony 
when he questioned in his speech: 
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For what do we hold this country but for wool? Take away wool and, in one 
locality, copper and commercially speaking what is left? The cost of governing 
this country is heavy on account of its great extent and most scant population. 
Year after year sheep-farmers have gone in search of wealth into regions more 
and more remote (Houghton & Dagut, 1973, p. 22). 
This captured the basis of the Cape economy in 1867 before the discovery of diamonds 
and it would seem that the trajectory of the economy would have continued in this 
sombre state without the mineral revolution. The diamond discovery in Kimberley in 
1867 initiated the change to the South African history from that of a purely unstable 
agricultural based economy to a mineral-industrial country. Geographically, the 
discovery of minerals prompted urbanization in the interior as well as on the coast. The 
diamond boom brought with it financial developments in South Africa and the banks, six 
of which were established 1844-50, became very important in the diamond driven 
economy (Schumann, 1938, p. 73).  The increase in banks and other financial 
developments entailed that the economy became more and more monetised. This is 
crucial for fiscal development because in a country with more barter trade than money 
transaction, monitoring, metering and collection of tax revenue is very difficult and 
expensive.   
With the discovery of diamonds there were ‘poor in June and rich in December’ 
experiences which brought a general euphoria causing high speculation in diamond 
shares and over-extension of credit by the banks. The euphoria was augmented by the 
granting of responsible government in 1872 and the short-lived annexation of Transvaal 
in 1877 since both events gave the investors more confidence in the British 
administration at the Cape. Schumann (1938, p. 84) reported that total bank short term 
loans in the Cape Colony rose from £5 388 861 in 1875 to £10 536 114 in 1881. The result 
of this was a huge crisis, justifiably referred to as ‘the diamond crisis’, which was the 
worst financial crisis to be experienced by South Africa in the 19th century (Schumann 
1938, p. 84). Banks started being cautious and withheld credit fearing liquidity problems 
and the first insolvency was reported in Grahamstown (Greyling & Verhoef, 2015, p. 33). 
The crisis, 1881-1886, was augmented by the first Anglo Boer war which led to the 
independence of the Transvaal in 1881. The gold discovery made the recovery from this 
crisis quick in the Cape Colony; from 1886 to 1890 £22 634 000 was invested in the 
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mining industry and this rose to £ 104 337 000 by 1900 and £ 121 488 000 by 1910 
(Greyling & Verhoef 2015, p. 34). While diamond mining was financed largely by the 
capital raised locally, gold mining was financed largely by foreign capital (Schumann, 
1938, p. 90). Gold and diamond mining contributed, directly and indirectly, to the bulk 
part of South Africa’s economic growth and development in the 19th century.  
Another important economic game changer was the railway transport industry in the 
Cape. Until the late 1890s, this only served the Cape Colony. Mining would have 
progressed slowly had it not been for the railway developments which began in the early 
1860s at the Cape. For our consideration of fiscal history, the railway construction was 
very important to the Cape Colony’s public finances because it was intimately tied to 
customs revenues (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 11). If the Cape had not become the early 
developer of railway transport, it was not going to enjoy the huge traffic to and from the 
mineral fields at Kimberley and Transvaal. The parliamentarians at the Cape were very 
aware that the loss of traffic to Durban or Lourenco Marques at Delagoa Bay meant 
imports through the Cape ports were going to dwindle and no revenue was to be earned 
through railway traffic and customs.   
Table 3. 3 South African railway construction 
Period  Mileage Opened Accumulated mileage Basis/ Influence 
1860-3 63 63 Agricultural Interests 
1875-85 1713 1776 Diamond mining 
1886-95 1462 3238 Gold mining  
1896-1909 3656 6894 Agriculture and Industrial 
interests-Branch extension 
period 
Source of data: Schumann (1938, p. 53) 
The Cape was at an advantage as the oldest colony with its developed ports and it took 
advantage of this and built the first state owned railway line to reach Kimberley in 1885 
and to reach Transvaal in 1895. The table above shows that much of South African railway 
success before 1895 was in essence the Cape Colony success and this meant tremendous 
revenue from railways and customs as most of the mineral traffic had to also use its ports 
(Burman, 1984; Van Der Poel, 1933). From using the wagons, the railways - the ‘iron 
horse’ as it was described - played a huge role as well in the wider economy as agricultural 
produce could be carried from up the country and remote areas of the colony.  
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Farmers were very slow to accept the new era of transportation. According to the South 
African Railways report (1947, p. 16), as late as 1887 there were many anti-railway 
conferences being held in South Africa with reasons such as “all railways were not 
necessary, they are detrimental to transport riding on wagons, they are injurious to horse 
breeding, they encroach on property rights etc.”18 These fears were not without ground 
given that the oxen/horse transport diminished and farmers faced stong competition 
from cheaper imports from overseas. Foodstuffs such as wheat could be produced more 
favourably in North America than was the case in South Africa (Wickins, 1983, p. 58). 
Without fully developed railway branches, farmers were at the mercy of the external 
world since imports arrived at the mining fields quicker than that produced from local 
farmers in remote areas. This was because “the railways were built in such a way that for 
economic purposes Australia and England were nearer to Johannesburg than other parts 
of South Africa” (Goodfellow, 1931a, p. 137). In other words, the railways had to be linked 
with road networks throughout the country for its economic advantages to be felt by the 
farmers and the preoccupation of the government with railways meant this was delayed. 
The contribution of the trinity of railways, customs and minerals to economic growth 
figures is however undoubted and figure 3.2 shows the rise of the Cape’s GDP from 1856 
to 1909.  
Prior to 1870 (that is, before the diamond boom showed up in the GDP figures), the 
economic growth of the Cape Colony and, arguably, South Africa as a whole was very 
sluggish (cf. figure 3.2). The information given allow a comparative perspective with 
Natal, New South Wales and Victoria. From 1870 onwards there was a decisive increase 
in the nominal GDP of the Cape Colony. It reached its highest point in 1882 before 
declining because of the diamond crisis described in the previous section. The Cape, 
although growing, was lagging behind the Australian colonies in this period.  
                                                 
18 Schumpeter (1942) coined the term ‘creative destruction’ and this was what the Cape economy was 
experiencing because of the introduction of the railway system. Markets were integrated in a way that had 
not been seen in the era of ox-drawn wagons and horse riding and breeding as well as all forms of 
transportation were beginning to decline and eventually disappeared.  
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Figure 3. 2 GDP at current prices (in £000s), (1855-1910) 
 
Source: Magee, Greyling and Verhoef (2016, p. 903) 
Table 3. 4 GDP per capita growth rates (%) (1861-1909) 
Years Victoria 
New 
South 
Wales Cape Natal 
1861-5 -4.31 -0.09 1.00 11.15 
1866-70 -1.51 0.75 14.24 8.21 
1871-5 3.43 6.67 3.04 -2.04 
1876-80 1.02 1.95 7.69 2.95 
1881-5 2.35 -1.03 -9.67 11.55 
1886-8 0.27 3.99 16.9 9.85 
1889-94 -2.36 -2.26 3.81 -6.31 
1895-8 0.81 -0.27 3.87 13.15 
1899-1902 0.95 1.09 -9.81 19.34 
1903-9 3.27 3.8 13.84 13.25 
1861-1909 0.24 1.24 4.06 6.56 
Source: Magee, Greyling and Verhoef (2016, p.904) 
Table 3.2 demonstrates that per capita growth rates were significantly higher in the South 
African colonies than in the Australian colonies between 1861 and 1909. Although levels 
of GDP were higher in Australia (cf. figure 3.2), rates of GDP growth were higher in South 
Africa. The economic growth was very volatile in colonial territories and “series 
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constructed from colonial data… are typically much less precise than comparable series 
for the twentieth century”(Magee et al., 2016, p. 902). The major upward and downward 
swings were largely driven by major growth affecting events such as the diamond crisis 
from 1881 to 1885 and the South African War from 1899 to 1902. The bulk of the fiscal 
benefits of South Africa’s diamonds and gold mining accrued to the Cape Colony while the 
Free State, Transvaal and Natal could not obtain much in comparative terms. The inland 
colonies did not have harbours to capture customs revenue while the British maritime 
colonies (Cape Colony and Natal Colony) did receive customs revenue. Paul Kruger was 
determined to push trade through Delagoa Bay in order to avoid reliance on the British 
colonies (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 18). The Free State was also promised by the Cape that 
customs revenue collected by the Cape officials would be remitted to the Free State but 
this was agreed upon in only principle (Goodfellow, 1931a, p. 24).  
The fact that the Cape was the first to develop ports and railways meant that with respect 
to fiscal developments the Free State and the Transvaal remained less sophisticated 
(Ross, 1986). With very few citizens able to pay taxes and no harbours for customs 
revenue, Paul Kruger’s “railway endeavours were frustratingly slow due to financial 
problems” (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 55). Equally the Free State’s population was too small 
for significant revenue and it had no access to harbours. This meant that no ambitious 
railway plans were made “because the government was not willing to burden the small 
public revenue with huge costs of railway construction” (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 11).  
The economic progress of the 19th century South Africa was characterised by shocks and 
the highly volatile government revenue mirrors these political and economic shocks – 
both negative and positive. The minerals discovery had a positive impact on the economy 
while other shocks had a negative impact and therefore on the public finances. Table 3.5 
below lists these growth promoting and impeding shocks which would ultimately affect 
the growth in government revenue and expenditures. These are also consistent with the 
picture given by the GDP graphs in figures 3.2 and 3.3. These shocks are important 
because they were not only affecting the economy but they also had a huge bearing on 
the public finances of the colony19. 
                                                 
19 Referring to the diamond crisis as an example, Mr Sprigg reiterated the depth of the depression that the 
Cape Colony was facing in 1882-4. He mentioned that diamond exports fell from £4 176 000 in 1881 to 
£3 000 000 in 1883 and that the falling trade affected the customs and the railway receipts as well. 
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Table 3. 5 Cape Colony’s economic and political events 
Period  Nature of event 
1854 Self-governance granted 
1866 Economic depression  
1867 Discovery of diamonds at Kimberley 
1872 Responsible governance granted 
1880 First Anglo–Boer war  
1882-4 The ‘Diamond Crisis’ 
1886 Gold discovery in Transvaal  
1899-1902 The second Anglo-Boer/South African war 
1903 Severe drought and post-war economic depression  
Sources: Schumann (1938); Verhoef, Greyling and Mwamba (2014); Greyling and Verhoef (2015) 
3.4 Political developments  
3.4.1 The evolution of parliamentary institutions  
A significant institutional change occurred in the Cape Colony’s governance in 1807 when 
a conflict rose between Caledon, a non-military nobleman and General Henry Grey, the 
garrison commander (De Villiers, 2014, p. 82). The British government then decided to 
appoint only former army generals as governors of the Cape Colony and this set in motion 
a development of governance institutions with an autocratic nature. Charles Somerset 
arrived as the governor of the Cape in 1814 and due to weak countervailing institutions 
he would not listen to the council of advice which was thought to be a way of subjecting 
the governors to some form of accountability (Grundlingh, 1937, p. 7; Peires, 1989, p. 
476). As a member of the council, Stockenstrom, later governor of the British Kaffraria, 
was frustrated by the idea of this toothless council. He argued that, “the council as a first 
step towards reform was the greatest insult that could have been inflicted upon the 
common sense of any country” (Grundlingh, 1937, p. 11). The 1822 commission’s 
recommendations, namely an independent judicial system, efficient civil service and 
removal of economic restraints, took long to be effective.   
Public revenues were not subject to discussion with the council as they were regarded as 
private property of the crown and the governors had power over budgeting, which could 
be abused  (De Villiers, 2014; Grundlingh, 1937). The council did nothing to reduce the 
governors’ monopoly on decision making processes with regards to the affairs of the 
colony and agitations in the Cape reached London in the form of petitions. Partly because 
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of the forgoing reasons, the royal charter of justice was issued and this created the 
supreme court of the Cape of Good Hope in 1832. The settler agitations also led to the 
introduction of a representative organ of the government in 1834 and this paved the way 
for a stronger  voice of the colonists with regards to governance (De Villiers, 2014, p. 104). 
 From Charles Somerset in 1814 to Sir Harry Smith in 1852, the Cape had an absolutist 
spending paradigm and there was no parliamentary veto to regulate public spending. 
This period was the incubation period of representative institutions. The new settlers 
who came in 1820 were used to public meetings and expressing their discontentment 
through free press and were not willing to let go of this right enjoyed by their fellow men 
in England (Grundlingh, 1937). Although the imperial authorities were indifferent to 
some of the details of colonial governance, they were certainly worried about colonial 
instability and were prepared to allow progress to occur as far as representative 
institutions were concerned. From the financial standpoint the Imperial government was 
also keen to allow colonies to be self-sufficient. Financial prudence in the British public 
finances was going to be easier because the colonies with responsible governments 
would cease or at least reduce their demands for support (McCracken, 1967).  
In 1854 the Cape Colony was granted representative governance to operate as a self-
governing colony. This year marked the beginning of parliamentary deliberations of 
issues concerning the colony and governors had to start working with other 
representatives from various districts. McCracken (1967, p. 138) argued that from 1854- 
1909 the number of Acts issued exceeded 30 in each year reaching 40-50 Acts in the 
period after 1881. These entailed parliamentary deliberations and debates which leaned 
more and more to democratic practices. De Kiewiet (1957, p. 97) argued that the Cape 
Colony was fortunate in that it obtained self-governance during a rising tide of economic 
prosperity as wool and copper were boosting the economy. This is evident in the patterns 
observed in loans obtained in aid of public revenue. Prior to 1854 only a few loans were 
obtained but from 1854 onwards the incidence of loans increased showing the increased 
autonomy of the government to borrow. Prior to 1854 there were no frequent meetings 
for governance issues but from 1854 the meetings were conducted each year. The 
maturing colony with power to enact various acts and better economic prospects from 
the 1870s was ready for another phase of parliamentary developments. Responsible 
government was granted in 1872 under prosperous conditions. The executive, that is the 
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prime minister and his cabinet, were now held responsible by the legislative council and 
had to resign if they lost the confidence of the legislature (Grobler, 2014, p. 168).  
Some colonists were inclined to make the franchise requirement very high so that the 
blacks could not qualify and hence not vote. This was unsuccessful because Downing 
Street gave the Cape representative institutions on the basis that the rights of the black 
Africans were fully protected (Kilpin, 1930, p. 81). The constitution came to the Cape in 
1853 with a low franchise allowing many blacks and coloured to vote (Kilpin, 1930, p. 
80). The Cape Parliament consisted of a governor and an elected council of 15 (eventually 
26) members headed by the chief justice and an elected house of assembly of 46 
(eventually 107). The 1853 constitution granted the vote to every male who was a British 
subject above the age of 21 with a house or land of at least £25 or a salary of £50 per year 
(“Ausi,” 1956, p. 10). Eventually, after 10 years it was realised that the system of sending 
key officials from Downing Street was not working and the Cape pushed for a responsible 
government which was granted in 1872. The fact that a low franchise requirement was 
in the initial constitution did not necessarily imply a black African majority because the 
Cape was still small before annexation of the eastern territories and economic conditions 
were not yet improved for many to qualify.  From 1855 the Cape eventually annexed the 
eastern territories bringing an addition of about one million Africans who would alter the 
white majority in parliament if the constitution was not amended (“Ausi,” 1956, p. 11).  
There were low and high franchise requirement supporters at the Cape for various 
reasons connected to their interests. Trapido (1964, p. 52) argued that “the Dutch 
speaking people were adherents of a low franchise because they were opposed to the 
ruling clique of politicians and merchants, and it was only the latter who would have 
benefited from a high qualification” This was important for the state formation and 
interest groups that would eventually dominate parliamentary institutions because an 
elitist parliament would mean that the interests of the majority non-propertied class 
would not be fully represented. This is also at the heart of Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) 
median voter argument because allowing more poor people to access voting would mean 
more expectations for government outlays (see section 2.4.3).  
Three legislative acts became crucial for the disenfranchisement of the black Africans in 
the Cape Colony and therefore to the creation of a state that limited the black African 
participation in the electoral system. These key acts were: the Cape Parliamentary 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 85 
 
Registration Act (1887), the Cape Franchise and Ballot Act (1892) and the Glen Grey Act 
(1894). These acts were meant to reduce the number of African voters whose numbers 
could have a deciding majority in vote outcomes. The Cape Parliamentary Registration 
Act of 1887 was more influential in excluding the Africans in the Eastern Cape by 
removing tribal forms of landholding as a form of property qualification for voting 
(Davenport, 1978, p. 108). It was during the debate on the introduction of this Act that 
Rhodes argued: “The native is to be treated as a child and denied the franchise. We must 
adopt a system of despotism, such as works in India, in our relations with the barbarism 
of South Africa” (Magubane, 1996, p. 108). The Cape Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 
became more direct and eventually raised the qualification of franchise from £25 to £75 
affecting mostly Africans, coloureds and poor whites. Rhodes introduced the additional 
provision that every person was supposed to be able to sign his name, his address and 
occupation in the presence of an officer. This effectively excluded the illiterate majority 
of Africans and was another indication that liberalism at the Cape was a myth and 
manipulated for political convenience (“Ausi,” 1956). There has not been an exact 
number in terms of how many people were removed from the voter’s roll but for Africans 
the number is estimated to be between 20 000 and 30 000 (Mbeki, 1964; Thompson, 
1960). According to ‘Ausi’ (1956, p. 11) these pieces of legislation removed about 90-95% 
of the African voters. While the exact numbers are highly contested, the negative effects 
were apparent. 
In practice the Glen Grey Act meant a concentration of black Africans in a small 
geographic region with no adequate land to make them supply labour to the mines and 
farms. It introduced individual land holdings and a labour tax for black Africans who 
could not prove that they were employed. It complemented other restrictive measures 
being pursued by the Cape and "various other proclamations and enactments (which 
were to be extended and elaborated from time to time until the 1930s) [it] laid down the 
rule of one-man-one-plot in the reserves" (Wolpe, 1972, p. 72). According to Davenport 
(1978, p. 108) "it excluded property ownership altogether as a voting qualification for 
blacks who held land under the Glen Grey Act." These measures made it easy for the 
minority to exploit the black African majority and make their livelihood dependent on the 
limited civic rights in which they were subservient to the white minority. Rhodes 
understood that the native question was linked to the labour question and the Glen Grey 
Act brought this close to fruition. All were only initial legislations which formed the basis 
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of subsequent series of legislative frameworks that were meant to deal effectively with 
the ‘native question’ into the 20th century (O’Malley, 1996). There is some evidence to 
suggest that the state was therefore formed to protect the elite and the eventual 
expenditure priorities were also protected within this exclusive legislative institutional 
path. The scope of the expenditure was narrowed since most areas with a black African 
population would not constitute a majority in parliament and the elite could steer 
through self-beneficial policies. What constituted the electorate was narrow and 
legitimised the state’s perceived responsibilities in terms of public expenditure. The 
thorough enforcement of hut tax was partly to ensure that any administrative activities 
for the black Africans was fully covered by their own contributions (see section 4.3.3). If 
suffrage of the Afrikaners and Africans was a key indicator of liberalism at the Cape 
(Trapido, 1980, p. 248), the subsequent legislations aimed at reducing the scope of the 
franchise negated significant attributes of this liberalism. It is important to point out that 
this was so in the state institutions but the economy operated in capitalistic norms 
compatible with liberalism in general (Ross, 1986). 
3.4.2 Political and economic interest groups  
In the period up to the 1840s there were virtually no parties and the only political 
relations were mercantile networks of patronage. Even though the British tried to abolish 
these, they took long to disappear from the Cape and dominated the first half of the 19th 
century. According to Peires (1989, p. 498), “there was a clammy hand of state regulation 
which necessarily plunged any commercial transaction into the morass of official 
patronage networks.” While Peires (1989) gives a picture of a radical transformation and 
effective bureaucracy after the first legislative changes at the Cape, others (e.g. 
Goodfellow, 1931; Grundlingh, 1937; Ross, 1986) give a sombre picture of slow 
developments in this period. The abolishment of concessions and monopolies on 
butchers, bakers and other forms of businesses was important for liberal trade.20 The 
governance and representative institutions took longer to become effective. It would 
seem that Peires (1898) took the Commission’s recommendations as given without 
                                                 
20 This was one of the causes of the Great Trek. One frontier farmer complained, “Now we have a Civil 
Commissioner to receive our money for Government and for Land Surveyors, a Magistrate to punish us, a 
clerk of the Peace to prosecute us and get us in Tronk…The Englishmen is very learned ...They and the 
Hottentots will squeeze us all out by degrees” (Peires, 1989, p. 499).  
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considering whether the implementation of these were necessarily smooth in every 
aspect.  
From the 1850s onwards, citizens of the Cape Colony were unwilling to stand for 
parliament because of factors such as the lack of payment and the long travel distances 
to Cape Town. Farmers, merchants, and lawyers often influenced the proceedings of the 
parliament before the mining magnates and their associates became members of 
parliament. The lack of concrete party lines, at least before the Jameson Raid in 1895, 
meant that a myriad of interests were represented and often ‘parish pump’ politics 
dominated the debates in the periods before 1870s (McCracken, 1967, p. 50). This means 
that the political system was vulnerable to capture by any influential group that pushed 
a particular cause. According to McCracken (1967, p. 61):  
Some entered parliament with a single objective in view – state aid for 
voluntary schools or protection for the diamond industry, for example. There 
were the promoters of railway extension or agricultural improvement…, 
some were ardent imperialists, some enthusiastic nationalists – one member 
of the house referred to the British forces as the enemy.  
Since there were no strong party politics to inform the objectives of the members it was 
highly probable, as demonstrated in this study, that some interest groups coalesced in 
instances where their interests overlapped. In a relatively homogenous group, allegiance 
was given on personal basis (McCracken, 1967, p. 106) and members could easily form 
cliques around a cause.21 For instance those who wanted protection for the diamond 
mining industry and those who supported railway extension coalesced and became 
influential for the formation of the Minerals-Railway Complex. In the period after the 
discovery of diamonds, parliamentary debate moved from parochial matters to weightier 
matters such as regulation of the mining industry as well as construction of railways. The 
pecuniary implications of these major projects meant that they became important for the 
government. McCracken (1967, p. 55) stated that “from the early 1880s merchants and 
farmers were overshadowed by the mining magnates and their associates.” 
                                                 
21 Constituencies being represented were not yet accustomed to the idea of representative governance and 
hence were not exacting. They hardly placed onerous demands on their representatives after electing them. 
According to McCracken (1967, p. 51), “John Fairbairn represented  Swellendam for many years before he 
visited it in 1860, and John Merriman was content with visiting his Namaqualand constituency two times a 
year arguing that “They never wanted to see me, neither did I want to see them.””  
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The dominant party-like organisation was the Zuidafrikaansche Boeren Beschermings 
Vereeniging (BBV) (The South African Farmers Protection Association) formed in 1878. 
This was formed by Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr and the directors of the Wine Farmers 
Association and its formation was triggered by the imposition of excise tax on colonial 
brandy. Its major aim was to make sure farmers’ interests were represented in 
parliament. It was soon criticized for being narrow and representing only local interests. 
This led to the formation of the Afrikander Bond (Alliance) in 1879 which had a vision of 
uniting all South Africans. This was amalgamated with the BBV in 1882 and had branches 
across South Africa, including the two Boer republics. The broader focus of the Bond 
entailed that it remained less effective in really affecting Cape politics. It, however, became 
a useful organisation for convenient liberalism in the Cape Colony as politicians used its 
platforms to appeal to the broad interests of the parliamentarians who had relatives in 
the other republics (Trapido, 1980, p. 267). For instance, Cecil Rhodes took over the 
premiership on behalf of the Bond in 1890 and strengthened the position of his chartered 
company. To make the Rhodes-Bond Alliance appear stronger, he effectively bought off  
many Bondsmen, offering them £1 Charter shares not available on the market, both before 
and after he assumed the premiership and promised them farms in Mashonaland 
(McCracken, 1967, p. 114). As Merriman put it, Rhodes had “a toughish term to drive with 
Imperialists and Bondsmen” (McCracken, 1967, p. 115). With key names coming up in the 
political economy of the Cape, it is important to give a brief profile of each of these names. 
A few major names are chosen here and the rest will be briefly explained as they appear 
in the rest of the dissertation. Depending on the availability of information, it is necessary 
to give a few details on who these people were, what they represented and their influence 
in the political and economic progress of the Cape. These profiles are by no means 
complete and aspects bearing on state formation, public revenue, and public debt will be 
given. These names recurred in the parliamentary debates and most were the longest 
serving members in the Cape parliament who had a grip of the Cape’s socio-political 
issues. Longevity in parliament was limited to a few individuals who inevitably steered 
the debates with decisive authority because of their institutional memory. The 
connections of the other members to Rhodes are apparent in these profiles and this 
influenced the success of the MRC in dictating and shaping processes in the public finances 
of the Cape. 
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Cecil John Rhodes 
A lot has been written on Rhodes as the arch imperialist with a vision to extend the 
imperial project to the rest of Africa (Thomas , 1996). He was the leading figure in shaping 
the diamond mining regime of the Cape Colony. From 1877 until his death in 1902 he 
represented Barkly West which was part of the annexed Griqualand West. In 1880 he was 
a member of the Diamond Mining Commission which gave recommendations to the 
government on how the sector was to be regulated. He was the Prime Minister of the Cape 
Colony from 1890 to 1896 and his success in mining was not only emanating from 
business acumen but also the fact that as a politician he could influence policies to favour 
his personal ends. His De Beers Company can be seen as a ‘blue chip’ of imperialism whose 
success emanated not only from prevailing rates of return but from his political and 
economic networks.  Being in the mining industry also meant that Rhodes supported 
railway extension with great enthusiasm, enthusiasm which he did not demonstrate for 
railway extension to serve farming.   
Hercules Robinson   
He became a close friend of Rhodes in the period before the Jameson Raid. He was an 
experienced statesman, having governed in Montserrat (1854-1855), Saint Christopher 
(1855-1859), Hong Kong (1859 -1869) British Ceylon (1865 -1872), New South Wales 
(1872- 1879), Fiji (874- 1875), New Zealand (1979-1880) and the Cape Colony (1881-
1889). As he was the governor during Rhodes’s early days in parliament he became crucial 
in shaping the mining industry and was a member of the Diamond Mining Commission.  
According to Thomas (1996, p. 132), Rhodes and Robinson pushed the eventual Mining 
Act “clause by clause and most of its provisions went through save for the flogging of illicit 
buyers and sellers”.  
John Xavier Merriman  
He was one of the ablest and longest serving member of the Cape Colony parliament. He 
was also a diamond investor, although not on a large scale, and he was the one who 
encouraged Rhodes to consider a parallel life in politics (Thomas , 1996, p. 79). As a 
railway enthusiast, his interests overlapped with those of Rhodes. He was appointed as 
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Treasurer General from 1890 to 1893 when he resigned after the “Logan Scandal”22, 
which exposed the level of corruption in Rhodes’s business dealings. The Jameson Raid in 
1895 ruined his relationship with Cecil John Rhodes and he forthwith opposed the mining 
interests and British imperialism in South Africa. Throughout his political life, Mr 
Merriman’s political and economic views were volatile and erratic. He initially pushed the 
railway extension towards the ends of the mining industry, resisting any railways to serve 
agriculture (referring to these lines at one stage as ‘pumpkin lines’), but later spoke at 
length on how agriculture as a key sector had been neglected. He initially fought the 
responsible governance but by 1875 he supported and was part of the leadership of the 
responsible government. He was the Prime Minister of the Cape from 1908 to 1910 when 
the Union was formed.     
Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr   
He was the chief leader of the Bond after it was amalgamated with his BBV. He shied away 
from being a top leader but was very influential in the background. Merriman described 
him as the “‘the Mole, an industrious little animal…You never see him work, but every now 
and then a little mound of earth, thrown up here and there, will testify to his 
activities”(McCracken, 1967, p. 114). His support for the farming community led him to 
form the BBV and when it was merged with the Bond, he chose to remain in the 
background refusing the top position which was taken by Rhodes. His support for Rhodes 
was also based on his desire to maintain unity between the English and the Afrikaners. 
His trust in Rhodes’s businesses is also revealed by his ownership of shares in Rhodes’s 
mining companies.  According to South African history online “Evidence shows that 
Hofmeyr himself made a large purchase of De Beers shares later, in August 1895, which 
Rhodes would later use as ammunition to force Hofmeyr to do his bidding.” After the 1895 
Jameson Raid, “… his condemnation of Rhodes did not extend to supporting Merriman’s 
demand that the British South Africa Company’s charter should be withdrawn: his 
purchase on preferential terms of Chartered shares in 1890 and of De Beers shares in 
1895 made him vulnerable to threats of exposure” (McCracken, 1967, p. 116).  
                                                 
22 James Sivewright, a close associate of Rhodes serving in cabinet, gave a government catering contract to 
a friend James Logan. The contract involved an 18 year monopoly of catering on the government run 
railway system. This caused huge protests from parliament (especially from Merriman, Sauer and Innes 
who refused to serve with Sivewright) forcing Rhodes to resign (McCracken, 1967, p. 115).  
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Gordon Sprigg 
His political career in the Cape spanned from 1879 to 1904. He was mainly in the 
opposition and remained a federalist throughout his career. He was behind the 
Registration Bill in 1887 which excluded communal land owners from voting and this was 
supported by Rhodes who favoured the disenfranchisement of the black Africans. Mr 
Sprigg was also a railway enthusiast though his proposals were impractical and 
expensive. His stance on railways and disenfranchisement was in line with Rhodes’s own 
interests. He offered to help Rhodes who had lost support after the ‘Logan Scandal’ in 
1893 and successfully secured the position of treasurer. He remained a vocal Rhodes 
supporter and this made him to disagree on many issues with the Afrikaner Bond party. 
For instance he was accused of wanting to favour British towns at the expense of Afrikaner 
rural areas.   
Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer  
He was elected into parliament in 1875 and served continually until 1904. His presence 
in parliament for over twenty years made him more knowledgeable and his contributions 
to parliamentary debates were grounded. He was in favour of enfranchisement, 
supported suffrage for woman and was in favour of incorporation of blacks into 
parliament. He was a key individual who brought down Rhodes’s government after the 
‘Logan Scandal’ and remained a vocal critic of Rhodes and his racism epitomised by his 
desire to treat blacks as ‘poor children’. His support and closeness to Mr Merriman made 
him a sympathiser of government policies on public finances.  
3.5 Trends in public finances  
This section seeks to briefly discuss the broad public revenue, expenditure and debt 
aggregates as well as the budget balances of the Cape Colony throughout its existence. In 
other words, the section establishes macro fiscal trends (total revenue, total expenditure, 
the budget balance and total debt). This is done in order to identify major trends and 
components and issues warranting further investigation in the remaining chapters. The 
general patterns in this section will help the focus in each of the subsequent chapters.   
3.5.1 The budget balances  
The budget balances are general broad indicators of the sustainability of the public 
finances and the commitment of the colonial government to financial prudence. The 
budget balances also determine the general trends in fiscal policy because when there is 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 92 
 
a constant deficit the colonial government would be forced to revisit their public 
expenditure and government revenue policies. Before the 1850s the Cape Colony had 
been hamstrung by public debt because much of the public expenditures were funded 
through colonial debt. Revenue collection capacity was not yet fully developed and the 
Cape struggled to pay annual interest on its debt (Burman, 1984, p. 11). The economy had 
not developed and the tax base was limited to trade revenue which could be readily 
collected at the harbours without investing significantly in fiscal capacity. According to 
Burman (1984, p. 14) significant change came when John Montagu arrived at the Cape in 
1843 and “set about to reduce the Cape’s debt in two short years by selling land, collecting 
arrear taxes and selling guano from the offshore islands and he succeeded in wiping the 
debt out”. Only after the debt was paid off did the state programmes such as road 
construction begin through the use of convict labour. 
Ordinary expenditures prior to the 1860s were only successfully met through a 
supplementary system of temporary loans. Transparency was also limited in this era 
since there was no proper system of auditing revenue which was not separated from 
these loans and therefore a surplus in revenue could have simply been a deficit concealed 
by the use of short term loans. Even as late as 1863 the governor’s speech revealed this 
weak state financial position:  
The expenditure of 1863 amounted to £682 868 and £191 613 in excess of 
receipts…No increase in taxation is expected to boost revenue and recourse 
must be had to a loan, to meet ordinary expenditure, but I earnestly trust that 
on this occasion your appeal to the capitalists of England will be accompanied 
by a substantial pledge of your desire to provide for the gradual, but sure, 
liquidation of your debt (Wodehouse 1864, p. 2). 
Up to 1875 this system of blending ordinary revenue with temporary loans was obscure 
and from 1875 a separate loan accounting system was introduced. There was increasing 
pressure on the colonial governor and the cabinet to consolidate the budget of the colony 
in order to avoid what the governor termed a “financially embarrassing position” 
(Wodehouse, 1964.p. 4). The number of petitions was increasing from the local capitalists 
who were against the government’s desperate attempt to increase revenue by raising 
various duties. A significant petition was from the Standard Bank’s representatives who 
expressly stated that “Your petitioners submit that an impost upon the subscribed capital 
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of the Standard Bank would bear with quadruple weight upon its working capital and 
would be therefore unjust and unfair” (Kirkwood, 1864, p. 1).  
The Cape’s public finances in figure 3.4 portrayed up to 1870 a positive balance which is 
counterintuitive to the qualitative evidence showing a colony in serious debt. The 
principle of budget balance was in use and the general caution came from the fact that 
the economic outlook of the colony was not promising hence the government could not 
be ambitious. 
Figure 3. 3 Budget balance 1827-1909 
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Figure 3. 4 The effect of short-term loans on the budget balance (1830-1875) 
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Budget balance excluding temporary loans
Budget balance including temporary loans  
Source of data: Blue books (1830-1909) 
The temporary loans were useful in this period up to 1875 as figure 3.5 shows. The 
temporary loans in aid of revenue aided the budget balance especially from 1857 when 
it curtailed significant financial problems by reducing the deficit. The debt of the Cape 
Colony was not recorded prior to 1875 and all that constituted debt in the Cape public 
records were the temporary loans while the real external public debt did not show up in 
the public accounts. These temporary loan figures are explicitly shown to be exclusive of 
long term borrowing. With the increase of business activity due to the discovery of 
diamonds the governor reported in the fourth session of parliament that “The larger 
portion of surplus revenue has been devoted to extinguishing the temporary loans which 
had been raised by the government in the former years to meet ordinary expenditure” 
(Barkly, 1873).  
While the temporary loans mitigated the deficit, part of the positive picture prior to the 
accelerated economic growth in the 1870s onwards lies in the fact that there was a 
general prudence and rationality among the Cape governors. British pragmatism and 
budget balance were adhered to in the true sense of the Gladstonian preferences of 
limiting government to a minimalist role. They were reluctant to begin any ambitious 
public expenditure projects unless reasonable means and economic benefits of such 
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projects were ascertained. This general exercise of prudence was strong if one considers 
various unsuccessful petitions made on the government with calls from the Eastern Cape 
settlers to build a railway linking Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. No amount of 
petitions and letters calling for state driven projects would move the government but as 
soon as diamonds were discovered the government started building the Cape Town to 
Kimberley railway line and the construction of lines was initiated also from Port Elizabeth 
and another from East London (Burman, 1984, p. 51). In light of this, the rather surprising 
positive picture of the budget balance prior to mineral discovery is a sign of hesitancy by 
the state to be ambitious with its meagre revenue and focus only on the real necessities 
of the colony. The balanced budget principle became difficult to follow strictly when the 
economy started to grow and when the government took over private railways. The 
balances started to fluctuate heavily contrary to the close watch of budgets portrayed in 
the period before 1870.   
3.5.2 Sources of public revenue 
The VOC bequeathed its tax structure, albeit poorly run, to the British administration. 
With no mission beyond profit, the company could not invest in fiscal capacity building.  
Table 3.3 lists all sources of revenue in the British Cape Colony divided into direct tax, 
indirect taxes and non-tax revenues.   
Table 3. 6 Public revenue sources by different categories 
Direct taxes Indirect taxes Non-tax revenue 
Hut tax 
(1859-1909) 
Customs duties 
(1820-1909) 
Post office revenue 
(1827-1909) 
Land quitrent 
(1820-1909) 
Excise duties 
(1879-1909) 
Railways revenue 
(1873-1909) 
Tithes on wine and grain 
(1821-1842) 
Transfer duty 
(1820-1909) 
Telegraph revenue 
(1873-1909) 
Income tax 
(1904-1909) 
Stamp duty 
(1820-1909) 
Property sales 
(1848-1909) 
 
 
Auction duties 
(1820-1909) 
Office fees 
(1820-1909) 
 
 
Mining tax 
(1882-1909) 
Fines and forfeitures 
(1826-1909) 
 
 
Bank notes duty 
(1865-1910) 
Rents 
(1849-1909) 
 
 
Succession duty 
(1864-1909) 
 
Sources: Cape Colony’s Blue books (1820-1910)  
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What is important to note is that over time some taxes inherited from the company were 
abolished while others were introduced as the economy progressed. For instance, land 
taxes and tithes on grain were two forms of direct taxes introduced by the company and 
hut tax and income tax were introduced under the British system. 
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Table 3. 7 Revenue sources and shares in total revenue over time. 
Sources  Years Importance  
Customs revenue  1820-1909 Below 20% from 1821-1844; 30-60 % between 
1845 and 1880 and 15-30% from 1880-1909 
Railway revenue  1873-1909  Rose from to 30% in 1886 and remained between 
30 -50% from 1886-1909. 
Loans in aid of revenue 1821-1874 Unsystematic fluctuations reaching 51% of total 
revenue 
Land revenue 1820-1909 Above 60% of total revenue between 1821 and 
1825 but never exceeded 10% for the rest of the 
period. 
Transfer duties  1821-1909 Rose to about 15% in 1856 but declined gradually 
to under 2% in 1980 
Post Office  1882-1909 Remained under 4% throughout the period  
Telegraphic lines 1873-1909 Oscillated below 2.5 % the whole period 
Interest 1849-1909 Oscillated below 2.5 % the whole period 
Stamp duty 1820-1909 Fluctuated between 4-10% between 1821-1870 
and declined to the 2-3% band from 1870-1909  
Auction duty  1821-1896 Rose to about 8%in 1856 but declined drastically 
to below 1% in 1896  
Tithes on wine and grain 1821-1842 More important in the 1820-1830, about 8-15.5 % 
but declined to below 1%  
Excise duty 1879-1909 Rose to about 3-5% only in 1905 -1909  
Sale of Government 
property 
1849-1909 Oscillated below 1.5 % the whole period 
Fees of office  1820-1909 Remained under 2% of total revenue  
Fines and forfeiture  1826-1909 Fluctuated between 0-2% of total revenue 
through the period except in 1867 when it went 
into 2-3 %  
Hut tax  1859-1909 Rose gradually reaching to about 1.5 % of total 
revenue in 1909. 
Mines  1882-1909 Oscillated below 1.5% throughout the period 
Rents (exclusive of land) 1849-1909 Oscillated below 1.6% throughout this period  
Bank notes duty  1865-1909 Oscillated below 1% throughout the period 
Succession duty  1864-1909 Below 1 % during the whole period 
Income tax 1904-1909 Between 4-6% in this short period  
Source of data: Blue books (1830-1909) 
On the tax side the British colonial government’s key new taxes were the hut taxes (1859), 
excise taxes (1879) and income tax (1904). The major sources of non-tax revenue were 
direct revenue from service provision from the state owned and controlled railways 
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(1873 onwards), telegraphs (1873 onwards) and postal services (1882 onwards). 
Customs was a major source of revenue throughout the period and the most important 
among indirect taxes. Table 3.3 above shows that if the major sources of revenue were to 
be isolated it would be customs revenue and railway revenue. Figure 3.6 below depicts 
the contribution of railways and customs as the two major sources of revenue and 
railways seem to outperform the customs from 1885 onwards. In terms of revenue 
coming to the coffers, there was no doubt that railways became the chief revenue source 
for the colony. There was a fundamental problem with this practice of mixing tax revenue 
and non-tax revenue because the revenue contribution from railways was not based upon 
the viability of the system but it was a revenue collection exercise. This created an illusion 
in the public finances. After analysing railway reports, Mr Merriman in the 1902 
parliamentary session remarked, “I could find nothing strange, no alteration as far as I 
could see, they have gone on in the same old jog-trot way of putting the railway revenue 
into the general pot” (House of Assembly budget debates, 1902, p. 163). 
Figure 3. 5 Customs and railway receipts 
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Source of data: Blue books (1830-1909) 
The problem with putting everything into the ‘general pot’ was that the government 
revenue grew significantly but fiscal sustainability was not an immediate concern. While 
looking at the revenue received from customs and railways shows that railways were 
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chief contributors from 1885 onwards, net revenue (receipts minus expenditure) shows 
that customs revenue remained the major revenue source of the colony. This was because 
the railway system absorbed more costs on the expenditure side than customs which 
needed few officers. The costs of the railways comprised of maintenance, new 
locomotives, relaying and other related costs. The cost side of railways made the customs 
a better revenue contributor, with its expenditure side never taking more than 16% of 
the receipts and a yearly average of 6% for the 83 years under review. The problem is 
that this approach of treating each parastatal separately was never the way in which the 
government operated the state owned entities. This was not unique to the Cape and some 
countries also went into the 20th century including state owned enterprises in the 
accounts of governments.  
Figure 3. 6 Customs and railway gross incomes 
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Source of data: Blue books (1830-1909) 
Goodfellow (1931b, p. 38) shed more light on the railway system when he argued that no 
system was put in place to determine what portion of revenue went into capital 
expenditure or profits and the whole system was “…taxation by railways due to the need 
to bring more revenue into central government’s revenue coffers.” It was left to the 
minister who was a member of the cabinet to determine how much to surrender to the 
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government’s coffers and the minister was only subject to questions in parliament 
(Goodfellow, 1931b). Van der Poel (1933, p. 128) also support this by arguing that all 
South African 19th century governments of the railway operating states tacitly used 
railways as instruments of taxation because they had no other meaningful sources. The 
import tariffs of the maritime Cape and Natal colonies also purely remained an expedient 
revenue collection exercise instead of elements of a trade related policy. Mining 
equipment import tariffs were significantly higher in the Cape and Natal than those in 
Canada and Australia (Goodfellow, 1931a, p. 104). 
The other state-owned and controlled entities were the postal and telegraphic systems. 
While the post office was already functional in the late 1820s, the telegraph system 
started functioning in the same year as the railway system (1873). The two state owned 
entities were meant for service provision and not necessarily for profit making but since 
they formed a huge source of state revenue in the 19th century, it is worthwhile to assess 
their net revenues. The telegraphic system was the worst performing of all state owned 
entities and always operated at a loss except during the period of the Anglo Boer war 
when the telegraphic system was in heavy usage. Expenditure as a percentage of revenue 
collected was on average 131% of total telegraph receipts except in the war period when 
it declined to 80%. The post office on the other hand shows a normal trend. In the early 
years expenditure was quite high, 80-140% of the receipts, but remained within the 30-
50% band up to 1900. Unlike the telegraphic system which only realised a revenue 
surplus during the war, the post office revenue and expenditure rose significantly during 
and immediately after the war.23 
For the smaller items of revenue hut tax is worth a closer look not only because before 
the income tax in 1904 it was the second form of direct revenue after land taxes but also 
because of its impact on the Africans. Disregarding the railway receipts since they 
dwarfed the shares, the revenue collected through hut taxes was rising steadily reaching 
close to 3% of total revenue in 1908.24 In this period the allocations for the education of 
                                                 
23 Mr Sprigg in his budget speech in 1900 highlighted the increase in communication during the war causing 
telegraphic and postal receipts to increase. He reported that, “There was a huge increase in postal and 
telegraphic returns during this period of war owing to the increase of people mainly soldiers who 
constantly communicated with their relatives and friends across the world” (House of Assembly budget 
debates 1900, p.259). 
24 Act 3 of 1869 was imposed to enable harsh treatment for all non-compliance. For instance, “Seizure of 
cattle was done whenever the hut tax was not paid in the required time and where nothing is obtained in 
terms of the actual owners, such hut was destroyed”(Kilpin, 1930). 
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black Africans was barely 1% of the total expenditure. When one considers the process 
that impoverished the black Africans through the encroachment of the European settlers 
on black African land, the wealth available to the black Africans meant that the hut tax 
was a huge burden. These developments were similar in the Natal colony as well where 
the hut taxes were imposed and collected by black headmen and were meant for British 
administration – quite similar to Mamdani’s decentralised despotism argument 
(Mamdani, 1996, p. 49). In 1872 Chalmers, the Tambookie (Xhosa tribe) Agent, in a report 
on political and social conditions of black Africans, revealed the resentment of hut taxes 
by the black Africans:  
There is no desire on the Tambookies to be annexed to the colony and any 
proposal for such will causes dissatisfaction and cause them to mistrust the 
government and a major reason they moved out was to avoid being subject to 
the colony …they have a dread of colonial law and tax-paying (Chalmers, 1872, 
p. 5). 
This also speaks to the huge impact the hut tax had on their way of life since they would 
be, for the need for tax money, forced to supply labour to the surrounding farms and 
industries within the Cape Colony. In proportion to the ‘services’ provided to Africans by 
the Cape government, the requirement for paying hut taxes was baseless. The post 
slavery period caused a lot of disillusionment to ex slaves and the only available help was 
from mission stations which could not support many who thronged them (Ross, 1993, p. 
144). Those who remained ‘apprenticed’ on farms could not escape “cycles of thraldom 
and debt peonage” and those who sought independent rural lives had to pay tax (Ross, 
1993, p. 145).  
3.5.3 Public expenditure 
Expenditure of the Cape government was in the initial period, 1806-1840, focused on 
securing the colony and establishing order. In 1815 the British government took over the 
Cape Colony and had to shoulder the expenditure on the military for a newfound colony 
which could not defend itself. With settlers penetrating the interior and the Eastern 
frontier districts, policing, magistracy and other protective measures to allow human 
settlement were a priority. It is natural that for a colony, the first thing to worry about is 
establishing law and order justifying large expenditure on police, magistrates and prisons 
before thinking of education and public health care. Furthermore, public social spending 
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was small throughout the world at that time. The Cape governor Edmond Wodehouse’s 
view in 1867 was testimony to the limited and low government outlays in the Cape:  
Year after year sheep-famers have gone in search of wealth into regions more 
and more remote. You have thought it right to follow them with posts, police 
and magistracy which they are now most desirous of retaining (Houghton & 
Dagut, 1973, p. 22). 
This clearly shows the initial concern of settlers as they moved into the interior and this 
would justify significant part of the expenditure to be for securing the colony. It is 
important to consider the various ministerial divisions where data is available to see how 
expenditure was divided between the different ministries. Again this is possible for the 
period for which data are reasonably detailed and the picture in Figure 3.8 below sums 
this up well. This split of expenditure by ministerial division was done from 1875 when 
the Blue books were using ministerial divisions when recording the expenditure side. It 
is clear that the ‘Colonial Secretary’, ‘Treasury’ and ‘Public works and crown lands’ 
dominated the expenditure of the colony (figure 3.8). The colonial secretary represents 
various expenditure items which were of great importance to the general affairs of the 
colony. These include public health (lunatic asylums, hospitals), security and order 
(police and gaols, Cape colonial forces), education and welfare (Robben Island, paupers, 
public worship).  
Figure 3.9 supports the general notion discussed above that there was no significant 
departure from providing colonial order in the early decades of the Cape’s existence 
under the British colonial administration. Figure 3.9 captures the reality of the colony 
over time by taking the total expenditure and dividing it to trace the changing shares of 
‘Administration, law and order’-related expenditure versus ‘public works and utilities’ 
which shows development-oriented investment. This is a rough measure that divides the 
total expenditure in two categories but it demonstrates the changing pattern of public 
expenditure from the 1870s. Since this is shown in per capita terms, it shows that mineral 
discovery brought structural change to the expenditure regime as more was spent on pro-
development investment. What is clear from figure 3.8 is that from 1873 there was a 
sudden change from the colonial focus on administration, law and order to the state 
driven focus on infrastructural development led by the investment in railways and the 
telegraphic system.  
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Figure 3. 7 Expenditure by ministries, as shares of total expenditure 
 
Source of data: Blue books (1875-1910) 
Figure 3. 8 Per capita expenditures over time. 
 
Source of data: Blue books (1830-1909) 
The ministerial division of expenditure is too aggregated and further classification is 
necessary to see the expenditure priorities of the colony. In other words, information is 
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needed on the functions discharged by the Cape Government, and analysis of ministerial 
divisions is an inadequate basis for obtaining such information. As a result, it is important 
to have a functional classification. Six categories were developed namely human 
resources, colonial administration, defence and military, law and order, national debt 
services and ‘public works and utilities’ (public works henceforth). This classification was 
adopted from Peacock and Wiseman (1961a) and the Appendix (Table 6.4) has the list of 
items in each category. Figure 3.10 below shows how expenditure of the Cape changed 
over time. In the period prior to 1870, the expenditure on colonial administration and on 
law and order took significant proportions compared to the period after 1870. 
Expenditure on public works was important but did not exceed the other categories by a 
huge amount. 
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Figure 3. 9 Functional classification of expenditure 
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Source of data: Blue books (1827-1909) 
From the 1870s onwards, when the Cape economy grew through diamond mining, the 
dominance of public works and national debt servicing is clear from figure 3.10 above 
and this was the leading cause of the high level of the debt/GDP ratios discussed in 
chapter 6. Public works is generally the highest and is due to the role of railway 
construction and the 1875 spike was because of the substantial amount spent by the Cape 
government on the Port Elizabeth railway construction. Much of the borrowed funds, as 
indicated by Robertson (1935, p. 14), became sunk capital in construction works. The 
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overall trends shown by expenditure is that the leading shares of total expenditure were 
public works driven largely by public debt and as a result debt servicing occupied the 
second place.25 The expenditure side is therefore incomplete without the story of the 
growth of the public debt in the colony.  
3.5.4 Public debt 
When and why was debt necessary and in what form? When the economy showed signs 
of improving from the 1860s and 1870s after self-governance was granted, public debt 
became an important source of financing for public expenditure projects. Buying out 
private railways and the telegraphic system was done through government debentures 
listed in London capital markets. Developing these public utilities also entailed a 
substantial increase in public debt. Analysing the parliamentary budget speech debates 
from 1820 to 1910 reveals that public debt was a subject of contention praised by some 
parliamentarians and abhorred by others. The parliamentary debates highlight the 
contradictory views which constantly recurred concerning public debts in the debates 
until the union was formed in 1910. The main argument for higher debt levels was that 
there was need for capital in the country if progress was to be made and resorting to debt, 
foreign debt in particular, was the only option since local financial markets were not fully 
developed. The opposing view was that the Cape’s economy was not grown yet to support 
high levels of public debt and that the increasing debt was going to be unsustainable. For 
instance in opposition of higher debt Mr Merriman stood and remarked (also bringing 
the municipal debt in):  
I classify myself amongst these pessimists who consider a gigantic debt not as 
a satisfactory feature of the colony. How is it that towns do not seem 
prosperous? There seems to be a dead weight upon them. Why? It is because 
of the enormous size of municipal debt. The municipal debt is now £5 700 000 
whereas in 1891 it was £885 000. They had more than doubled the public debt 
between 1899 and 1905. …The easy way in which money can be raised is an 
inducement to extravagance among municipalities; it encourages them to rush 
to the treasury to borrow money for what they are pleased to call 
                                                 
25 The accumulation of debt was gradual but the debt servicing grew to become a huge burden on the colony. 
For instance, Mr Merriman in 1908 remarked in parliamentary debate that, “The total debt of the country 
stands at £55 421 000 and the interest payable on the loan is £1 905 000. This is an unsatisfactory feature 
that we send such an amount over the water to Europe every year (House of Assembly budget debates 
1908, p.97). 
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improvements. Why, some of the most stinking villages in the Colony, reeking 
with typhoid fever, have magnificent town halls? (House of Assembly budget 
debates, 1906, p. 215). 
The above quote from Mr Merriman shows the one side which heavily opposed public 
debt in the colony while other parliamentarians treated it is as necessary for 
development. The leading sector attracting public debt was railway construction followed 
by harbours which were administered by harbour boards. The municipal debt was also 
important and it varied between the municipalities with the bigger municipalities 
borrowing more. Figure 3.8 shows the debt recorded as a percent of GDP. This is the 
combination of the debt by the central government and the harbour boards which 
constituted a smaller portion of public debt.  
There is a clear rise in public debt of the colony peaking in 1886. This is the period when 
the Cape government borrowed heavily in the aftermath of the ‘diamond crisis’. The debt 
was raised for further investment in the railway system from Kimberley to Johannesburg. 
Before the 1870s government borrowing was limited and the desire of the government 
to avoid ambitious public works also worked indirectly to keep public debt low. Once the 
mineral led economy started growing, the expenditure was possible and hence public 
debt also started growing rapidly as shown from 1873 to 1886 depicted by figure 3.11. 
According to De Kiewiet (1957, p. 98): 
A low public debt, so necessary in the sixties was no longer wise, for the time 
had come to knit this sprawling land together and to bridge, in more ways than 
one, the gap between the coast and the interior. 
Figure 3.11 below shows the picture described above very well. The debt of the colony 
was growing very slowly from the 1860s up to 1875 when there was a sudden increase. 
What this demonstrated was that when governments did not own big parastatals such as 
railways, there was no big need for massive expenditure justifying huge debt. Corporate 
boards, mainly harbour boards, were not highly indebted and in most cases their debts 
were underwritten by the state. This means that the Cape’s debt obligations mainly fell on 
the government since it had to guarantee the debts of the municipalities, divisional 
councils and harbour boards as well.   
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 108 
 
Figure 3. 10 Cape Colony’s debt 
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Source of data: Blue books (1860-1909) 
The Cape Government had autonomy as far as public debt was concerned. Overall, the 
picture of the Cape government public debt is that it rose drastically and was the key 
driver of the public expenditure. The picture given is most likely to be an underestimate 
because the municipal debt is not included in the above graph. This is because it was not 
recorded systematically but a future study focusing on the municipalities will be able to 
complement this central government debt discussion.  
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that the shift from a company run colony to a British 
settler colony brought many changes with far reaching implications for the history of 
South Africa. Transvaal, Natal and the Orange Free State emerged out of the developments 
at the Cape and this means that the Cape played a big role in shaping the South African 
history in the 19th century. If the case for a modern fiscal state can be argued, it is clear 
that the Cape had these features (central revenue, permanent debt, commitment to 
welfare and limited democracy) from 1872 onwards. These features were not perfect, like 
in many early forms of fiscal modernity, but were refined over time. The evolution of 
public finances followed general political and economic developments at the Cape.  
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The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley shook the economy from a lower equilibrium in 
which the government was not ambitious and strictly followed the norm of balanced 
budgets, resisting pressure from people for more and better infrastructure such as roads 
and railways. In this low equilibrium there was nothing to justify high levels of public debt 
and the government relied heavily on short term loans to support its meagre revenues 
whenever the need arose. The low equilibrium was unsettled by the positive shock of the 
discovery of diamonds which also coincided with self-governance and responsible 
governance at the Cape. Once the government took over the railways and telegraphic 
systems, there was a strong push towards public works and the state became enterprising 
using the public purse. The inadequacy of revenue for capital intensive investment in 
public works (railways, harbours, telegraphs, roads) entailed that public debt had to 
become a permanent feature of the colonial finances.26 This led the expenditure on public 
works and debt servicing to take the biggest portions of the public finances. 
What comes out clear in this chapter is the dominance of customs revenue followed by 
railway receipts. On the expenditure side, public works dominate and represented above 
80% of all ‘public works and utilities’ of the colony throughout its existence. Public debt 
thus follows a pattern driven by the railway expenditure and towards the end of its 
existence, the Cape had about 55 million pounds of debt that required 2 million pounds 
each year to service it. This was in the face of diminished railway traffic – and hence 
railway receipts – and diminished customs revenue. It is upon this foundation that the 
subsequent chapters are built.  
  
                                                 
26 The governor, Henry Barkly, in his speech in 1871 remarked that “Reproductive works such as harbours 
should not be left subject to such provision as can be afforded from year to year out of the annual revenue 
of the colony, but that it would be better and more economical, in the long run, that whenever the 
engineering plans have been approved, and it has been decided to commence their execution, and Act 
should be passed, authorising the raising as speedily as occasion may require of funds for the estimated 
costs.” 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAPE COLONY’S FISCAL CAPACITY  
 
As usual, and in an increasing measure, the revenue rests upon great sources 
of Customs and Railways; which together produces more than two thirds of 
colonial income, while they exhibit fluctuations impossible to forecast that are 
a despair of any colonial Treasurer who has to base his expenditure on 
forecast of returns (Mr Merriman in the House of Assembly budget debates, 
1892, p. 28). 
The Cape (by the end of its existence in 1909) was in dire circumstances having 
handled 80% per cent of the Transvaal carrying trade and were now reduced 
to 12%. The practice of using the railways as instruments of taxation was 
tacitly accepted by all states as they had no other sources of revenue besides 
railway and customs (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 128). 
4.1 Introduction  
The above quotes confirm what has been shown in chapter 3 concerning the dominance 
of customs revenue followed by railway receipts. Minimising effort rather than 
maximising revenue has been a strategy of other African colonies as the colonial 
governments avoided costly interventions and direct clashes with the citizens. The Cape 
Colony, by virtue of having many settlers of Dutch and British origin, portray an 
interesting dynamic because the tax structure had to be aligned with the expectations of 
the different races and classes. The discovery of diamonds was a crucial event that 
determined whether the Cape was going to build diversified fiscal institutions or allow 
vested interests to determine the tax structure. This chapter seeks to investigate why the 
colonial government could not diversify away from customs taxes and railway revenue. 
It also investigates the extent to which the Cape sought to maintain internal peace and 
order by avoiding burdensome direct taxes which could be costly to administer and 
potentially prone to raise dissent by the citizens. It also investigates whether the reliance 
on customs (indirect taxes) and reliance on state owned railway service provision was 
the best of all possibilities for fiscal capacity-building. The different interest groups 
represented by the political and economic elite were decisive with regards to the 
structure of the tax system. Chapter 2 discussed England’s income tax, introduced in 
1840, which took more time in the Cape being introduced only in 1904. The resistance to 
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direct forms of taxation, led by the mining interests, is what is exposed as the major 
problem causing the poor diversification of the fiscal system.  
Section 4.2 will discuss the general determinants of tax and non-tax revenue. This is 
important in order to tease out whether the Cape Colony had attained a level of 
development that allowed more extraction of revenue given the available tax handles. 
Section 4.3 delves into the effects of the British Imperial policies on the Cape’s fiscal 
strategy. Section 4.4 discusses the effects the discovery of diamond and its legislative 
environment that shaped and acted as a benchmark to many other industries. Section 4.5 
discusses fiscal decentralisation and the complementary role played by municipal fiscal 
developments. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.   
4.2 Determinants of tax and non-tax revenue 
In each country, the taxation charged has to be negotiated between government and 
citizens and this means legitimacy is important for voluntary compliance from citizens. 
This entails that each country imposes taxes that are guided by the prevailing social 
contract with more acquiescence being sought in democratic leaning regimes. Things 
were not necessarily so in colonial times when many of the modern democratic norms 
were not fully applied. The fact that the Cape had many settlers made it a better settler 
colony administratively than cases of indirect rule where there were no elaborate state 
institutions. State–society interaction was more involved and there was a sense of the 
need to empower the state with fiscal means for it to roll out basic functions like 
administering justice. The integration of the black Africans remained a continuous 
challenge and the Cape colonial government had to introduce black African taxes such as 
hut tax.  
The challenge of dealing with a 19th century colony is properly contextualising the 
revenue expectations and this is a useful premise in order to make sure we are not asking 
too much from the colonial government operating in the 19th century. The kind of taxes 
to be expected are usually consonant with the period being considered. For colonies, the 
metropolitan developments were vitally important in informing taxation. This is in line 
with chapter 2, and prevailing practices in Britain and other European countries provide 
a broader context within which the Cape was located. For instance section 2.3.1 shows 
that in Britain customs and excises constituted about 45% of total revenue and this helps 
to build expectations for the Cape. While the taxes of the colonial governments were not 
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entirely transplanted from the metropolitan centres, it makes sense that the colonies at 
least followed the lead of fiscal developments of the motherland.  
In trying to understand the current challenges of taxation in Africa, Mkandawire (2010) 
has tentatively pushed the boundaries backwards into colonial history. He followed Amin 
(1972) by dividing Africa into three distinct regions – Africa of the labour reserves, Africa 
of the colonial trade and Africa of the concession companies. The premise of this 
argument is that the economic and political setup of the colonies were important because 
they determined the fiscal inertia and what is seen today is a path-dependent outcome of 
colonial systems. Mkandawire’s conclusion is that the current relative success of the 
former ‘Africa of the labour reserves’ in raising tax revenues depends largely on the 
inherited practices that constitute ‘initial conditions’ of the structure of the economy, 
politics and degrees of formality of economic activities. Mkandawire (2010) gave the 
need for security by settlers as a possible explanation of why settler colonies, included 
those in his ‘Africa of the labour reserves’, have higher tax levels in the current period. 
With lower levels of informalisation in labour reserve economies, alternative ways of life 
were fewer than in cash crop economies (Mkandawire, 2010, p. 1653). He further argued 
that settler colonists had a Faustian bargain with the colonial state given that they were 
constantly at war with the indigenous tribes27 and this led to them to accepting higher 
taxes which persisted into the modern day tax structure. This is the fiscal ‘inertia’ 
argument that argues that taxes and the behaviour they incentivise tend to outlive the 
initial reasons for which they were introduced (Peacock & Wiseman, 1961b; Zolt & Bird, 
2005).  
One of the key challenges to Mkandawire’s (2010) thesis is that an implicit assumption is 
made that the imperial influence, direct or indirect, is held constant over time and across 
colonies. This also implies that the imperial government’s relations with colonies did not 
matter in how tax revenues were raised. This is problematic because the legislature 
behind the tax regimes of some British colonies in Africa was indirectly influenced by 
capital from London and imperial diplomacy. To assume that the colonial tax systems 
                                                 
27 This was evident, though to a lesser degree, at the Cape when in the face of the depredation by the black 
Africans a commando tax was imposed which was meant to be for protection from the black African tribes 
on the frontier. Those on the frontier keenly paid the tax rather than clash with the tribes on their own. The 
commission of inquiry on public finances (1826, p. 191) reported that “The early commando taxes were 
also raised in order to administer protection of the frontier from independent tribes.” 
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were outcomes of entirely colonists’ wishes and other purely local economic 
determinants is problematic. Even the so called self-governing colonies or dominions had 
to have their bills assented to by her Majesty’s government – the so called ‘signification’. 
Once this assumption is relaxed, it is clear that what is referred to in literature as ‘colonial 
states’ are actually mere colonial territories whose status in sovereignty was less than 
that of an ancient village with a king. A ‘colonial state’ should be understood as an 
unnatural state.   
Before considering the complicating imperial effects on the revenues raised in colonial 
territories, it is important to briefly look into the general factors considered to affect the 
overall tax performance. These are factors which in theory should bear on the tax base of 
an economy, whether it is a colony or a sovereign country. Musgrave (1969) has been 
highly influential and informed most studies on tax efforts. His argument is that structural 
variables (or tax handles), other than the efforts of government, such as the extent of 
economic diversification and the character of economic activities, determine the taxable 
capacity and hence expected tax performance. For instance, agricultural economies, 
especially those dominated by peasant farming, are very difficult and even irrational to 
tax but over time the expectation is that industrialisation brings more taxable capacity 
through different avenues such as manufacturing, trade and increased consumption. The 
literature shows that usual tax handles (structural features of an economy that facilitates 
tax collection) include, among others: The level of GDP, shares of imports and imports to 
GDP, population density, urbanisation, share of agriculture in GDP and share of 
manufacturing in GDP (Davoodi & Grigorian, 2007; Mkandawire, 2010; Stotsky & 
WoldeMariam, 1997; Teera & Hudson, 2004). The tax effort, an index that compares 
expected to realised revenues, is only a crude measure which has to be carefully 
considered and applied differently given the circumstances of each country – rather a 
guiding metric that should not be mechanistically applied. According to Teera and 
Hudson (2004, p. 797):  
It is however important to emphasize that a low index of tax effort does not 
necessarily indicate that the country should raise taxes nor does a high index 
indicate that taxes should be lowered. Such a decision should emerge from a 
careful consideration of expenditure needs, alternative sources of finance, the 
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effects of the particular taxes that would be changed, administrative 
capability, and the political acceptability of the program. 
It is clear that this approach, although a good guideline of what could be expected in taxes 
given the existing tax handles, does require intimate knowledge of each country before 
any advice can be given. This also reflects on the importance of country studies and case 
studies which investigate the socio-political factors (Musgrave, 1992). The above 
approach is even difficult to extend to the colonial period in which data are unreliable or 
simply unavailable and as a result tax effort and fiscal performance in general tend to be 
measured through the use of blunt measures. Consequently, in the colonial period 
additional qualitative evidence is needed not only for complementing the quantitative 
measures but also to unpack the influence of the imperial factors affecting the levels of 
tax revenue in a colonial setup. According to Good (1979, 610), the difficult feature known 
by the colonists continuously was the “inelastic and slow administration from Downing 
Street” – making any fiscal reform difficult. The example of North American colonies 
discussed in chapter 2 attests to this. 
The explanatory variables of the tax effort literature, mentioned above, are also 
important as a guideline to understand the Cape Colony’s fiscal evolution and indeed a 
selected number of variables are possible to quantify with the available data. The 
literature works only as a guideline that helps to point out key tax handles of the colony 
since some of the economic determinants of tax levels tend to be similar in colonies and 
in sovereign countries. In other words, we seek factors that explain the growth of the 
tax/GDP ratio of the Cape by looking at various sources of revenue. These indicators, 
which are consistent with the tax effort literature, include per capita GDP from Magee et 
al. (2016), imports and exports from Schumann (1938) and external debt from the 
compiled public finance data from the Blue books. Economic factors were very important 
because the GDP growth, growth of exports and imports, external debt, agriculture, 
mining, transportation and communication industries had major implication for the 
taxable capacity of the Cape.  
These factors became more important as the Cape economy expanded. The liberalisation 
of local trade and international trade by the British administration strengthened the 
taxable capacity of the Cape over time. This chapter will present trends in the level and 
composition of government revenue, and use these general factors affecting the tax 
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revenue in relation to GDP to discuss and structure the qualitative evidence used in the 
discussion of the patterns.    
4.3 The imperial effect on the Cape Colony’s revenue strategy  
4.3.1 The colonial status and state capacity 
Here the emphasis is given to those aspects of the empire-colony relationship which had 
a strong bearing on the fiscal capacity development of the Cape Colony. These factors 
were important, besides the usual economic tax handles discussed above, in shaping a 
unique social and political order within which taxation was levied. The ‘empire effect’28 
was strong in the Cape, as the first major imperial project on the African continent, 
through avenues of the evolving colonial status and state capacity, the pre-eminence of 
British capital and the native issues. These were quite interwoven issues which plagued 
the British Empire administrators not only at the Cape but also in almost every British 
colony and it is important to see how these affected the Cape’s fiscal trajectory. 
The Cape Colony’s status in the early decades was, from the British Government’s 
perspective, a crown colony that served to secure the route to the East Indies. In the 
words of Kilpin (1930:37) it also served as “a convenient asylum to Britain’s surplus 
population which was in poverty and the depression of the aftermath of the war with 
France and the industrial revolution”. The behaviour of governors who had been told that 
colonial revenue was the private property of King George IV was unquestioned by local 
colonists as long as the governors had been trusted with the colony by Downing Street in 
the first place (Grundlingh, 1937, p. 11; Kilpin, 1930, p. 50). India and other colonies had 
charters, even the VOC as the predecessor of British rule at the Cape had one, which had 
full guidelines as to how these colonies were to be run but the Cape relied on one 
autocratic governor up to 1833 when the legislative council was put in place (Grundlingh, 
1937). In the first half of the 19th century: 
                                                 
28 According to Gardner (2017, p. 237) the ‘empire effect’ was the “willingness of investors to trust imperial 
institutions over unpromising local economic fundamentals” in the colonies. It is premised on the notion 
that the British authorities desired colonies to prosper and were willing to assist especially with easy access 
to capital. The implicit guarantees to colonial government loans was therefore important to the favourable 
reputation enjoyed by British colonies. The usage of this term (empire effect) in the study also broadly 
covers the advantages, beyond easy borrowing, enjoyed by the Cape by being part and parcel of the British 
Empire.  
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New governors could bring new constitutions in much the same way as one 
might bring out a new suit of clothes for a distant relative, trusting to luck and 
the tailor that the suit would be a good fit (Kilpin, 1930, p. 50).  
As a result of the above ‘trial and error’ approach, there were many institutional 
vicissitudes from the British imperial authorities as they tried many approaches to 
handling the Cape’s affairs. Outright authoritarianism and disregard for popular opinion 
from settlers had failed given the immigration of the 1820 settlers. The success of the anti-
convict protest in the 1840s testified to this relevance of public opinion. The attempt by 
the British government to make the Cape a penal colony was strongly resisted between 
1840 and 1850. The key argument from the settlers was that the Cape was emerging from 
the era of slavery and many of the former slaves would be contaminated by the new 
convicts which were to be brought to the colony. Despite the fact that Montagu had 
managed to improve roads using convict labour, the notion of becoming a penal colony 
did not agree with both Natal and the Cape Colony settlers (Anderson, 2016). Of 
importance is the argument that “This was an important moment for the Cape’s growing 
independence from London and the development of political unity” (Anderson, 2016, p. 
439). The subsequent granting of self-governance was spurred by this growing unity 
among the citizens and this was important for the advancement of representative 
institutions and the formation of state institution. With regards to the colonial status and 
state capacity, a crucial event for the Cape’s colonial status was the introduction of settlers 
in 1820 who had been used to British freedom and the ideals of liberty. 
The settlers awakened Downing Street into worrying about the affairs of the Cape and 
forced them to allow reforms that put the Cape on the path towards representative 
institutions in 1853 and responsible government in 1872 (McCracken, 1967). During the 
early decades the public revenue was mainly obtained from transfer duties on immovable 
property, duties on wine and brandy imports, stamp duties, customs duties and auction 
duties (De Kock, 1924, p. 83). To a large extent these sources were bequeathed to the 
British administration by the VOC which had long relied on these taxes (Fourie et al., 
2013). What the British Cape government did was to extend these taxes, abolish some and 
gradually introduce new ones. The commission of inquiry in 1826 shows this removal by 
the British colonial government at the Cape of impolitic trade restrictions of the VOC 
dispensation. The commission pushed for the: 
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…removal of various taxes such as tithes on the produce of the country 
brought to Cape town and Simon’s town by land; trade in bread and corn be 
declared free; import and export of corn to be permanently free of duty; 
reduction of taxes levied on sheep and oxen slaughtered in Cape Town; an 
entire reduction of market duties. Privileged and licenced butchers were to be 
stripped of many privileges which inhibited the remote areas of a fair trading 
practice (Commission of Inquiry on Public Revenue, 1826, p.36).  
In light of the above developments, state capacity and therefore legitimacy took different 
shapes starting from an autocratic kind in the early decades towards a representative and 
responsible government which could not ignore the popular desires of the electorate. 
Responsible governance in 1872 meant the creation of a veto player and the end of 
absolutist spending patterns, to use the language of Dincceco (Dincecco, 2015). Although 
the democratic institutions were not fully operative and representative, the state could 
not disregard the wishes of the people, at least the white males and the few members of 
other races who had voting power and therefore political voice. The franchise, despite 
being pegged sufficiently high to exclude the indigenous people, entailed that the state 
could induce a quasi-voluntary compliance among the tax payers (Levi, 1988) justified by 
the legitimacy of providing basic functions. It is worth noting that the state’s coercive 
capacity at the Cape Colony (discussed in chapter 2) was reinforced by the British 
Government’s financial support to the garrison at the Cape – a feature of the Cape’s public 
expenditure to be covered in chapter 5.  
 Mkandawire (2010, p. 1651) argued that colonists in settler colonies dominated in 
numbers by the indigenous majority were preoccupied with the need for security. He 
argued that the feeling of insecurity “produced in the minds of the denizens of the enclave 
a ‘laager mentality’, and the need for the construction of strong state apparatus for both 
administration and security.” This means that the settlers were ready to tolerate high 
taxation levels in exchange for a strong state that could protect them (Mkandawire, 2010, 
p. 1651). Data on taxes, especially direct taxes, shows that the colonists did not bear any 
strong burden for their security and defence. External defence responsibility is a defining 
feature of strong states (Besley & Persson, 2010, p. 528).  
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4.3.2 The pre-eminence of British capital 
If the British Empire’s success story is told, capital ought to be recognised as the leading 
tool of imperialism (Davis& Huttenback, 1986; Edelstein, 1982). This was true especially 
in the 19th century when mercantilism was giving way to cosmopolitan capital, which 
could move freely between major trading countries and centres. The role of British capital 
in the Cape Colony, be it in terms of private investors or loans obtained through 
government bonds, was very influential to the nature of the economy and the 
development of taxable capacity in its economy. This capital was crucial in railway 
construction, harbour developments, telegraphic systems and most importantly in 
private mining industry. The broad argument of this chapter hinges on the discovery of 
minerals as an external shock that set the Cape’s fiscal regime on an extractive and 
unsustainable path. The power of private business is strongly revealed by the Diamond 
Commission’s representation to the Cape government in1881: 
It is a notorious fact that the amount of money invested in Mining Companies 
is far beyond the resources of the community; and that, as a remedy for this, it 
is absolutely necessary that European and foreign capital should be 
introduced. This can be done only by the re-floating of Companies in the 
European market. If, however, a heavy tax, namely 4%, is put upon transfer, it 
will most seriously hamper such undertakings, and such a tax is absurdly 
disproportionate to the just dues of Government (Diamond Commission29, 
1881, p, 144). 
Once such advice was given to the state by the commissioners, some of whom had mining 
interests, there is ample evidence that the tax regime around mineral activities was 
benign due to the liberal tax legislation which favoured capital. The Diamond Commission 
represented the manner in which extractive institutions played out at the Cape because 
mining companies’ representatives entered parliament and then formulated how mining 
should be regulated. Mr Molteno’s argument in parliament points to the incidence of tax 
on diamonds and the fact that the diamonds were supposed to do more for the economy. 
He argued that: 
                                                 
29 The point to note is that the Diamond Commission comprised of people with vested interests in the 
mining industry as well as the state: Cecil John Rhodes, John X. Merriman, J.H. Lange, L. Hoskyns, et cetera.  
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It seems to me that some members opposite think that they manufactured 
diamonds, put them in to the ground. Every stone they take from the ground 
deprived the country of its wealth. The diamond buying syndicate absolutely 
control prices and that if we tax diamond it is not the industry which will pay 
it; it is the people all over the world who will pay -the vain man and the vain 
woman. Does the rich man care what he pays for diamonds? (House of 
Assembly budget debates, 1906, p. 248).  
The commission of inquiry into diamond mining in 1880 was a brainchild of Rhodes and 
his fellow parliamentarians with mining interests. According to Thomas (1996, p. 132), 
Rhodes and Robinson pushed the Act “clause by clause and most of its provisions went 
through serve for the flogging of illicit buyers and sellers”. With the dominance of mining, 
farming remained stagnant30 and yet heavily taxed while not receiving much support 
from the mining controlled government. Mr Stiglingh in support of Mr Molteno in 1906 
expressed the skewness of prevailing taxes in favour of mining and punitive against 
agriculture: 
There are about 3455 wine farms in the country, which reckon £3000 each 
and in aggregate represent a value of £10 365 000. De Beers, with its four 
mines, is worth more than £14 - 15 million. Now why should the wine farmers 
pay £165 000 more in taxes than De Beers? A tax on diamonds will be a very 
fair one. What did the Wesselton mine mean for the country? Annually it 
produced half a million worth of diamonds and not a sixpence was received by 
the government. No licence fee were paid, and yet police, magistrates, 
inspectors etc., had to be appointed and paid by the colony (House of Assembly 
budget debates, 1906, p. 265).  
The counter argument for capital was that the Cape Colony, being poor, had to create a 
conducive environment for business to thrive. This would have been more meaningful if 
diamond mining during this time had many forward linkages such as those found in 
                                                 
30 In his address on the financial position of the colony Mr Merriman argued for the focus on the “common 
denominator” which refers to the exports of the country excluding diamonds, gold and copper since they 
were rather fortuitous commodities on which not much hope had to be placed. Considering exports of the 
agricultural sector and all other produce of the colony outside minerals there was no difference between 
the exports realised in 1874 and 1890 and this to him reflected 16 years of stagnation of real economic 
prosperity of the colony. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 120 
 
manufacturing. The government had to rely on direct revenue from its railway lines and 
customs revenue as the major two sources of revenue. Due to fear of being ‘punished’ by 
capital, diamond mining was spared of direct taxation and this was the position of the 
Cape Government as distorted by the influence of the industry. The parliamentary 
debates show, through persistent representations, that the mining houses were left 
untouched by the tax regime. The mining benefits to the economy were not through 
government revenue, but spill overs through financial developments, and a nascent 
manufacturing sector alongside the wool based agricultural sectors (Schumann, 1938; 
Verhoef, 2014). This means that the Cape remained mainly a primary exporter of raw 
commodities up to the formation of the Union in 1910. The Cape’s case seems to be worse 
than a resource curse because government actually made things easier by providing 
transport infrastructure for the mining regime that was exclusive. The railways primarily 
linked the mining fields and before the union they had not brought much return to the 
Cape Colony’s remote interior places (Goodfellow, 1931a; Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 11). The 
railways could be seen as, from the fiscal perspective, simply assisting easy access to the 
Cape’s, and thus South Africa’s, minerals through a mineral-railways complex.31 The 
argument for a mineral-railway complex is elaborated further in Chapter 5.  
4.3.3 The black Africans and taxation  
Regarding taxation, the mining and agricultural interests were usually in rivalry from the 
1870s with the mining occupying the enviable position. Taxes were paid by farmers and 
other small businesses in the form of excises, land quitrent and customs duties on all 
imported goods. The black Africans’ role is also crucial because they also paid hut taxes 
and their in-kind contribution cannot be ignored. Over time the black Africans were 
compelled into a form of life in which their sustenance was derived from land and assets 
owned legally by the settlers (Austin, 2008a, p. 613; Good, 1976, p. 606; Plaatje, 1915, p. 
23). Amin (1972, p. 519) argued:  
We must remember that their (colonisers in the scramble for Africa) target was 
the same everywhere: to obtain cheap exports. But to achieve this, capital at 
                                                 
31 This was an unplanned and represented an unintended outcome from prevailing state institutions which 
were weak and could be manipulated by networks of businessmen, politicians and financiers. The 
businessmen involved in politics pushed the government towards a pro-mining tax regime and expenditure 
policies benefiting a few. This phrase is adopted from the work by Fine and Rustomjee (1997) when they 
studied 20th century South Africa and referred to a ‘minerals-energy complex’. In this case the role of the 
minerals–railway complex, was strong in influencing the direction of taxes and the spending patterns of 
the Cape.  
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the centre – which had now reached the monopoly stage – could organise 
production on the spot, and there exploit the cheap labour and the natural 
resources, by wasting or stealing them, i.e. by paying a price which did not 
enable alternative activities to replace them when they were exhausted. 
Moreover, through direct domination and brutal political coercion, incidental 
expenses could be limited by maintaining the local social classes as ‘conveyor 
belts’.  
Amin’s argument exposed the other dark side of the colonial systems which was the 
devastation of the indigenous people’s lives (Good, 1976, p. 601). These arrangements 
make the revenue calculations quite difficult, and at best an underestimate of the actual, 
because cheap labour and some of the forced economic activities are not taken into 
account – at best all the colonial measures of economic activities need to be approached 
with caution (Smith, 1777; Waijenburg, 2015). The primacy of capital posed a 
fundamental dilemma for the Cape government of striking a balance between creating a 
conducive business environment versus a mere rent-seeking environment. While it may 
be true that the intentions of the state was to create a business friendly environment, the 
businessmen involved in politics pushed to distort these desired outcomes. With limited 
forward and backward linkages in the primary extractive industries such as the mining 
sector, diamonds were essentially a non-renewable resource (Blattman, Hwang, & 
Williamson, 2007). Giving the mining sector control over the mining legislation meant 
that conducive business environment easily became inclined to extraction instead of 
spurring productive institutions.  
The parliamentary debates show that the level of taxes proposed was fair to the mining 
houses, as done in Transvaal, but there was strong resistance from the mining linked 
parliamentarians. The mining sector, therefore, successfully resisted taxes while it was 
the key beneficiary of government expenditures through public revenue. The payment of 
fees and licences for mining claims was not based on the profit or output and as a result 
they were puny compared to the value of exported diamonds. The Cape was thus locked 
into a path of extractive institutions which could not be easily reversed because 
accumulated debt needed to be serviced. The discovery of diamonds happened during the 
early phase of institutional development which left the dominant interest group with no 
countervailing intuitional forces.  
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Among the chief concerns of the imperial government in South African territories was the 
native affairs and the proof is in volumes and volumes of archived correspondence titled 
‘native affairs’ or broadly about the ‘native question’. In the Cape Colony this was 
complicated by the presence of the British colonists, Dutch colonists, former slaves and 
indentured labour. The granting of responsible government in the Cape was delayed 
because the British government worried about how the black Africans were going to be 
treated. The desire for a union or federation in the 1870s, in the British government’s 
perspective, was a move to provide a uniform policy towards the black Africans so that 
the European states in South Africa would not appear to be divided on the native question. 
The last few of the series of frontier wars had been costly to the colonial office and having 
an agitated black African majority lingering around, rightly referred to in archival 
dispatches as ‘threatening conditions of the native affairs’, was seen as a huge risk.  
From the perspective of the British Government, however, the concern for black Africans 
was mainly to avoid the creation of uncertainty and instability which had huge pecuniary 
implications (The colonial secretary, 1880, p. 3). Being seen by other powers as presiding 
over chaotic colonies would create a bad image and probably conjure other nations into 
thinking that the empire was insolvent and could not defend its territories. For this 
reason, the imperial authorities maintained that “the subject of defence and native policy 
should on no account be delegated to any subordinate authority” despite calls by colonists 
to be allowed to handle native issues (The colonial secretary, 1880, p. 1).  
With reference to the native question, the uniqueness of the Cape Colony in terms of 
population diversity meant that, although the Cape became a self-governing colony, it was 
still going to be remotely controlled from Downing Street. On the face of it, the imperial 
government seemed to be more sympathetic, for instance, to the proposed constitution 
with a low franchise, but their remoteness meant the default position was indifference as 
long as peace prevailed in the colonies. This indifference allowed the colonists to 
practically shape how the colonial government was going to relate with the black African 
population. This allowed a paternalistic relationship, along race and class lines, to develop 
at the Cape Colony over time with the black Africans reduced to an underclass only good 
to serve their European masters. Davenport (1978, p. 76) argued that the relationship 
between the settlers and the black Africans was moulded by British colonists’ 
“…paternalistic and circumscribed liberalism.”   
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With confinements such as proposed in various legislative vehicles and loss of their prime 
land by various means, a huge labour reserve was formed – a migrant labour force whose 
traditional way had been fundamentally destroyed (Amin, 1972). Legislatively, the Cape 
Parliament Registration Act of 1887, the Cape Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 and the 
Glen Grey Act of 1894 had far reaching consequences in disenfranchising the black 
Africans. Later, in Transvaal, a similar logic was at play as has been highlighted by Trapido 
(1971) in his exposition of the marriage of convenience between maize and gold mining. 
According to Morrell (1988, p. 619), “The gold and maize alliance also rested on a shared 
interest in the creation and preservation of a highly exploitable and disciplined black 
wage labour force.” The mines survived on farm produce, mainly maize, while farmers 
had a ready market and labour could be shared between these two major sectors which 
complemented each other.  
For the Cape, the implication for the fiscal regime was important. Of all the direct taxes in 
the Cape a major form of direct revenue was the hut tax which directly affected the way 
of life of the black Africans and complemented the legislative vehicles mentioned above. 
According to Act 3 of 1869, the Hut Tax Consolidation Act, heavy penalties were imposed 
on non-payment of hut tax, through cattle seizure and burning of any hut for which no 
owner could be ascertained. There was no sign of such draconian measures taken against 
non-payment among settlers. Of all the direct tax revenue sources (income tax, tithes on 
wine and grain, land taxes and hut tax), the hut tax and land tax are the only two that 
endured as direct taxes for a long time. Income tax came to be implemented only in 1904 
meaning that the indigenous people bore the heavier direct tax burden if ability to pay 
principle is considered. Figure 4.1 below compares land quit rent and hut taxes as key 
forms of direct taxes in the Cape Colony. 
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Figure 4. 1 Major sources of direct taxes (as shares of total revenue) 
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Figure 4.2 shows that land revenues shrank as a share of total revenue while the hut taxes, 
brutally enforced, grew over time to out-perform land revenue from 1902 onwards.32 
Assuming that quitrents were paid by both settlers and the few black African land owners, 
while hut taxes were mainly obtained from blacks, it is easy to see the increasing burden 
on the blacks.33 It is therefore possible to argue that the hut tax was not only meant for 
revenue extraction but also for organising black Africans in a way that made them depend 
on their labour for survival. 
This tax structure of the Cape left the tax burden on colonists very low, at least as far as 
direct taxes were concerned, and consequential on the black Africans and their 
livelihoods. The black Africans, after their pastoral and other means of livelihood were 
decimated, did consume the imports of the colony in terms of food items and textile 
products hence they paid indirect taxes to the state besides their direct hut taxes. This 
was especially true for those who were becoming more and more dependent on supplying 
                                                 
32 Lord Milner’s argument in 1902 is revealing concerning the low to insignificant land taxes when he 
argued that “I do not think for example, that a charge of one shilling on every 100 acres should be called a 
tax, and indeed I believe it is not” (quoted in Davis and Huttenback 1986, p. 232). 
33 Mr Hay argued in parliament in 1896 that “It is well to know that these (black Africans) people are 
contributing handsomely to the taxation of the country and that they are paying up the large amount of 
money demanded from them. These people could do even more than they were doing at the time if only 
they were delivered from the curse of cheap drink.” Later in 1906 Mr Walton argued that for the first time 
in the colony the expenses of the native administration have been covered entirely by revenue raised 
through hut taxes (House of Assembly budget debates 1906, p. 171). 
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their labour for survival. The colonists who could afford expensive imports did pay taxes 
through customs. Within the black African population the taxable capacity was very low 
and hut taxes could push them to supply their labour to farms and mines in order to raise 
not only hut tax but also livelihood after their means of life had been discontinued by the 
colonial system. In both Natal and the Cape Colony, chiefs were used as a way, although 
their powers were reduced gradually, of indirectly controlling the black Africans (Grobler, 
2014, p. 161). In other words, the British Government's preference for peace and stability 
throughout the Empire meant that revenue for the administration of native affairs had to 
be sourced from the black Africans themselves while the imperial authorities heavily 
protected the settlers through financing defence and security.  
The difference between direct tax and indirect tax reveals important facts about the 
nature of the fiscal system. According to Levi (1988) voluntary acquiescence of taxpayers 
comes from their perception of the legitimacy of the state. The 1840s in the Cape Colony 
was the period of dissent, aggravated by the anti-convict protests as discussed previously 
and in such an environment, where the composition of the legislature itself was 
questioned, it was difficult to impose any form of direct taxes. This was also the period 
when Britain itself was reintroducing income tax and it was for the first-time delinked 
from the wartime needs. In this regard the resistance to more direct forms of taxes in the 
1840s were justifiable, since the metropolitan had not introduced such a tax, compared 
to the period from the 1870s onwards. For the rest of the period direct revenues remained 
very low making the tax regime less diversified compared to that of Britain where income 
tax was permanently introduced in 1840. Figure 4.2 shows the patterns of direct and 
indirect taxes from 1856 to 1909. Direct tax revenue never exceeded 2.4% of GDP while 
the indirect taxes were substantial but declined over time from 20% of GDP in 1860s to 
about 5% in 1909. 
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Figure 4. 2 Shares of direct and indirect tax in GDP (1856=1910) 
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Source: Blue books (1830-1910) 
The dire financial situation in the second half of the 1860s led to the proposition of direct 
taxes in the form of income tax and property taxes with incomes of less than 50 pound 
per annum being exempted (Wodehouse, 1860, p. 1). This was rejected and over the years 
non-contentious indirect taxes were adjusted frequently as this did not alter the 
prevailing social contract of no payment of burdensome direct taxes. With more economic 
prosperity in the Cape, other indirect taxes such as excise taxes from 1879 were 
introduced, together with revision of the existing rates of these indirect taxes. One 
difficulty of this period was that merchants and farmers with mining interests often made 
it into the legislative council and the house of assembly where they resisted the increase 
of taxes. Foreign capital, in mining and other sectors, was also not easy to tax directly and 
with the company regulatory framework not yet fully developed the onus was simply on 
the company to argue why they could not pay a certain tax. One example of such a petition 
was from Standard Bank in 1864 against the government’s proposed stamps and licence 
bill: 
That your petitioners beg to submit to your honourable house that the 
proposed mode of raising a duty upon the subscribed capital of joint stock 
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companies, as set forth in the schedule annexed to the bill, is one which is 
wrong in principle and inequitable in its nature. This will stop shareholders 
from being interested in this colony from the mother country and other parts. 
Your petitioners submit that an impost upon the subscribed capital of the 
Standard Bank would bear with quadruple weight upon its working capital 
and would be therefore be unjust and unfair (Kirkwood and three others, 
1864).  
The only remaining means of government to raise revenue from companies was mainly 
through the imposition of licences and stamps for companies wishing to conduct business 
in the Cape. This made the prospect of owning public utilities an attractive role for the 
government because it could easily guarantee the sufficiency of the government revenue 
by making railways a tool of revenue. This extended to other public utilities such as 
telegraphic systems which in many ways were already, even under private ownership, 
subsidised by the state (Barkly, 1872). The reliance on indirect taxes had negative 
implications for the poor and the black Africans who were also paying these taxes through 
consumption taxes. Expediency was dominating any sound policy on revenue because 
whatever yielded the least dissent was adopted.34 The reliance on indirect revenues 
meant that the following statement applied to the Cape: 
Despite an official commitment to free trade, simplification of collection and 
minimisation of political turmoil appear to have carried more weight with the 
treasury and colonial office than the words “comparative advantage” (Davis& 
Huttenback, 1986, p. 235). 
When the existing social contract is difficult to navigate on the tax front, one British India 
tax officer’s view holds. He argued concerning India that you have to “hit your man where 
you can hit him” (Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 237). This entails that even if the policy 
goals such as free trade promotion are violated in the process, it does not matter as long 
as revenue accumulates for the state. An important distinction was that some colonies 
had no option but to stick to specific taxes available while others had more room for 
                                                 
34 Although there is no full information on the tax structure of the Colony of Mauritian, the burden was high 
for the poor. For instance the Governor of Mauritius, Hamilton Gordon, in 1871 remarked “I am appalled 
by the incidence of taxation on the Island. It falls almost wholly on the poor, who are made to pay in almost 
every conceivable way, while the rich are pretty well exempt from taxation” (Davis and Huttenback 1986, 
p.236) 
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exploiting their tax bases and did not do it. The Cape, I argue, fell into the latter group 
where the outcome was not an inevitable outcome of prevailing economic conditions or 
existing tax handles but of political and economic interest bargaining.  
4.4 The discovery of diamonds, responsible governance and the tax regime 
4.4.1 Structural changes to the economy  
The discovery of diamonds brought structural changes to the Cape economy. Most of the 
revenue trends in chapter 3 show significant shifts or breaks in the mid-1870s as a result 
of the mining boom and state ownership of railways as a key revenue producing entity. 
Figure 4.3 below also supports this shift in the 1870s and the structural break test 
identified 1876 as the break year.35 This was the year in which mining activities became 
significant and this was manifested in the revenue of the Cape as phrases such as 
“financial prosperity” or “unprecedented prosperity” featured more in the public finances 
section of the governor’s speeches in parliament. The annexation of the diamond field, a 
territory contested between Transvaal, Orange Free State and the chief of Griqualand, was 
seen to be economically beneficial to the colony which mainly relied on wool farming 
prior to this period.   
Figure 4. 3 Structural break in the total non-tax revenue 
 
Data source: Blue books (1940-1910) 
                                                 
35 The structural break observed for public revenue is consistent with the recent work enquiring when 
exactly South Africa became integrated into the global economy. Boshoff and Fourie (2017, p. 19) argued 
that, “…the start of South Africa’s integration into the global market economy was in the 1870s.” 
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The graph only depicts the non-tax revenue category because it directly made the 
difference in the public revenues through public utilities. Tax revenue took time to reflect 
the changes because the government did not respond with new taxes while the purchase 
of privately owned railways by the government meant a sudden leap in revenue captured 
by the break in figure 4.3. It is clear that the major response of the Cape government to 
the newfound mineral ‘jackpot’ was the acquisition of public utilities, mainly railways and 
telegraphic systems, which then became instruments of revenue. Figure 4.4 shows the 
general trends in tax and non-tax revenue as percentages of GDP. The  non-tax revenue 
percentages rose sharply from 1876 and this was mainly driven by the railway gross 
receipts. Tax revenues declined over time and this supports the unsustainability of the 
fiscal path which the Cape was pursuing. With the economic buoyancy, there was no 
diversification of taxes as the non-tax revenue was growing as a share of GDP.  
Figure 4. 4 Tax and non-tax revenue (% GDP) 
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Sources: Blue books (1850-1910); GDP figures form Verhoef et al. (2014, pp. 29–30) 
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Figure 4. 5 Elasticities of government revenue components, 1855-1910 
 
Sources: Blue books (1850-1910); GDP figures from Verhoef et al. (2014, pp. 29–30) 
Figure 4.5 shows that revenue from different sources grew as the economy (GDP) grew 
and this supports the structural change argument as all the revenue sources show higher 
magnitudes of positive responsiveness (1876-1880s). The responsiveness of tax 
revenues to changes in GDP (tax elasticity) shows that as the GDP changed so did the 
taxes. Breaking down the tax revenue into direct and indirect tax revenue shows that it 
was only indirect taxes which were very responsive – especially from the mineral 
discovery period. From 1885 onwards the direct tax category shows a less responsive 
pattern and it was low compared to the rest of the categories and pointing to low efforts 
towards fiscal diversification. The influence of the mining industry in resisting direct 
taxes was the leading factor and throughout the parliamentary debates any direct tax on 
other sectors was resisted with the mining sector being a negative benchmark. The 
mining companies showed unwillingness even regarding the meagre taxes they were 
supposed to pay, such as licences, and had to be pushed to pay. The colonial Treasurer, 
Mr Sprigg, expressed this in his 1885 speech when he argued that: 
There is an important body of which a great deal has been heard in this House 
recently, the Mining board of Griquland West. Perhaps the house will be 
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surprised to hear that this wealthy mining board, these people who represent 
themselves to be the great financial stay of the colony, owe revenue of £20 
000, and I am sorry to say that I cannot get it out of those people. They admit 
their liability but they don’t pay (House of Assembly Budget debates, 1885, p. 
114).  
4.4.2 Responsible government and financial overhaul  
The early 1870s was an eventful time in the Cape Colony and these events include the 
granting of responsible government, mineral discovery and the formation of state 
utilities. The new responsible government could not operate on a non-transparent basis 
because they now had to be accountable about their ability to run the colony 
transparently not only to the imperial authority, but also to the electorate. Earlier, during 
the early council years, the financial discussions were “very circumscribed and the council 
was left in an awkward position of not being able to repeal taxes which by common 
consent were no longer required” (Kilpin, 1930, p. 63).   
There was a great need for financial system overhaul because, with the advent of 
responsible governance in 1872, public accounts were to be laid before parliamentary 
scrutiny every year. From 1872 onwards the ‘Receiver general ‘was replaced by a fully-
fledged treasury department which was no longer a mere depository of revenues and 
moneys, charged only with the custody and issue, but all the duties and responsibility, 
such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in England had. Before the 1870s the system was 
not systematic and transparent and it made auditing difficult. For instance, the Select 
Committee on the State of Public Finances in 1860 reported to the house:  
The committee has experienced much difficulty, in consequences of no fixed, 
definite, clear and easily understood plan being adhered to, in making out of 
the public accounts, and the fact that loans and advances being mixed up with 
revenue (Select Committee on Finance, 1860, p. 4). 
This was not only a problem at the central level, inherited from the early decades of 
British Cape Colony years; the divisional districts’ revenues were also problematic. With 
the advent of responsible government, a commission was set up in 1874 to investigate 
the system of audit and public accounts of the Cape Colony and they recommended the 
treasury department to be led by a “Controller and auditor general of public accounts.” 
This was enacted into legislation in the Audit Act of 1875.  
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The further speeches and commissions of enquiries into public revenue show that the 
responsible government brought with it significant changes in public accounts even in the 
manner of accounting practices. More transparent reporting was now required to replace 
the obscure old system of handling of public accounts. The growth of the British Empire 
and the incessant reports of absentee governors earning high salaries also called for more 
robust accountability by the British government on all its colonies (Gardner, 2015, p. 10). 
For instance, the commissioners appointed by the governor in 1874 to investigate the 
system of audit and public accounts recommended in 1875 that: 
The revenue of certain heads such as customs, stamps, licences be stated in 
greater detail and the same should be done for expenditure in order for a clear 
comparison of votes and actual expenditure and that a ‘Controller and Auditor 
General of public accounts’ should be appointed (Commission of Inquiry into 
Public Finances, 1874, p. 184). 
For the divisional councils, the financial system was even more chaotic and in need of 
change since it was subject to corruption and more obscure. Governor P.E Wodehouse’s 
speech was revealing: 
With a cursory examination the accounts of the divisional councils are very 
unsatisfactory and indeed worthless. Transactions of every description are 
blended together, legitimate revenue is mixed up with sums borrowed without 
authority of law and in many cases accounts are not signed by auditors nor is it 
known if any have been elected. The accounts submitted are deficient, evincing 
great carelessness on the part of the officers charged with the accounts 
(Wodehouse 1867, p. 1). 
The responsible government would no longer operate with such great carelessness 
especially with growing revenues from the growing economy. More generally, the 
representative and later the responsible government was partly going to be pivotal for 
the extension of the Cape’s political and economic interests towards the interior. In other 
words, the period of greater autonomy coincided with other developments that required 
decisions about the scope of the Cape Colony's political and economic influence. For 
instance, the period of representative government coincided with the rise of and 
implementation of the confederation idea in the British imperial policies, which meant 
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that the Cape government was pulled into the Confederation Wars against indigenous 
peoples and the Boer republics. These political developments are epitomised by 
politicians and capitalists such as Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner who had a huge role in 
the agitations leading to the Anglo-Boer war and political turmoil which led to the 
unification of South Africa in 1910. 
Within the captured data, the overhaul of public records is evident in that, instead of the 
revenue sources being classified vaguely as was the case before 1870, more details were 
provided. Before the Audit Act in 1875 the regulatory framework was inadequate and 
could not provide checks on unauthorised expenditures. The customs revenues from 
1876, for instance, were divided into import duties, export duties and wharfage duties for 
better clarity instead of being recorded as a single figure. The same applies to the 
expenditure side where clear categories had to be established for each department, in 
terms of how much went to salaries, transport and contingencies among others. 
Transparency was brought into the system and each year the various departments were 
supposed to make estimates of expected revenues to allow expenditure estimates to be 
done. In most years from the 1870s the estimates were quite conservative and they were 
in many cases exceeded by the actual revenue eventually received.  
Another important aspect of the public accounts overhaul was the Public Debt 
Consolidation Act 30 of 1870 which removed obscurity from public revenues. Before this 
Act, the ordinary revenues were mixed with short term loans and this rendered it difficult 
for the Cape government to accurately assess its financial position. The Act enabled the 
ordinary revenue accounts to be separated from the loan accounts and these two were 
managed separately henceforth. The public finance overhaul was imperfect in the sense 
that it did not separate public utilities such as the post office, railways and telegraphic 
systems out of the ordinary revenues. This provided a false sense of vibrant public 
accounts because these public utilities were run as tools of revenue without a clear fiscal 
strategy being pursued. This weakness in the financial accounts overhaul was invisible as 
long as the economy was performing well and the state received direct earnings from its 
utilities.  
4.4.3 Non-inclusive legislative policies  
The discovery of diamonds gave the colonial state an opportunity to determine the 
legislative framework to maximise the public revenue but this failed because of vested 
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interests. This is seen through the systematic resistance to paying taxes by the mining 
houses. Mr Molteno explicitly agreed with this premise:  
I have a shrewd suspicion that what I call the dishonest finance, the cruel 
finance of the government, a financial policy purely arranged in the interest of 
a certain section, and mostly in the interest of the people who do not live here, 
will be seen, and that scales will be taken off the eyes of the people (House of 
Assembly budget debates, 1906, p. 248). 
A clear contrast is observed in Transvaal where Gold Tax was introduced, going as high 
as 30 percent on output or profit, and the government also invested directly in gold 
mining (Colonial Office, 1897, p. 154). The Cape government, soon after annexing the 
diamond territory, moved in with a heavy handedness and relegated the established 
Diamond Committee into the background and appointed an inspector and a mining board. 
On this path the Cape was heavily involved in the activities of the mining fields and the 
miners disliked it since they were inclined towards self-governance through their self-
appointed committees. The miners wanted the government to intervene only in 
protecting lives, through safety engineers and property rights. According to the Diamond 
Commission Report (1881, p. 144), De Beers was involved in pressuring the government 
into making new legislation which was brought in in 1880. The new legislation gave 
power to the mining companies to govern themselves without government intervention. 
The mining legislation was thus heavily influenced by the mining companies whose 
owners were also influential in the Cape parliament. This seems to suggest some kind of 
a minimalistic legislative framework meant to allow the mining interests to have their 
way without countervailing institutional checks. Section 2.4.2 in chapter 2 highlighted 
that in the wake of the mineral discoveries, weak institutions cause a conditional resource 
curse and the state will not be able to leverage the resources for prosperity for all. 
Powerful groups can easily overwhelm the weak institutions and steer them in grabber 
friendly rather than production friendly directions (Mehlum et al., 2005). While there is 
no evidence of outright corruption, the available evidence suggests that the mining 
houses took advantage of the lack of maturity of the legislative institutions. For instance, 
a closer look at the requirements for one to own a mining licence reveals that the 
legislation was meant to protect the few big companies. For instance, for one to get a 
certificate for a claim, a certificate of good character was to be obtained from local 
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resident magistrates (Diamond Commission, 1881, p. 15). This effectively excluded most 
black Africans from owning mining claims since they were easily legislated out of the 
mining activities since the requirement was abused to exclude them.  
In comparison to the revenue from utilities such as railways, the post office and the 
telegraphic system the licences from the mining firms were puny. With a tax resistant 
mining industry, other sectors would not yield to direct taxation when the mining 
industry had set the standard for the rest of the economy. Land revenue was another key 
direct revenue which shows drastic decline and this could be partly attributed to the 
precedent set by the mining sector in resting direct taxation. The exit threats were quite 
strong from capital so that the government was left with no option but to leave capital to 
have its way and affected the other sectors making fiscal diversification difficult. These 
exit threats seem to be less real considering later developments in the Transvaal, which 
had no option but to tax gold mining heavily since it had no railways nor ports of entry to 
get government revenue through customs. Gold mining activities did not dwindle because 
of these high tax levels on output but instead the government managed to embark on 
many developmental projects based on the receipts from mining activities (Denoon, 
1890). This could not have been the case had the Transvaal relied on licence fees only as 
the Cape did.  
Considering the liberal legislative environment, which could be seen as a ‘conducive 
business environment’, the Cape lost a lot of potential revenue which could have easily 
accrued to the government. The railway construction by the state was a developmental 
endeavour but this mostly did not help to drastically transform the society. Goodfellow 
(1931b) argued that due to the manner in which the railway system was built – targeting 
mining regions only – Canada was closer than some remote parts of the Cape. The Cape 
Colony itself remained uneven in terms of development and the areas through which the 
railways passed had better prospects besides the major coastal towns and mining 
towns.36 This entailed that, besides direct revenues for the government, railways were 
more beneficial in the period post 1910 when branches were developed. 
                                                 
36 In 1902 Mr Merriman opposed Mr Sprigg about the conditions of the colony arguing: “But in regard to 
the state of prosperity of this country, my hon. friend is living in a fool’s paradise…the prosperity alluded 
to by the honourable member was perhaps only in the Cape Peninsula (around Cape Town) and not in the 
rest of the country where no land has been tilled” (House of Assembly budget debates 1902, p. 162).  
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4.5 Municipal revenues and fiscal decentralisation  
The Cape Colony’s capital city had been Cape Town, even during the VOC rule since 1652, 
and, as a result of this, the commercial, judiciary and other public services were easily 
accessible to those in the vicinity of Cape Town. While there was no problem during the 
VOC period, the British colonial government had to expand its administrative reach by a 
significant stretch due to the high number of the settlers in the eastern region. In 1873 a 
Bill was passed for the introduction of provincial governments in the colony, and the Bill 
acknowledged that the remote regions suffered many difficulties and disabilities because 
they were “far removed from the Seat of Government in Cape Town”. The colony was then 
divided into three provincial governments namely Western, Midlands and Eastern 
provinces – each with its own provincial legislature. The railway system was also divided 
according to these provinces. 
Even before the provincial governments were introduced, municipalities and divisional 
councils were an earlier phenomenon in the Cape Colony. The first one was the Municipal 
Ordinance (No 9 of 1836) for the creation of municipal boards in towns and villages of the 
Colony. The government’s reach to all remote towns and villages was limited and as a 
result complaints were incessant at the doors of the colonial administrators at Cape Town 
regarding many challenges faced by colonists in the remote districts. Security, law and 
order were the priorities of the Cape government and later infrastructural projects. There 
was no need for the parliament in Cape Town to continue to receive parochial requests, 
such as “lack of shelter at train stations in Uitenhage” (McCracken, 1967, p. 137), which 
could be dealt with by municipal or divisional boards. With municipal boards and 
provincial legislatures, the separatists37 were to some extent appeased as they now had a 
degree of autonomy in their local affairs.  
The municipal and divisional boards were given, through various ordinances and Acts, 
permission to raise local revenues to defray local expenses such as police, street lights, 
roads and bridges. In the event of loans being raised, the central government had to assent 
to this because central revenues in most cases were used to guarantee these loans. The 
Cape’s decentralisation was, when carefully considered, not a ‘luxury’ creation but a 
necessity in a diversified society in which regional and racial fault lines could easily 
                                                 
37 These were the settlers in the Eastern region who felt far removed from the seat of parliament at Cape 
Town and kept agitating for a separation of administration power and for them to have their own 
administration in the Eastern region of the colony.  
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destabilise the colony. The revenue of the municipalities, like those of the central 
government, depended on the broader economic performance of the colony.   
The aggregate municipal revenue trend shows a similar trend to that of the central 
government. From a simple log-log correlation of municipal revenue on central 
government revenue (LGREV), a percentage increase in central government revenue was 
matched by more than a one percent increase in municipal revenue (LMREV) (figure 4.6). 
In other words, the economic growth mattered for increasing public revenues, but 
municipal revenues were influenced by other factors such as regional economic 
dynamics, population, structure of economic activities and many other local factors. The 
correlation between the central government revenue and municipal revenue is very 
strong (figure 4.6) because in most cases the government had to consent to municipal 
revenue strategies. This was because the municipalities required funds beyond what the 
government could provide and they had to be allowed to borrow for local development. 
The municipal revenues (total aggregate revenues from each municipality’s sources) 
grew between 1881 and 1907 and the shifts in the top five municipalities in terms of 
receipts highlight important dynamics of the economic progress of the Cape Colony. Cape 
Town municipality as the hub of the Cape’s political and commercial activities remained 
in the top five municipalities between 1881 and 1907. 
Figure 4. 6 Correlation of the central and municipal revenues  
 
Source: Blue books (1830-1910) 
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Figure 4.7 Municipal revenues (1881 against 1907) 
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Source: Blue books (1881 & 1907). 
The 1870s and early 1880s were the period of the wool boom and the economic activities 
were more focused on the eastern region hence making Cape Town come second in terms 
of revenues. Once wool farming had declined, Uitenhage’s revenues declined and in 1907 
it was relegated to number eighteen in the list. Economic geography has also explained 
such regional and geographical dynamics that affect economic performance of countries 
in general. These factors include distance to the coastlines, population, railways, major 
economic activities and climate. The municipalities which dominated in terms of revenue 
were the coastal municipalities. Kimberley municipality, and to some extent Uitenhage 
with its wool washing industry in late 1870s and early 1880s, was the inland municipality 
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to rival the coastal municipalities because of diamond mining activities which attracted 
many people and businesses.38 This means that the municipality could easily raise 
revenue through rates and other forms of local taxes which other inland municipalities 
with few economic activities could not raise. De Kiewiet, the South African historian, 
observed: 
In a year after the rush, Kimberley was the most populous place in south Africa 
outside Cape town with two churches , hospital, theatre and probably as many 
grogshops as the rest of South Africa put together (De Kiewiet, 1957).  
The concentration of people around such a major economic activity made Kimberley a 
testing ground for the Cape’s social welfare policy (more on this in chapter 5). Archival 
evidence also shows that Kimberley was difficult to handle legislatively hence it was also 
a testing ground for the legislative capacity due to the volumes of mining disputes solved 
each year. The diamond commission recommended a mining tribunal to be formed, after 
the manner of the Australian Courts of Mines, to specifically handle mining disputes but 
this was rejected on grounds of costs. In such a difficult legislative environment, for 
instance underground mining claims disputes were interwoven with surface land 
ownership disputes, the main issue was the land owner and the digger’s rights on the 
land, water, business stands, buildings to be erected and the diamonds themselves. On the 
surface the proprietary rights were to be observed while beneath the soil diamonds 
meant a different legislative framework. 
4.6 Conclusion  
The main conclusion from this chapter is that diamond discovery and responsible 
governance were decisive factors in the evolution of the Cape Colony’s fiscal capacity 
building. Besides boosting revenues that accrued to the state coffers, they shifted the 
attention of the government into railway projects whose earnings were substantial to the 
point of relegating the need to creatively improve and diversify the tax regime. Settlers 
did not, throughout the period, pay high direct taxes to the government as argued for 
settler-labour reserve colonies by Mkandawire (2010). This was because the British 
Government viewed the Cape as a key colony and was ready to defend it from external 
                                                 
38 Port Elizabeth is puzzling because its revenue is not available for 1881 and whether it was under 
Uitenhage is not clear. The Blue Books show no record for Port Elizabeth in this year but it is clear that with 
the wool industry, Uitenhage was doing well in this period.  
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threats as well as securing its colonists from the indigenous population. With no need for 
a huge defence and security budget, the Cape Colony’s revenue needs were below what 
the case would have been if it was fully responsible for its own defence.  
On the one hand, indirect taxes were a major feature of tax revenue, the bulk of this being 
customs revenue and, on the other hand, non-tax revenue was important from 1870s, the 
bulk of this being direct railway earnings. This meant that the Cape’s fiscal regime was on 
an unsustainable path because the railway traffic was mainly for the mining fields, be it 
equipment or supplies of other imported items. The fact that railway revenue was 
recorded on a gross basis (chapter 3) made it look like a significant source of revenue. 
Customs revenue itself was more a matter of revenue collection than an organised policy 
with developmental goals such as the post WWI import substitution policy (Goodfellow, 
1931b, p. 25). The status of having developed railway lines meant that the Cape’s ports 
became the preferred and easy ports of entry into the interior mining fields in South 
Africa.  
As long as the Cape had no competition, because it was the first colony to complete 
railways, customs duties were guaranteed and overall government revenue was in good 
shape. The Cape’s agriculture and manufacturing business enjoyed reduced rates on the 
Cape’s railway lines and were not significant sources of government revenue. After the 
opening of the Transvaal line via Lorenzo Marques, the Cape lost the gold mining traffic 
and, therefore, the customs revenue because traffic on Cape lines declined from 80% to 
12% of gold mining traffic. The loss of the control of the bulk part of gold traffic and 
customs meant that the revenue loss was catastrophic. This exposed the fact that the Cape 
had not strategically thought about its fiscal regime, having used the railway system as an 
instrument of taxation, and was thrown into a sort of querulous despondency – eagerly 
waiting to throw its financial burden onto the unionized South Africa (Goodfellow, 1931b; 
Van Der Poel, 1933). Municipalities also played an important role and ignoring them may 
lead to an incomplete picture by under-estimating the revenue raised for meeting local 
needs (Gardner, 2015). Municipal revenues also complemented the central government 
revenue and the bigger cities and economically important cities such as Kimberley tended 
to have higher revenues than smaller and less economically important places. 
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CHAPTER 5: “SERVING TWO MASTERS”? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE IN THE BRITISH CAPE COLONY, 1810-1910. 
 
The functions of the state are indeed protective, commercial, and 
developmental as well as executive, legislative, and judicial. But to assume that 
all public expenditures are for the direct and deliberate promotion of these 
governmental functions is to assume intelligence, an honesty of purpose and a 
concern for the social goods such as is not characteristic of the average citizen 
or legislator… Expenditure is an empiric fact, while functions of the state are 
part and parcel of social philosophy (Guest, 1930, pp. 41–42). 
Those who governed the settlers suffered the difficulties of simultaneously 
serving God and Mammon. Reliance upon Mammon in the form of foreign 
capital had a consequence which could not have been foreseen at all clearly 
(Denoon, 1983, p. 71). 
5.1 Introduction  
Public expenditure should not be seen as merely representing the traditional functions of 
the state. For colonial governments the desire for social goods was limited in many 
instances. The agenda of colonial states was pushed through state expenditure and it will 
be superficial for instance to see huge expenditure outlays and assume there was an 
honesty of purpose for ‘development’. Colonial governors, at least those who governed in 
most settler colonies, were faced with a huge challenge of meeting local political demands 
while placating scarce international capital. Public expenditure policies in these 
territories required a careful balance between appeasing the electorate, as democratic 
structures became more institutionalised, and ensuring that profitability was guaranteed 
to foreign capital. Interest payment on foreign loans became a major component of public 
expenditure. The reality that colonial governments were the main recipients of this 
foreign capital, through government bonds and debentures, complicated everything. As 
Denoon argued “Capital did not act directly on the citizens but had its influence refracted 
by the state” (Denoon, 1983, p. 93). In so far as capital was foreign, mainly from London, 
colonial territories had an undeniable dependency on it given that in most of these 
territories local capital markets were still small. This, nonetheless, did not dissolve the 
autonomy of these settler colonies because their governments, political and 
parliamentary institutions were fully functional. This is a paradox that requires a careful 
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consideration of the political economy of the Cape and public expenditure offers an 
important avenue to analyse how different interests bargained or lobbied for priority in 
public expenditures.  
In this chapter the Cape Colony is used to unpack, through public expenditures, the 
difficult political economy terrain of public expenditure policies in colonial times. It has 
been established throughout the colonial and non-colonial polities that “one bright spot 
for an easily identifiable tax base throughout history is the foreign trade sector” 
(Musgrave, 1969, p. 129). Evidence from the previous chapter, and many other studies on 
colonial taxation, is clear that customs were the single most important revenue earner in 
most countries (Waijenburg, 2015). Yet the volume of foreign trade actually depended on 
the economic activities in which foreign capital was a significant player. The form of 
public expenditure followed a pattern that had to keep foreign trade flourishing so that 
more customs revenue could be extracted.  
Section 5.2 shows the determinants of the growth of public expenditure of the Cape by 
analysing public infrastructure, social spending and, law, order and defence. Section 5.3 
discusses the implications of British pragmatism on the Cape’s public expenditures. 
Section 5.4 focuses on elite control of the state and how the colonial government was 
steered towards an extractive path by the mining interests. Section 5.5 concludes the 
chapter.  
5.2 Determinants of the growth in public expenditure in the Cape Colony 
5.2.1 Initial conditions  
If the Cape had been limited to a garrison colonial possession of Britain, there was nothing 
to talk about in terms of public expenditure growth because the empire was going to take 
care of its territory. The desire on the part of the British government to promote 
immigration, due to many push factors caused by the Napoleonic war, changed the 
prospects of public expenditure growth in many British colonies. The first important 
factor leading to the growth of public expenditure at the Cape was population growth, 
especially that of the settlers. Reference is often made to the 1820 settlers coming to the 
Cape but over time, especially with the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley, more 
Europeans came to the Cape creating more reasons for the growth in public expenditure. 
As more and more settlers moved into the interior and the frontier regions of the colony, 
there were public goods they needed which could not be provided privately. For instance, 
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the occupation of land often meant exposure to the infamous ‘depredation of the black 
Africans’39 and conflicts within and across different races. This naturally gave rise to the 
need for general security and order to be provided by the colonial government 
(Mkandawire, 2010). While expenditure for outright wars was the preserve of the 
imperial armies, general day to day administration meant that the state had to provide 
its service such as local magistracy, district policing and many others. The expenditure 
rose as new territories were established in the interior and frontier regions.  
The changing structure of the Cape economy was also crucial in determining the growth 
of public expenditure. From wine production in the early decades, wool in the 1860s-70s, 
to diamonds from the 1870s onwards meant that the structure of the economy changed 
and with it so did the demands for state funded public goods. Law and order outlays 
received priority in the early decades of colonial occupation. If the government had not 
intervened in these circumstances, one can only imagine that anarchy would have 
prevailed in these remote areas. With the shift from the pre-eminence of wool to diamond 
mining there were new challenges and the impact on public expenditure was enormous. 
Unlike wool farming the mining industry had the effect of bringing people into one 
locality causing high population density –urbanisation has high disease risks among 
other implications. While this might have meant ease of collection of taxes depending on 
the tax structure, as discussed in chapter 4, the Cape government remained reliant on 
customs duties. More was required on the expenditure side in terms of resources and 
private businesses could not solve all the expenditure needs of the mining industry. The 
fundamental problem was access to the diamond fields and the state could not consider 
any comprehensive welfare programmes before establishing easy access through reliable 
railroads, roads and communication through a telegraphic system.  
5.2.2 Broad categorisation of expenditures 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show a recap of the general classification alluded to in chapter 3. The 
dominance of public works and debt servicing is clear as these were leading as shares of 
total expenditures. The period from 1876 shows a clear break and shift in the expenditure 
                                                 
39 For instance one perspective argues that between 1834-35, they invaded the Eastern district of the Colony 
and were claimed to have “murdered every man they could find; burnt 450 farm houses; carried off above 
4000 horses; 100000 head of cattle and 150000 sheep and goats making the district of Albany and Somerset 
a desert. The disturbed state of the eastern frontier continued till 1847 when another Kaffir war erupted 
which cost the country 1 million pounds and another million in the Kaffir war of 1851-52 (Memoranda of 
Southern African Colonies 1856, p3.). 
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as the public works and debt servicing took the lead. The pattern was that high 
expenditure on public works was only made possible through public debt hence the debt 
servicing inevitably grew as more was borrowed for these projects. 
Figure 5. 1 Broad expenditure classification as shares of total expenditures, 1830-1910 
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Source: Data from Blue books (1830-1910) 
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Figure 5. 2 Per capita expenditure by various categories, 1856-1904. 
 
Source: Blue books (1856-1910) 
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war period the Cape was responsible for some of the remaining soldiers and their post-
war needs hence this made the defence expenditure considerable in this period. Mr 
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members of the settler population were prosperous (Fourie, 2013). It was indeed the 
diamond mining which became the sparkplug for the economic progress. After all, there 
was no strong incentive at the Cape during Dutch occupation and the early decades of 
British occupation to construct roads, bridges and mountain passes penetrating the 
interior. Returns on wool farming alone could not bring these expensive projects to 
fruition and the imperial government concerned itself with defence issues. Figure 5.3 
shows expenditure in public infrastructure and the dominance of the railway system. The 
size of railway expenditure makes it difficult to present the data but it demonstrates that 
other outlays were peripheral to the railway construction. 
Figure 5. 3 Public infrastructure expenditures, 1827-1910 
£0
£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
£4,000,000
£5,000,000
1
82
8
1
83
1
1
83
4
1
83
7
1
84
0
1
84
3
1
84
6
1
84
9
1
85
2
1
85
5
1
85
8
1
86
1
1
86
4
1
86
7
1
87
0
1
87
3
1
87
6
1
87
9
1
88
2
1
88
5
1
88
8
1
89
1
1
89
4
1
89
7
1
90
0
1
90
3
1
90
6
1
90
9
Ports & Harbours
£0
£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
£4,000,000
£5,000,000
1
82
8
1
83
1
1
83
4
1
83
7
1
84
0
1
84
3
1
84
6
1
84
9
1
85
2
1
85
5
1
85
8
1
86
1
1
86
4
1
86
7
1
87
0
1
87
3
1
87
6
1
87
9
1
88
2
1
88
5
1
88
8
1
89
1
1
89
4
1
89
7
1
90
0
1
90
3
1
90
6
1
90
9
Post Office
£0
£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
£4,000,000
£5,000,000
1
82
8
1
83
1
1
83
4
1
83
7
1
84
0
1
84
3
1
84
6
1
84
9
1
85
2
1
85
5
1
85
8
1
86
1
1
86
4
1
86
7
1
87
0
1
87
3
1
87
6
1
87
9
1
88
2
1
88
5
1
88
8
1
89
1
1
89
4
1
89
7
1
90
0
1
90
3
1
90
6
1
90
9
Railw ays
£0
£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
£4,000,000
£5,000,000
1
82
8
1
83
1
1
83
4
1
83
7
1
84
0
1
84
3
1
84
6
1
84
9
1
85
2
1
85
5
1
85
8
1
86
1
1
86
4
1
86
7
1
87
0
1
87
3
1
87
6
1
87
9
1
88
2
1
88
5
1
88
8
1
89
1
1
89
4
1
89
7
1
90
0
1
90
3
1
90
6
1
90
9
Roads & Bridges
£0
£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
£4,000,000
£5,000,000
1
82
8
1
83
1
1
83
4
1
83
7
1
84
0
1
84
3
1
84
6
1
84
9
1
85
2
1
85
5
1
85
8
1
86
1
1
86
4
1
86
7
1
87
0
1
87
3
1
87
6
1
87
9
1
88
2
1
88
5
1
88
8
1
89
1
1
89
4
1
89
7
1
90
0
1
90
3
1
90
6
1
90
9
Telegraphs
£0
£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
£4,000,000
£5,000,000
1
82
8
1
83
1
1
83
4
1
83
7
1
84
0
1
84
3
1
84
6
1
84
9
1
85
2
1
85
5
1
85
8
1
86
1
1
86
4
1
86
7
1
87
0
1
87
3
1
87
6
1
87
9
1
88
2
1
88
5
1
88
8
1
89
1
1
89
4
1
89
7
1
90
0
1
90
3
1
90
6
1
90
9
Works & Buildings
 
Source: Data from Blue books (1827-1910) 
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Figure 5. 4 Expenditure shares total public works, 1827-1910 
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Source: Data from Blue books (1827-1910) 
Expenditures on public works particularly took off in the post-diamond discovery period 
as feasibility was more apparent to the colonial government. This does not mean that no 
work was done prior to the discovery of diamond as is evident in figure 5.3 which shows 
that decent expenditure outlays went to harbours and ports, post office, roads and 
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bridges40 and works and buildings. In figure 5.4, telegraphic and railway outlays only 
feature from 1873 onwards and there is a definitive dominance of railway expenditure 
compared to telegraphic systems which did not require much capital. A shift in attitudes 
from the parliamentarians was obvious and they were no longer resistant to the idea of 
construction of railways and developing telegraphic lines. One clear fact was that the 
growth in public expenditure, mainly through these public works, meant that the 
government had to commit and demonstrate to the foreign capitalists that they employed 
wise parsimony in their finances and were willing to keep the colony solvent.  
As figure 5.3 has demonstrated, more roads, bridges and mountain passes were also built 
alongside the development of railways and telegraphic lines but these remained 
secondary to railway construction. In one of his parliamentary speeches Governor H. 
Barkly reported the diamond-induced shift of attitude towards telegraphic lines as a key 
communication infrastructure: 
The reason that induced the committee to recommend that a line to Queen’s 
Town should be constructed without delay with a view to further extend it 
towards the Free State have gained a tenfold force through the subsequent 
discovery of diamonds (Barkly, 1872 p.1).  
Development of infrastructure would have probably followed the coastal lines had 
diamonds not been discovered but the prospects and euphoria around it changed the 
attitudes of the parliamentarians. When the whole public works and utilities sector is 
considered it is clear that railways absorbed a higher range of 4-5 million pounds at its 
peak while the rest never exceeded £600 000 (figure 5.3). Even when combined at their 
peak years, harbours, bridges, post office, and telegraphic outlays could not rival the 
outlays on railway construction. There is no doubt that railways dominated the public 
works category. Figure 5.5 below shows that, as shares of total expenditure, public works 
and debt servicing were unique with an upward trend while other categories depict 
general downward trends. It is expected that public works and debt servicing had upward 
trends because much of the Cape’s public debt was linked to the railway construction. 
According to the Blue books, it was only during the years in which the borrowed funds 
                                                 
40 There was indeed the road enthusiast, Montagu, who used convict labour in the 1840s and the graph on 
roads and bridges shows a significant rise during this period (Burman, 1984, p. 14). He was influential in 
wiping out the Cape’s debt through land sales, selling guano and collecting arrears in taxes.  
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slightly exceeded the railway needs that funds were directed towards other public works 
such as roads and bridges.  
Figure 5. 5 Classification of total public expenditure, 1830-1910 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Colonial Administration
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Debt Service
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Defence and Military
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Human Resources
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Law and Order
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Public Works and Utilities
 
Source: Data from Blue books (1830-1910). 
Table 6.4 in the appendix shows list of items in each category of expenditure in figure 5.3. 
As share of total expenditures the debt driven public works is the only sector with a sharp 
rising trend followed by debt servicing while others decrease over time. Indeed, in 
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parliament, public works was a leading spending category attracting huge contestations. 
Mr Merriman in 1885 argued in parliament that: 
At first I am bound to say there was some little difficulty on the part of some 
officers who had so long indulged in the vicious practice of spending money 
unauthorised without reference to government and some attempts were made 
to defy the authority of the treasury. The department of public works has been 
the great sinner in this regard. There is something in the profession of a civil 
engineer which leads a man to spend money (House of Assembly budget 
debates, 1885, p. 113).  
Bemoaning the growth and growing demand for railway expenditure, Mr Merriman in 
1898 argued in parliament that:  
There has never been a motion in the house to limit or reduce expenditure 
towards railways. I have seen hundreds of motion for further facilities and 
further facilities means money. Extravagance is working tremendously upon 
the railway system. They want more trains, express trains. They say the 
stations are not good enough. It is astonishing to see people who travelled in 
carts at the rate of six miles an hour desire to travel on railway at 30 miles an 
hour. It is ridiculous to pass a motion in the house requiring £500 000 for 
building better palatial stations in Cape Town when the rest of the colony 
wallow in poverty as farmers have to also access light railway lines (House of 
Assembly budget debates, 1898, p. 184).  
The bias towards railways is strong throughout the period and its links to mining were 
unquestionable. What the quotes above do not explicitly reveal is that very strong vested 
interests were at play for this bias. It was strong to the extent that money could be 
borrowed by some officials unauthorised and without due procedures being taken to fund 
railway projects (Chapter 6). This is consistent with the limited access order arguments 
in chapter two in which few individuals decided on self-serving policies that had 
ramifications for the rest of the nation. There was an informal coalition of business and 
parliamentary elites which evidently steered the parliamentary debates towards mining 
friendly policies as well as construction of railways that led to rapid accumulation of 
public debt. The continued focus on railway construction was easy because longevity in 
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the Cape parliament was restricted to few members and the formation of a Rhodes led 
coalition41 was not difficult. This clear bias towards ‘mining railways’ can be contrasted 
with unanswered calls and petitions for light railway lines for the development of the 
Cape’s agricultural activities. For instance, Mr Merriman rejected the calls for a railway 
line to Oudtshoorn and said that there was no need for “these pumpkin lines” while Mr 
Sauer called it a “political line” (House of Assembly budget debates, 1894, p. 448). 
5.2.4 The social spending and the nascent welfare state  
There are limits to the use of the ‘welfare state42’ concept in the 19th century because 
social spending was a very small component of public expenditure in all countries 
(Lindert, 2013; Tanzi & Schuknecht, 2000). The concept originated in the 20th century 
and it would be anachronistic to expect high levels of social spending in the Cape Colony 
in the 19th century. The Scandinavian countries are the usual exemplars of the welfare 
states but the growth of social spending in the second half of the 20th century has caused 
wider application of the concept (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Lindert, 2004). It is important, 
however, to trace how the social friction arising from high density living during 
industrialisation in the Cape context exposed the inadequacy of the railway-biased public 
expenditure. This was not unique to the Cape because Australian colonies had an extreme 
level of government intervention and a considerable welfare state given the context of 
the 19th century in which Britain’s welfare state was itself very nascent (Gilchrist, 2013). 
The initial conditions of a convict colony meant that the large role of the government was 
established and could not be reversed easily in Australia (Gilchrist, 2013). 
 In the Cape Colony, social spending seemed to lag that of the British system and the state 
did not go ahead of Britain in terms of social spending. No serious attention was paid 
towards establishing many social expenditure programmes prematurely when physical 
investment in roads and bridges was not yet done. A reactionary approach to welfare 
needs was used even in England which only changed in the 1830s when epidemics jolted 
the state into action. It was the general practice for England to institute laws against 
“…vagabonds, rogues, disorderly and idle people and the state prohibited beggary…” 
                                                 
41 Names that also feature in the parliamentary debates had a dual character of being politicians and 
business people. Among others, these included: John. X. Merriman, Barney Barnato, H. Robinson, Gordon 
Sprigg, Rudd, J.H. Hofmeyr, John Molteno and J.W. Sauer (Whiteside, 2014, p. 24) 
42 It was William Beveridge who identified five social evils, namely ignorance, squalor, idleness, disease and 
want. The welfare state focused on these and many other social-related ills. His famous Beveridge report 
went on to be popular and became the foundation of the British national insurance, national health service 
and other reforms which constituted a safety net (Whiteside, 2014, p. 24). 
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(Lindert, 2004, p. 41). The 1831-32 cholera epidemics in England were important in 
bringing consciousness and a change of attitudes, around the need for public health 
programmes. This led to the Public Health Act of 1848, which was a milestone in proactive 
rather than reactive public healthcare provisioning (Fee & Brown, 2005, p. 866). The 
corollary of this Act was that the government had to commit to the creation of a 
permanent department of health that required fiscal commitments each year. Later into 
the 20th century, the aftermath of WWII also caused the welfare state to grow 
significantly. Without these social disturbances, as famously postulated by Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961a), there was a general slow acceptance of the ideas of the welfare state 
in the 19th century (section 2.3.1).  
In the Cape Colony, once diamond mining took off, the state could not only be concerned 
with the railway construction, provision of police and magistracy but also had to think 
about welfare. As the welfare concerns of the public broadened, these included safety in 
and around the mines, health care, education, asylums and paupers, the demands for 
more social spending programmes were growing. Thomas (1996, p. 74) paints a sombre 
picture of the diamond mining industry and indeed reveals it as a cradle and testing 
ground for the Cape’s welfare state:   
But the worst danger was disease. The shortage of water, the open latrines, 
the rotting carcases and plagues of flies contributed to severe outbreaks of 
typhoid and dysentery in the summer of 1871-72. Scurvy, brought on by a lack 
of fresh fruit and vegetables raged through the camps. The flies and the all -
pervading dust caused serious eye infections and turned ‘a slight break in the 
skin into a villainous wound’. There were no hospitals and nurses were 
unknown. To make matters worse most diggers were not earning enough to 
make ends meet. 
The diamond mining did not kick start the Cape’s social spending which existed prior to 
this period in the form of pensions, asylums, public worship and health care. Mining, 
however, increased the scope and need for more elaborate government plans because of 
mining related injuries and high density living at Kimberley’s diamonds fields. The 
Government pension system, education, and public health (see figure 5.6) show huge 
rises in absolute terms when diamond mining activities increased in 1870. The 
government did finance all these state programmes through taxation. Borrowing was 
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essential (chapter 6) and this caused another factor of increasing government 
expenditure, namely public debt servicing. Early modern states borrowed heavily mainly 
for war expenditure and the rising of post war expenditure was partly explained by debt 
servicing, war reparation, pensions for retired soldiers, etc. (Lindert, 2004) – the so called 
ratcheting effect (Peacock & Wiseman, 1961a). The Cape’s borrowing was mainly for the 
establishment and running of the state-owned entities, hence its debt servicing was 
actually the second largest outlay. Figure 5.7 below depicts the four major categories of 
social spending which were education, pensions of soldiers and government employees, 
public health and public worship. 
Figure 5. 6 Major social spending programmes of the Cape Colony, 1827-1910 
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Source: Data from Blue books (1830-1910) 
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Figure 5. 7 Social spending categories as shares of Cape’s total expenditure, 1827-1910 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1
8
2
8
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Education
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1
8
2
8
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Public Health
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1
8
2
8
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Pensions
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1
8
2
8
1
8
3
1
1
8
3
4
1
8
3
7
1
8
4
0
1
8
4
3
1
8
4
6
1
8
4
9
1
8
5
2
1
8
5
5
1
8
5
8
1
8
6
1
1
8
6
4
1
8
6
7
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
7
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
9
Public worship
 
Source: Data from Blue books (1830-1910) 
Spending on education and healthcare grew significantly in absolute terms from 1876 
onwards. Prior to 1876 there is clear stagnation and the structural changes that followed 
the discovery of diamonds also affected the attitudes of the government towards social 
spending. In terms of shares of total expenditure, education shows a steady rise and a 
sharp increase in the early 1900s. Welfare spending was not readily accepted and the 
parliamentary report of the conversation surrounding Kimberley is revealing as Mr 
Merriman opposed the call for state support to victims of mining accidents when he 
argued that:  
I think that the people who come away maimed with legs and arms off should 
be provided for by people who employed them. They should be provided for 
out of the employer’s liability fund. Surely the wealthiest city in the colony 
should do something to support these people who are at present so dependent 
on the public treasury.  
Mr Tudhope rose in response to argue that: 
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Although £6 000 set apart for Kimberley hospitals seemed somewhat 
excessive as other members argued, there is a great deal of sickness at 
Kimberley and a large number of patients to provide for and in the previous 
year there were about 700 deaths (House of Assembly Budget debates, 1888, 
p. 288). 
The expenditure on public health rose sharply around 1900 as a result of the rinderpest 
epidemic and the South African War the government was dealing with.  Veterinary 
services had to be expanded during this period too as the colonial government dealt with 
the epidemic. Education deserves more attention because it was disaggregated by native 
and non-native groups. Figure 5.8 shows that while expenditure on education for the 
settlers had been part of the public outlays since the early 1830s, from 1876 the state 
started devoting public finances towards the native population’s education. There was a 
clear division between education for ‘natives and non-natives’ and the former did not 
increase substantially even when a huge education drive started after 1900.  
Figure 5. 8 Education expenditure of the Cape over time, 1830-1910 
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Missionary education for the black Africans was seen as inadequate for the first time in 
1876 and the state had to channel money towards the black African education, however 
circumscribed. The civilisation mission for the black Africans was accepted as far as it 
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assisted the settlers in attaining their goals.43 The movement of labour from farms and 
coastal towns towards the mining fields and the effect of the general increase in labour 
costs meant that some minimal training was necessary for the black Africans to meet the 
developing economy’s labour needs. The education expenditure rose significantly in the 
early 1900s but was heavily skewed against the black Africans. This was in line with 
developments in England which took time to invest heavily in public education (see 
chapter 2, section 2.3.1). Mr Merriman acknowledged this growth by arguing that, “Our 
education now cost more than the whole revenue and expenditure put together of fifty 
years ago; we are spending a great deal more money” (House of Assembly budget debates 
1909, p. 245). The black Africans were, however, to be kept at the periphery of the 
education system so that they could remain in the cheap labour reserve status to supply 
labour. It was realised that the Africans needed some form of education as the mining 
industry grew and labour shortages became potentially problematic. Evidence of this can 
be inferred from the governor’s speech when he spoke about some of the outcomes of the 
discovery of diamonds: 
…the exodus of young and active men to the diamond fields, has had an effect 
of raising the salaries given by the Banks and Commercial establishments, 
especially in the eastern districts from 20 to 25% increase. This has also meant 
that the government has been pressed with demands from its employees for 
increase in salaries which indeed had been reduced in the previous years of 
hard economic situations44 (Barkly 1872, p. 6). 
With the discovery of diamonds and the changing structure of the economy evidently 
causing increases in salaries, the large scale investment projects such as expansion of 
railway lines and telegraphic systems meant that public expenditure had to grow as the 
state took ownership of these entities and personnel. The colonial state was better placed 
to deal with the volumes of capital required for these projects (Barkly, 1871) and it was 
not the case only in the Cape Colony but New Zealand and Australia experienced similar 
                                                 
43 For instance Molteno (1984, p. 53) argued that: “Schooling in the 19th century helped to undermine the 
unconquered, while incorporating the already conquered into the structure of settler society". Such an 
approach was influential and indeed a foundation for the 20th century apartheid education in South Africa.  
44 This was consistent with the so called Baumol’s disease, similar to Wagner’s law of increasing state 
expenditure, which entailed that as productivity increased in the mining industry, the public wage bill had 
to also increase to maintain the prevailing salary levels or risk the flow of skilled labour to the higher paying 
mining sector. 
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state-led development (Boot, 1998; Denoon, 1980; Gilchrist, 2013). Private capital in 
colonial territories was not yet developed to a large extent and only the state could 
mobilise investments in foreign markets, mainly London capital markets (Davis& 
Huttenback, 1986; Stone, 1999). The fact that there is a literature devoted to ‘colonial 
socialism’ in Australia (see a review by Gilchrist, 2013) shows that the state was the main 
promoter of economic development and this meant that growth in public expenditure 
was inevitable. Boot (1998, p. 90) argued that three quarters of Australia’s budget was 
taken up by roads, railways and their operations continued to dominate public 
expenditure. He argued that until the end of the 19th century railways absorbed half of all 
government expenditure on new capital formation. For New Zealand, Denoon (1983, p. 
74) revealed similar trends when he argued that: 
By 1890 the state was the largest landowner and receiver of rents, the largest 
employer of labour. It owned nearly all the railways and all the telegraphs, 
and was establishing a state system of telephones. It entirely controlled and 
supported the hospitals and lunatic asylums and the whole charitable aid of 
the country. It was the largest trustee, managed the largest life insurance 
business, and educated more than nine-tenths of the children.  
 The Cape took ownership of the private railway company and telegraphic systems in 
1872 when the diamond rush had proved to be more than a quick passing windfall for 
the Cape’s economy. By the 1880s the Cape government thus directly owned and 
controlled the railway company, post office, the telegraphic system, hospitals, asylums 
and public schools with huge implications for public expenditure. The main three state 
owned entities – railways, telegraphs and the post office – were crucial for the Cape 
economy and they caused the general rise in public expenditure of the Cape economy due 
to huge capital investment needs. The traffic linked to diamond mining provided the bulk 
of the revenues of the railway system and in the mid-1880s, when diamond mining was 
in crisis, revenue dwindled drastically sending the state finances into disarray. The news 
of gold in Transvaal meant another similar strategy based on the notion that extending 
the Kimberley line to the gold fields would solve the Cape’s crisis. In both cases the Cape’s 
drive for railways was based on serving mining activities and it is thus impossible to talk 
about the Cape’s revenue and the expenditure side of the public finances without talking 
about railways and the mining industries. 
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5.2.5 Military and defence expenditures  
External security and internal order have been key defining features of early modern 
states and, as shown in chapter two, the cliché ‘war made states’ is linked to the state’s 
ability to defend itself while not imploding with disorder. The 19th century colonies had 
a fundamental problem of starting out as one thing and then evolving into something else. 
For instance the Australian colonies were convict colonies while the Cape was a garrison 
colony, run by a governor who was a military officer, and the Australian colonies’ 
dependency on the British government for external security and general internal security 
concerns were complete. This was a fundamental problem which went on to haunt the 
British colonial offices for a long time and the desire to extend self-governance and 
responsible government was partly linked to the huge military outlays by the British 
government on its colonies. Figure 5.9 shows a breakdown of the money spent for 
internal order and external security by the Government of the Cape Colony.  
Figure 5. 9 Cape Colony’s expenditure on defence and law and order, 1827-1910 
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Source: Data from Blue books (1830-1910). 
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What is clear is that in the beginning of the occupation, police, jail and convicts took the 
total amount devoted to the internal order and external security as the concerns of the 
colonial government were law, order and security. Mounted riflemen were introduced in 
the early 1850s while imperial military aid was sporadic and only recorded in the Blue 
books for a few years. The direct nature of the military intervention and poor accounting 
meant that it was not easy for the colonial office or the colonial government to keep all 
records of the military aid. For instance, the first Anglo Boer war, various frontier wars 
and eventually the South African war required huge sums from the colonial office. What 
is clear, however, is that expenditure declined over time and in the early years the Cape’s 
administrative reach was limited. The colonial government avoided shouldering 
responsibility making the imperial authorities bear as much as the governors could solicit 
from them. Davis and Huttenback (1986, p. 12) supported this argument for the self-
governing dominions when they argued that: 
Increased autonomy, however, allowed colonial legislatures to reject British 
requests for financial support in what London assumed a shared responsibility 
– the administration and defence of the empire. The marriage of war and 
colonies was not a happy one. 
Responsible governance in this regard was thus a strategic error for the British imperial 
authorities because colonies abused the fact that they were indispensable. Archives have 
volumes of dispatches between the Cape governors and the imperial authorities debating 
the fact that the Cape had to take responsibility and pay a fair share of its defence. In 
documents of colonial conferences of the self-governing colonies, many pages were 
devoted to the issue of expenditure on defence and a concomitant issue at these 
conferences was the issue of federating colonies geographically closer to each other so 
that they could pool resources and defend themselves. In view of this transferred 
responsibility for defence, the Cape’s public expenditure picture is not the complete 
picture because the need for maintaining British troops and expenditure on various wars 
up to the South African war could have easily bankrupted the Cape. The Cape’s ‘colonial 
state’ therefore was a weak state without imperial security guarantees and one may think 
that railways would have not taken precedence over huge budgets on defence and 
security – a primary concern and a key feature of a state.   
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The Cape parliamentarians were adamant that security was the duty of the British 
government not the colonial government. In 1865 and 1867 governor Wodehouse in his 
exchange with the colonial secretary argued in a letter that:  
If the colony were now called on for a serious military contribution, the 
Parliament would, in all probability, request the removal of the troops in 
preference to paying for them; and you ought to be aware of the political 
consequences of such a step, if assented to by Her Majesty’s government 
(Wodehouse 1865, p. 165). 
Again in 1867 the Cape parliament’s position was clear as the governor elaborated on the 
reasons why the British government was to continue supporting the Cape’s military 
endeavours: 
Great Britain must continue to provide military protection because in 1820 
certain settlers were brought out and located on the frontier, under an implied 
pledge of protection.... The turning point of the whole controversy is that to me 
it appears to be inconsistent with sound policy, and opposed to the judicious 
administration of affairs, that in a colony inhabited by antagonistic races, 
where the whole political power is concentrated in the hands of one of them, 
where the war of races is familiar to the minds of all, that in such a place, the 
amount of military force , the sufficiency or insufficiency of military protection, 
should be made dependent on a pecuniary bargain between the white race in 
the Colony and the mother country (Wodehouse 1867, p. 171). 
At times it was not necessarily clear what constituted imperial and local government’s 
responsibilities when it came to defence and military responsibilities. As Davis and 
Huttenback (1986, p. 146) argued, it was a case of “point-counterpoint as to what 
constituted an ‘imperial’ as opposed to purely local concern, and the colonies were never 
loathing to exploit that ambiguity”. According to Morrel (1966, p. 177), one key argument 
in the Cape parliament’s armoury was a plea of poverty. In England the Colonial Office 
and the Treasury were at loggerheads regarding the colonial military and defence 
budgets. In 1886 for instance the colonial office, as the one being in touch with events and 
conditions in the colonies, favoured an expenditure for defence of Table Bay, Simon’s 
Town and Cape Town but the treasury strongly opposed it. Robert Meader, one of the 
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colonial undersecretaries, captured the conundrum for the Cape Colony when he 
defended it by arguing that: 
Defence is an ambiguous word in relation to a colony like the Cape with 1) a 
large black African population, and 2) a seaboard liable to attract enemies in 
war. If we claim in general that the imperial troops are there for defence and 
that the colony ought to pay for their cost, the colony might in turn request to 
make use of them in native wars, which would be a losing bargain for the home 
government in the end, and might lead to incalculable expenses (quoted in 
Davis & Huttenback, 1986, p.148). 
With developments such as the discovery of diamonds at the Cape, the military officers 
in Britain regarded it as unfair that the military expenditure at the Cape was not partly 
covered by the colonial state which indeed benefited from the peace and was prospering 
economically. The Colonial Office argued that self-defence responsibility was supposed 
to be considered a privilege instead of a burden to the Cape Colony because it was a most 
important training for a colony that would become sovereign one day. The colonial 
government was known to generally be strategic when dealing with the British 
government and would thus easily take advantage of the uniqueness of the Cape Colony 
for continued military support.  
Part of the big problems was that the war department in Britain continued to provide for 
military expenditure in anomalous and unequal ways and the embarrassment, confusion, 
and expenses caused by the prevailing unorganised system were great. The growth of the 
colonies had not been carefully considered in terms of military expenditure, and 
outbreaks of war in the colonies only caused panic and hasty decisions on military 
expenditure. Table 5.1 shows the 1858 snapshot of imperial and colonial military 
responsibilities. Of the total military expenditure of the Cape Colony of £830 597, the 
Cape government contributed only 4.1%. One clear fact in table 5.1 is that, while the 
actual wars caused huge increases in supplies such as ammunition, maintenance of these 
garrisons was a huge cost in terms of salaries and allowances for about 10 000 soldiers.  
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Table 5. 1 Cape Colony’s military expenditure (1858) 
Payment and allowances  £600107 
Stores  £8042 
Recruitment expenses £7712 
Barracks and fortification £7326 
Departmental expenses £122012 
Transport and freight £50995 
Total imperial government £796194 
Total colonial government £34403 (4.1% all military expenses) 
Source: Data from Blue books (1858) 
Compared to expenditure in other colonies, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, 
the Cape’s military expenditure by the British government’s war department was 
enormous. The report on colonial military expenditure in 1857 clearly put the Cape’s 
outstanding position as the recipient of the lion’s share of imperial military outlays: 
If we were to omit the Mediterranean garrisons, which evidently are a special 
class, it would be found that the Cape contained in 1857 one-third of the whole 
force in the Colonies, and occasioned nearly one-third of the direct military 
expenditure… The result has been to produce an excessive drain of British 
resources for a single Colony; the expenditure is enormous and is not likely to 
be materially reduced except by radical change of policy (Colonial Office 
report 1858, p. 3).  
If the expenditure was enormous during the 1860s, the South African war would cause it 
to be way beyond the Cape’s financial resources. Even the first Anglo-Boer war, which led 
to the independence of Transvaal in 1878-79, cost Britain about £5.5 million (Schumann, 
1938, p. 84). This was a significant amount given the short duration of the war. Later after 
the South African war reports on the official statement from the House of Commons 
revealed that the South African war had cost the British Exchequer £1 500 000 per week 
which amounted to about £6 million a month and led to an economic crisis through 
deficiency in the exchequer. Davis and Huttenback reported that in total the Anglo-Boer 
war cost the British Exchequer (most was paid by the British tax payers) about £217 166 
000 (Davis& Huttenback, 1986, p. 151). This was much greater than the total government 
expenditure of the Cape Colony which peaked at only £11 million clearly showing that 
the Cape would never have managed to foot such a bill. The counter fact is that the Cape 
would not even have started such a war in the first place but these numbers bring an 
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important perspective. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had to negotiate for a special 
type of tax and a loan. For the earlier period, the Blue books did not record these military 
outlays and it is known that the last frontier wars, the 1879 first Anglo Boer war and the 
Anglo-Ndebele wars were funded by the British government as well. The Cape in a sense 
was an administration colony facilitating and helping the British government with war 
logistics. It seems, therefore, that the interests of the British government and its 
involvement in these wars in South Africa had the indirect effect of giving the Cape’s 
defence system a boost.  
The Cape was only responsible for its mounted rifleman, Cape forces and general police 
which could be funded through ordinary revenues of the Cape. An additional role for the 
Cape was to provide transportation and road access to the British contingents whenever 
war broke out. In essence the war had some implications for the Cape’s expenditures. In 
1902 Mr Sprigg’s argument in parliament revealed the need for and evidence of 
extraordinary outlays during the war: 
For 1901-2 the extraordinary expenditures were £249 597 for the plague and 
£2 600 000 for the war the total being £2 850 000 making the total 
expenditure, both ordinary and extraordinary expenditure being £11 232 000 
while the revenue for the same year was £9 072 755 (House of Assembly 
budget debates, 1902, p. 158). 
It is however clear that the Colony did not bear the full brunt of the war expenditure and 
the Cape parliamentarians also took advantage of the salience of the Cape Colony to the 
interests of the British government’s African and Asian regional strategies. It was as if the 
greatest loser, by imperial troop withdrawal, was the British government with dire 
consequences. The Cape route had coaling stations for ships going to the East, which were 
also very important for the Britain’s naval power. Evidence from a report on the ‘Defence 
of the Cape of Good Hope’ was revealing: 
The security of the route by the Suez Canal might, under certain contingencies, 
become very precarious, and the risk attendant on sending commercial ships 
through it so great as practically to preclude its use; in which case the long sea 
route, through the Cape, would be the only one available. In addition, the Cape 
route was not only important for commercial reasons but strategically played 
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a far higher important role to the Empire at large, as being essential to the 
retention by Great Britain of her possessions in India, Mauritius, Ceylon, 
Singapore, China and even Australasia. It is by this route alone that 
reinforcements of troops could be sent from the United Kingdom with any 
degree of certainty or security (Defence of the Cape of Good Hope, 1881 p. 6). 
The British imperial authorities were at a dilemma because they could not neglect certain 
colonies that were critical for the survival of the empire itself. Egypt was critical for the 
Suez Canal, and Hong Kong, St Helena and Bermuda were important coaling stations and 
guard centres for British trade. Troops had to be permanently present in these territories 
seen as ‘imperial fortresses’ (Davis & Huttenback, 1986, p. 146). The irony, according to 
Davis and Huttenback, was that the dependent colonies were actually paying a higher 
proportion for their defence as compared to the self-governing colonies, the Cape 
included. It would seem that the granting of self-governance, de facto, brought net costs 
to the British government while beneficial to the colonies (O’Brien & De la Escosura, 
1998). The colonists could enjoy all the benefits of a strong state, backed by a military 
defence guarantee, while not paying as much for it as the British tax payers were doing. 
The secretary of state for war, Edward Cardwell, complained to the colonial office’s 
George Granville that:  
It is not, I think satisfactory to Parliament…that the Australian colonies and 
the Cape…shall contribute at much lower rate than required from Ceylon, a 
crown colony, or that the Dominion of Canada, the most powerful and not the 
least prosperous of her majesty’s possessions shall…be an exception to the 
rule which requires contribution from the colonies (quoted in Davis & 
Huttenback 1986, p.148). 
The self-governing colonies could plead their way out of their obligations while the 
dependent colonies had no choice as they were merely reserved for surplus extraction. 
The imperial authorities could not impose anything on the self-governing colonies and 
could only cajole them through reasoning why military defence was a responsibility any 
colony aiming for full sovereignty should shoulder. For the Cape, the fiscal inertia of 
public works on a large scale meant that the Cape was soon to be in difficulties with huge 
debt payments that left no room for defraying defence related expenses. It is in this area 
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that the Cape’s statehood is questionable considering that external coercive power was 
the preserve of the imperial government. 
5.3 Solid public expenditure policies or ad hoc solutions to colonial development?  
Being a British colony, the Cape leaned towards the English traditions in many ways but 
the public expenditure outlays did not strictly follow a given policy framework 
(Goodfellow, 1931b, p. 25). The Cape government seemed to follow a survival mode 
economically and politically with government functions being rudimentary. Pragmatism 
took centre stage as Davis and Huttenback argued for the whole British Empire that: 
British Empire was founded in a fit of absence of mind, and that the largely ad 
hoc development of overseas extensions owed itself to traditional British 
pragmatism rather than to any master plan emanating from corridors of 
Whitehall. Inadvertence, greed, humanitarianism, personal ambition, 
missionary zeal, fear of foreign intervention, and that curious phenomenon, 
‘prestige imperialism’ which towards the end of the century wetted the British 
appetite for expansion – all may have played their part (Davis& Huttenback, 
1986, pp. 7–8). 
The above perspective shows that the imperial expansion has to be understood as a 
complex case and each colony likely dealt with the colonial office differently as their 
circumstances dictated. One thing that might have been borrowed from the British 
system itself was that deficits were to be avoided at all costs and the budget had to be 
kept in balance if not in surplus. This norm would generally be relaxed during wars but 
the colonies which were protected by metropolitan powers did not have to borrow for 
war. Indeed, this idea was the prevailing norm until the Keynesian era when government 
expenditure was regarded as key for stimulating the economy (Lindert, 2004). If the Cape 
budget speeches are considered, the budget balance principle was the driving force of 
public expenditure thinking even before political reforms such as representative 
government (1853) and responsible government (1872).   
From the 1830s onwards the British pound sterling replaced the Rix dollar and with the 
advent of the legislative council and the eventual consolidation of parliamentary 
institutions, fiscal prudence of keeping expenditure within the revenue limit was 
observed. Comparing revenue estimates and the actual revenues realised reveals that the 
colonial government tried to contain the expenditure within the means of the public 
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revenues. Pressure was mounting in the 1860s when Cape Town had its early railways 
run by private companies. Various letters and petitions were sent from different regions 
of the Cape Colony, especially from the Eastern Cape. These petitions followed one line of 
argument summarised by what was recorded in the Port Elizabeth Herald in 1862:  
No! Let us have cheap railroads, worked by cheap locomotives; but let us have 
railroads. We are convinced that if only the colony will make railroads, that 
rail roads will make the colony; it is the practical experience of other countries, 
it is the established dictum of other men (quoted in Houghton & Dagut, 1973, 
p. 112). 
Most of these petitions were indeed based on sound economic grounds measured with 
traffic flow in most of these coastal towns, but the state was not hasty to fall for these 
representations without thinking about the feasibility of these projects. Equally 
important were counter petitions which opposed these pro-railway petitions, based on 
the fact that railways would benefit only those close to the lines while non-beneficiaries 
in remote areas from the proposed lines would be required to pay as well, but the state 
was reluctant to succumb to these growing demands. For instance, in 1868 Governor 
Wodehouse’s speech is testimony to this; indeed, similar sentiments prevail in most of 
these parliamentary speeches:  
The government has abstained as far as practicable from proposing an 
addition to salaries or other ordinary charges. While pressure lasts, the 
government must, I think, continue to be conducted on the most economical 
principles. It is easy to find in every direction objects on which money should 
be spent to the satisfaction of those in the vicinity. But it will be the duty of the 
government in the interest of all, to deny itself the pleasure of yielding to local 
solicitations, and to trust to the general support of the whole community in the 
exercise of a wise parsimony (Wodehouse, 1868 p. 2). 
Free trade and expenditure containment were doctrines clearly adhered to by the Cape 
government even without a written framework to follow. Economic historians have 
attributed this fiscal prudence to the Gladstonian philosophy exemplified by his 
insistence on balanced budgets (Gardner, 2012; O’Brien, 2011). This strictness with the 
expenditure regime was seemingly loosened when minerals were discovered. This could 
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be attributed to the access to international capital which partly allowed the colonial 
government to expand public goods provision since public revenue growth allowed it to 
be more feasible. Once the state took over the railway company, there was less resistance 
to embark on a spree of public borrowing for the expansion of railways. It is evident in 
the Cape Colony that the doctrine of a balanced budget became less important when the 
colonial government took ownership of strategic entities.  
What is important for our argument is that the dominant ad-hoc progress of the Cape 
Colony leaning towards British pragmatism was liable to capture by vested interests. The 
absence of institutional constraints meant that whoever was dominant in parliament 
could push their agenda and thus direct public expenditure. At a practical level, the 
limited knowledge and experience of most members of the Cape parliament seem to have 
facilitated mining-biased policies. Since it took many years before proper political parties 
developed, personal alliances and relationships long played very important roles 
(McCracken, 1967). The minerals-railways complex took centre stage and became the 
driving force of what government was supposed to focus on. In 1908 there were strong 
arguments that “The government led by Dr Jameson (Cape Prime Minster, 1904-1908) 
was dubbed the De Beers government and representatives of capitalism” (House of 
Assembly budget debates, 1908, p. 139). The parliamentary debates seem to suggest that 
indeed the mining sector was the unjustified winner in terms of government’s stance on 
revenue and expenditures. For instance, Mr Jones, after being a member for twelve years, 
rose in opposition to the treasurer’s speech which gave a positive picture about the 
conditions of the colony. He argued: 
The prosperity of the country has been lost sight of by successive governments 
for the 12 years during which I have been in the house. No government has 
brought in a Bill for the construction of one mile of railway for the 
development of the country. They have not brought up one Bill which can 
increase railways into agricultural districts of the colony. Any increase in 
mohair, postal returns, railways and other matters as being indications of the 
country’s prosperity is entirely owing to the fact that the country has become 
a great carrying country for Transvaal (House of Assembly budget debates, 
1896, p. 241). 
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Through the parliamentary debates and the evidence from public expenditure, it seems 
that the elite in parliament pushed the government towards huge outlays on the railway 
construction for easy access to the mining areas. The railway receipts legitimised this 
because top revenue earners were railways and customs so there was no sense of strong 
contestation. The fact that railway revenue was brought to the general ‘pot’ made things 
worse because it brought a false sense of prosperity since the expenditure side was not 
an immediate concern. In any case the expenditure side was seen as capital expenditure 
and was never investigated separately. As long as railways brought revenue there was no 
need for any alarm. When it comes to business interests hijacking the state towards their 
preferred end, the Cape does show features observed elsewhere in the nineteenth 
century as argued aptly by Davis and Huttenback: 
The evidence shows that 19th century business people realised that if 
government could be made to assume ‘its responsibilities’ any number of 
‘free’ services could be produced that would drastically reduce the costs of 
doing business…When the cost of all physical capital investment and 
improvements are assessed directly against the business sector, private 
profits plummet (Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 118) (emphasis in the 
original). 
This argument brings the question of whether the kind of state capture as observed in the 
Cape was common and necessarily positive. Whereas this study does not show that there 
was corruption going on, the available evidence suggests that the state institutions were 
distorted to serve private interests. In corruption the outcomes are not easily predictable 
but in state capture the benefits accrue to the private interests and for the Cape Colony 
the Diamond Trading Act was the fundamental regulatory tool produced entirely by the 
private mining interests and was brought to government for approval. Regarding the Act, 
Mr Rudd, for instance, who was linked to the mining sector, rose in parliament to argue 
that: 
The Diamond Trade Act is unjustifiably delayed to be carried through despite 
my discussion with the Attorney general of the colony …In the view of the 
probable passing of the diamond trade bill, through the house and of similar 
legislation in the Free State, will the government put itself in communication 
with Natal and the Transvaal with the objective of inducing the legislatures of 
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these countries to adopt measures of a similar nature? (House of Assembly 
budget debates, 1885, p. 148).  
A clear sense of wanting to be able to uniformly control the diamond trading activities 
was in Mr Rudd’s question above. Regulatory framework was important in terms of 
legitimising the mining activities and the purpose was to tailor it for maximum profits 
while key decision makers in government (businessmen involved in politics) preferred 
this outcome and made laws to this effect. Railway construction was a key example of 
such private interests driven state programmes. This view moves a step further from the 
general ‘railways were good for development’ thesis (Herranz-Loncan & Fourie, 2017) 
which is broadly correct but does not go further to unpack the personalist phase of 
capitalism in which stronger groups dominated and dictated government policy.  
5.4 The evolving statehood and governance by small coalitions 
A multiparty political system presents a strong veto in parliament and would influence 
the direction of public policy and therefore expenditure without a single group 
determining the outcomes. This also depends on how competitive such systems are at 
any point in time. Competitiveness was not necessarily present in most colonial 
territories whose parliaments were small and few individuals could make a coalition on 
a motion and obtain their preferred outcome. This was also true for New Zealand which 
had the transition from government by cliques to government by major parties after the 
1890s. The Cape’s government, far from being fiscally careless otherwise the public loans 
would not have been obtained, was in the hands of the common merchants, farmers and 
business people who formed various cliques which were somewhat easier to capture by 
any coalition that could be powerful at each time. By virtue of having parliamentarians 
who seldom represented the working class of the society but were leading merchants, 
farmers, and business people, it was easy for government expenditure to lean towards 
business interests. This was the outcome of 19th century franchise systems that usually 
restricted the vote to property owners. In Britain itself, heads of urban working-class 
households who paid property tax got the vote in 1867; this was extended to rural areas 
in 1884. The Cape parliament, unlike the New Zealand one, according to McCracken 
(1967, p. 138), “… was quite an instrument of ascendancy and unlike the Australian 
colonies it showed no tendencies for democracy”. In other words, some of these 
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parliamentarians pursued their own interests. Thomas (1996, p. 13) argued, for instance 
that:   
Rhodes had a way around even the Queen herself and local politicians could 
be bought with flattery and a few thousand pounds. One thing is clear with 
Rhodes, he embraced the imperial ideal when it served his purpose. If there 
was ever a conflict of interest he could be as anti-imperialist as a Fenian or a 
Boer. 
Davis and Huttenback also argued in general depicting the same for the self-governing 
dominions when they argued that colonists: 
…importuned the British government to underwrite military operations 
designed solely to expand the empire in direction that the colonists thought 
profitable. In many ways, the Great Britain seemed a helpless giant as it faced 
its self-confident and often arrogant offspring (Davis& Huttenback, 1986, p. 
152).  
Understanding how Rhodes navigated politics and business is important if one has to fully 
understand the Cape Colony’s public expenditures. It was John Merriman, a serving 
member of the Cape parliament and a fellow diamond digger – though less successful than 
Rhodes himself - who encouraged Rhodes to consider a parallel life in politics (Thomas , 
1996, p. 79). The commission of inquiry on diamond mining in 1880 and the Diamond 
Mining Act of 1881 were formed by Rhodes and his fellow parliamentarians with mining 
interests and of course he had no difficulty adding more support to his side. According to 
Thomas (1996, p. 132), Rhodes and Robinson pushed the Act “clause by clause and most 
of its provisions went through save for the flogging of illicit buyers and sellers”. The Act, 
besides being meant to deal with mining regulations, was important for changing the 
labour market regime of the Cape Colony. The Act, passed before the Diamond Trading 
Act, was the first to provide a systematic way of dealing with black African labour, a model 
followed in the later period for industrial and agricultural employment, with the 
imposition of fixed periods of contracts, pass laws and closed compounds (Thomas , 1996, 
p. 133). The state apparatus had begun to systematically initiate the far reaching racial 
and to a lesser extent class struggles which would affect South Africa for a century to 
come.  
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State expenditure on railways, pushed by business interests within parliament, was 
contested heavily and the government ended up constructing three lines to the diamond 
fields from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London. Thomas (1996, p. 127) argued 
that one of the key frustrations of Rhodes with the government was the delay to approve 
a railway line to Kimberley. Railways were an easy area to justify huge outlays for the 
‘development’ of the colony, yet under the motivation were a coalition of vested interests. 
The whole system was driven by the minerals–railway complex in which the state owned 
railway system and the mining houses had a pervasive coalition which was easy because 
the mining interests were represented in parliament. The precise ways in which the 
railway projects benefited the public remain uncertain. Despite inducing economic 
growth through transportation it can be argued that economic growth might have been 
much higher if public money was invested differently via other sectors such as 
agriculture.  
5.5 Conclusion  
Growth of public expenditure took a definite upward shift from the discovery of 
diamonds and state ownership of railways and the telegraphic system. Of all the 
expenditure categories railways grew most sharply and became the largest outlay 
followed by debt servicing. Education and health only grew rapidly in the early 1900s but 
remained very small categories compared to the railway expenditures. While outright 
corruption was not a problem of the Cape Colony government, evidence provided from 
both quantitative and qualitative sources suggest that the ruling elite influenced the 
public expenditures of the Cape Colony. Business interests in mining shaped public 
expenditure policies and the undeniable bias towards railway construction has been 
established.  
The spending regime was an outcome of the minerals-railways complex as the defining 
feature of the Cape Colony’s public expenditures. Since the public railways and the mining 
sector were involved, economic development was also dictated by the developments in 
this complex. Businessmen involved in politics had an undeniable influence on the 
budgetary processes in parliament and heavily influenced what the colonial government 
was to spend its money on. This is compatible with the LAO institutions discussed in 
chapter which imply that the elite dominated rent creation and management. It is 
important to point out that this was not necessarily conspiratorial in nature but a case of 
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the elite exploiting the weaknesses in state institutions. To the extent that social spending 
grew, it remained subordinate to the typical 19th century public expenditure outlays such 
as railways. When these physical investments in public works are considered without the 
minerals-railways complex, one could argue that the Cape was pursuing ‘developmental’ 
goals. This was, however, broadly capital-serving and extractive in nature. The social 
spending facet augments the foregoing notion of an extractive system. Education and 
pensions were observed right from the early decades of the British occupation of the Cape 
but it was only from the 1870s onwards that some attention was given to the black 
African education. The heavy emphasis on railway construction undoubtedly reduced the 
availability of funds for education spending, especially on African children and in the 19th 
century this might have been normal. The repressive legislative regime also meant a 
permanent stratification of the Cape society through ‘legal-official’ means and as a result 
it cemented the relegation of the black Africans to the lower class. 
The absence of strong institutional constraints meant that those who lobbied well could 
win and weak institutions could be distorted for the benefit of the few. The fact that only 
those involved in diamond mining brought the Acts to parliament shows that the 
weakness of the system led to regulatory capture as well. Regulations around public 
borrowing for instance, meant that representatives of companies used their political 
power to get the government to borrow to finance projects that benefitted the companies 
and made the state liable for debt obligations primarily serving business interests. 
Mammon was served but only in a way that benefited a small enclave of business interests 
locally. On the other hand, mammon was served as the state paid interest to British 
investors for railways which primarily served private interests. The majority of 
businesses, mainly farmers, did not benefit much as they watched the state at the mercy 
of the dictates of a small group of mining elites. The following chapter (chapter 6) 
completes the argument built so far by fully investigating the public debt of the Cape 
Colony.  
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CHAPTER 6: LESSONS FROM THE CAPE COLONY’S PUBLIC DEBT IN A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
With regards to debt, I do not like to say that it is not a large debt for this 
country, and I will say this, that debt in a young country is a valuable thing, 
provided that the money is being prudently and wisely expended. It only 
becomes a burden to the country when the debt becomes an unproductive 
debt to the colony and I have little patience with the pessimists who go about 
the country bewailing this debt. It is obvious that in a young country like ours 
we must have capital to develop our resources and that can only be obtained 
through borrowing (Mr Walton in House of Assembly budget debates, 1906, p. 
174). 
I class myself amongst these pessimists who consider a gigantic debt not as a 
satisfactory feature of the colony. The total debt of the country stands at 
£55 421 000 pounds and the interest payable on the loans is £1 905 000. This 
is an unsatisfactory feature that we sent such an amount over the water to 
Europe every year (Mr Merriman in the House of Assembly budget debates, 
1908, p. 97). 
6.1 Introduction  
The above quotes from the budget speech debates reveal two important issues about the 
Cape Colony’s public debt a few years before the formation of the Union of South Africa in 
1910. The first issue is that the public debt had grown significantly by the end of the 
Cape’s existence being £55 421 000 in 1908 while its total revenue was only about 12. 7% 
of this accumulated debt. This was accumulated over time through various bonds, loans 
and debentures which were mainly floated in the British capital markets. The second 
issue is that the parliamentarians were polarised concerning the public debt levels and 
this was evident in most budget debates. One side represented by Mr Walton’s position 
in the first quote above was that public debt was indispensable in a capital scarce colony 
such as the Cape and foreign borrowing was inevitable as long as the debt was to finance 
‘development’. The opposite side, represented by Mr Merriman’s quote above, was that 
public debt was not a good thing and the colony had accumulated a burdensome debt 
which it would be unable to service. The dwindling revenues in the last five years of the 
Cape’s existence were a sure sign of this problem (chapter 4).   
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This chapter will deal with a few important questions concerning public debt. The first 
question is to consider whether the Cape Colony overborrowed given its prevailing fiscal 
capacity investigated in chapter 4. Various measures will be explored to establish 
whether the Cape was overburdened and this will allow a more systematic exposition of 
the polarisation between the pro-debt and anti-debt groups. The second important 
question is the role played by self-governance, responsible governance and the discovery 
of minerals in the growth of public debt in the colony. The chapter is linked to the debates 
on how colonies with poor economic fundamentals could access capital on better terms, 
the so called ‘empire effect’ (Accominotti, Flandreau, & Rezzik, 2011; Ferguson & 
Schularick, 2006; Gardner, 2017). Reference will be made to other 19th century self-
governing colonies, mainly Australia, New Zealand and Canada, to investigate whether 
the Cape’s debt levels were atypical or were in line those of these colonies. Ceylon, Jamaica 
and Mauritius are the other set of colonies which are discussed to illustrate how colonial 
status (self-governance or indirect rule) affected borrowing patterns. The reflection on 
other colonies is merely to contextualise the Cape and not meant to give a fully 
comparative discussion because level of debt in each colony had to be related to the fiscal 
capacity of each country and the ability to meet debt service requirements.  
 Section 6.2 will discuss the politics of public debt in the Cape before major institutional 
changes such as self-governance and responsible governance and how becoming a 
dominion might have influenced the ability to easily access capital markets. The section 
will trace institutional changes which made public debt a permanent feature of the colony. 
Section 6.3 will analyse the Cape’s level of indebtedness using different measures and 
where data are available compare it to other dominions. Section 6.4 will examine the 
general implications of being a self-governing colony and compare the Cape with other 
main colonies. Section 6.5 will discuss the effect of the discovery diamonds on the growth 
of public debt and also discuss how capital was attracted by minerals. This section argues 
that discovering of key natural resources had a huge role in attracting capital. Section 6.6 
will conclude the chapter.  
6.2 Self-governance and responsible governance and ease of borrowing 
6.2.1 Diamonds discovery, self-governance and responsible governance  
From the information in earlier chapters it is clear that the public revenue was barely 
covering the ordinary expenditure of the government prior to the 1870s. In this 
environment, the Cape Colony resorted to short term borrowing just to make sure the 
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government itself remained afloat, discharging only critical activities such as magistracy, 
policing and general administration. Wool farming was the mainstay of the Cape Colony’s 
economy and it was evident that it was not enough to spur and justify ambitious public 
expenditure projects through large scale borrowing by the colonial government. The 
output of wool, at the mercy of global price fluctuations, could not initiate an industrial 
boom in the Cape Colony despite a few shearing and washing firms in the eastern 
districts. Backward and forward linkages of wool farming were not sufficiently large to 
change the industrial outlook of the economy. The fact that wool farming was 
concentrated close to eastern port of Port Elizabeth meant, fortunately, that no massive 
infrastructure was required to warrant huge public debt which the Colony could not 
afford. The government, with the backdrop of meagre public revenues, was also 
unyielding to popular requests for railway construction.   
In the mid-1860s the government had already been borrowing for ordinary expenditures 
after retrenching public works in the face of insufficient revenues. Throughout the history 
of the development of fiscal states, public debt was an option for extraordinary 
circumstances such as wars (Bonney, 2012; O’Brien, 2011). Borrowing under normal 
circumstances was not a good sign and the Cape Colony was already in difficulties since 
its financial position was ‘embarrassing’ in the words of the governor (Wodehouse, 1864, 
p. 3). Without real economic prospects, potential lenders from London would be difficult 
to satisfy with a mere pledge and any public borrowing had to be very limited reflecting 
the Colony’s ability to pay shown by its limited fiscal capacity. The complicating factor 
was that, with no substantial economic prospects, the Cape was in a difficult position 
because no substantial imports would be realised to warrant more customs revenue. The 
existing taxes had already been resisted by the merchants and business people as 
injurious to their businesses and petitions were rampant to the colonial governors to 
reduce and not impose any new taxes (section 4.3.3). One crucial element at this time was 
that the Cape Colony was already a self-governing colony but responsible governance had 
not yet been given. In other words, the ongoing negotiations regarding responsible 
government had a bearing on the prospects of public borrowing. This is still consistent 
with the argument in this chapter because for foreign borrowing it helped to be seen as a 
stable self-governing and responsibly run colony (Gardner, 2017). The real important 
factor, however, was that the primary commodity endowment made the investors in 
London more certain that the government in such favourable economic conditions would 
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be worthy of receiving their capital. Most of the government borrowing at the Cape was 
done through London capital markets and Act number 8 of 1860 explicitly stated that 
only when favourable interest rates could be obtained locally was the government going 
to avoid floating debentures in the London capital markets.  
The late 1870s at the Cape coincided with responsible government and the expanding 
diamond mining and economic activities. In the face of abundant revenue from various 
sources including railways, public borrowing was soon to grow and become a permanent 
feature of the Cape’s fiscal system. More revenue did not obviate the need for borrowing 
to finance large capital projects, but made it easier to service debts. In the presence of 
surplus revenue, the governor’s speech revealed the emerging scope to deal with debt. 
The governor argued in 1871 that: 
Good harvest and increase of commerce, resulting from diamond discoveries, 
has caused the revenue to significantly increase not only to meet extra 
expenditure but to leave a surplus of £35 518 and this has served to bring 
down public debt (Barkly, 1871, p.5). 
It is important to note that without a stronger staple commodity in demand worldwide 
such as diamonds the Cape had not experienced a meaningful revenue surplus since its 
inception in 1806. Before the 1870s the Cape Colony could not escape debt accumulation 
to support ordinary expenditures and natural resources were the major source of 
economic hope.45 With surplus revenue accruing to the Cape Colony’s public coffers, the 
reduction of public debt became easier and once the debt was eliminated surplus 
revenues would soon go to revive the previously retrenched public works. This also 
meant the improving credit worthiness of the Cape Colony since potential lenders in 
London would not hesitate to invest in government bonds of a self-governing colony.  
Legislatively there was need for improvement in terms of financial transparency not only 
because of the pending responsible governance but also the handling of the increasing 
public revenues needed to be more systematic for auditing and other purposes. The 
deficits experienced prior to the 1870s had caused revenue raised through loans to be 
mixed with ordinary revenues from taxes for a long time (section 4.4.2). The select 
                                                 
45 In 1841, for instance, the Cape had accumulated half a million pounds in debt and licences from guano, 
another natural resource, eliminated this debt (Memoranda on South African colonies, 1856 p.1). 
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committee appointed for an inquiry into the state of public finances of the Colony 
reported their difficulties in trying to make sense of the procedures and ways in which 
finance records were kept. It would seem that the introduction of the Blue books for 
record keeping and accountability was necessary but insufficient without the 
improvement in accounting standards. The accounts remained obscure for a long time 
after the Blue books were introduced (Wodehouse, 1867, pp. 1-3). As a self-governing 
colony that soon thereafter was granted responsible government, the Cape Colony could 
not continue with this opacity in its public finances. This was not only happening with 
central revenues but it also filtered into local public finances of municipalities and 
divisional councils. The governor in 1867 confirmed this in his speech in which he was 
reporting on the Auditor General’s report and stressed that accounts of the divisional 
councils were “indeed worthless” (Wodehouse 1867, p. 3). 
When the public revenue was meagre, this might have been problematic because low 
levels of revenue require proper financial management to ensure that basic services are 
provided. With large sums of money coming from the growing economy, the scale of 
mishandling public funds would increase and be more problematic. Possibly, corruption 
would also easily occur given the messy records. This chaotic state of public accounts 
would not be good for the Cape’s public borrowing credibility because investors could 
not access meaningful public accounts records with which to assess the credit profile of 
the Cape Colony. The problem was that creditors would want to know how much was 
ordinary revenue and what part was borrowed and for what purposes, while the debt 
repayment history would be required too. Although the legislative institutions allowed 
the Cape Colony to raise loans through Acts of parliament, the financial reports and 
record keeping needed to improve as well.  
The 1870 Public Debt Consolidation Act was passed to solve this problem and thus helped 
to bring clarity and simplicity to the public accounts. The Act was for the conversion, 
redemption, payment and discharge of several colonial debts. Any revenue raised under 
this Act was henceforth supposed to be managed under a separate public debt account 
and to be removed from ordinary revenues. The use of public debt was also more 
institutionalised by this Act and debt was to be used for capital expenditure rather than 
using tax revenue. The argument was well articulated by Governor Henry Barkly: 
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Reproductive works such as harbours should not be left subject to such 
provision as can be afforded from year to year out of the annual revenue of the 
colony, but that it would be better and more economical, in the long run, that 
whenever the engineering plans have been approved, and it has been decided 
to commence their execution, an Act should be passed, authorising the raising 
as speedily as occasion may require of funds for the estimated costs (Barkly 
1871, p.5).  
With responsible governance granted in 1872, a new era came during which ordinary 
revenues were meant for ordinary expenditures while the debt account was meant for 
non-ordinary outlays such as harbour works, railways and other capital investments.46 
Public borrowing was also not uniformly passed through a single act but various targeted 
loans were raised as long as the parliamentarians agreed and voted on them, a practice 
now common worldwide. For instance, the Railway Purchase Act of 1872 came with the 
power of government to raise loans through debentures to facilitate the purchase of the 
railway system from a private company.  
Harbour boards were also authorised to borrow subject to approval by parliament since 
they were responsible for the interest payments on their loans while the government only 
guaranteed their loans. This was also true for municipal borrowing which was allowed 
only through acts of parliament but the responsibility for the repayment was solely on 
the municipalities. What this shows is that the capital flows into the Cape Colony through 
loans was not limited to the central government alone but municipal boards, harbour 
boards and divisional council boards were influential. The debt of these boards, except 
for harbour boards, do not feature in the central government debt. This implies that the 
indebtedness is underestimated when municipal debt is not included.  
6.2.2 Borrowing at the Cape  
The Cape Colony government borrowed internally and externally but foreign debt 
dominated government borrowing. The instruments of borrowing were not 
systematically reported but throughout the archival documents a few types often come 
up. These include government bonds, debentures, local loans and irrigation bonds (House 
of Assembly budget debates, 1892, p. 80). As the local banks grew and increased in 
                                                 
46 This arrangement satisfied a well-known principle known as the "golden rule of fiscal policy" which 
restricted government to borrow only for investment and not for current spending. 
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number more and more loans were obtained locally but mostly when it came to 
(especially) large amounts the London capital markets were used.  
Figure 6.1 below shows the total central government debt of the Cape Colony from the 
1860s to 1910. What is evident is a sharp increase in public debt in the second half of the 
1870s which is the period when diamond mining proved to be more than a passing small 
discovery. The Cape Colony had resisted the temptation of investing in unaffordable 
public infrastructure such as railways throughout the period before 1870. With the 
evidence from the petitions requesting the government to construct railways in various 
districts prior to 1870, it is evident that the government could not be pushed to invest in 
let alone own the public utilities by buying them from private companies. This is exactly 
what happened once diamonds were discovered as the government bought the railway 
company and telegraphic system, and continued expanding the postal services which it 
had already been running. The revenues were increasing beyond the needs for ordinary 
expenditures and with surplus revenues the government was better placed for large scale 
investment which required capital beyond the means of private companies. Public 
borrowing, mainly through government bonds, became the natural way of financing these 
large scale investments under the ownership of the colonial government. The public debt, 
once institutionalised as a permanent feature of the fiscal system, grew continuously for 
the entire existence of the Cape. 
Figure 6. 1 Cape Colony’s central government debt, 1860-1910 
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Source: Data from Blue books (1860-1910) 
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The graph also shows that the early 1880s saw a sharp hike in public debt. This is 
consistent with the diamond crisis which prompted the Cape government to borrow for 
further railway construction to connect Kimberley with the gold mining fields in 
Transvaal discussed in earlier chapters (De Kiewiet, 1957; Goodfellow, 1931b; 
Schumann, 1938). The speculative bubble was going to burst at some stage and this 
meant a bleak picture for the Cape which had invested massively in railway lines to the 
diamond fields. Traffic was not as high as expected and the lines were barely recovering 
the maintenance and running costs and half of the interest payments had to come from 
ordinary revenue (Van Der Poel, 1933, p. 8).  
The Cape Colony’s only hope for more railway revenue was gold mining which by this 
time was attracting high levels of capital, hence the Cape had to borrow for the extension 
of the railway line to Transvaal’s goldfields. The issue was that if the Cape did not have 
its line extended to Transvaal it was going to lose out not only on its traffic revenue but 
also on customs on all imports destined for the goldfields. As long as no other colony or 
government had developed railway lines from the sea to the goldfields, the Cape’s 
railways and ports racked in significant amounts of money through direct traffic revenue 
and customs, enabling the Cape to meet its debt obligation with ease. When railway 
transport and harbours were developed in other  territories such as Natal and Lourenco 
Marques, rivalry emerged in the form of railways and customs wars (Van Der Poel, 1933). 
The Cape began to lose customs revenue as other ports were preferred and this entailed 
loss of traffic for railway revenue as well. The result was that public debt rose 
uncontrollably in the Cape until 1910 when the Union of South Africa was formed. Debt 
became a defining feature of the Cape’s fiscal problems. Archival sources show that many 
of the acts of parliament passed after 1872, when responsible government was granted, 
were related to public debt. 
Borrowing at the Cape was inevitably linked to the public expenditure of the colony for 
which railway construction was key. The political and economic elite controlling the 
public expenditure policies realised that borrowing was necessary. Since it was the state, 
and not their private firms, that would pay for debt servicing it was easy for them to push 
for more borrowing even to deviously do so behind the scenes with no due processes 
being followed. For instance, Mr Sprigg in 1885 argued in parliament that: 
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The great offense that the government has committed is that it has been able 
to negotiate a loan of £400,000 from the imperial government for the 
construction and maintenance of Kimberley railway without the authority of 
parliament, and the honourable member of Namaqualand said that our action 
in that matter was grossly illegal and grossly unconstitutional (House of 
Assembly budget debates, 1885, p. 112). 
Mr Merriman in response argued: 
I am not bringing a charge against the honourable member, but point to it to 
show that when charges of gross unconstitutional practices are so freely 
thrown about, honourable members should inquire whether people who are 
throwing stones so readily have not themselves at one time lived in a glass 
house (House of Assembly budget debates, 1885, p. 113). 
Mr Merriman seems to admit the malpractice and his response also accuses the treasury 
of similar practices before. This may suggest that weak institutional constraints were 
prone to manipulation and such non-procedural borrowing happened due to stronger 
interest groups exploiting weak institutions. This means that looking at the actual figures 
spent and assuming an honesty of purpose for ‘development’ can be misleading for 
colonial government expenditures. Ultimately, the key question is whether the elite’s 
private goals coincidentally aligned with desirable investment in infrastructure and 
public works. The evidence shows that the contrary is true because irrigation and light 
railway systems for agricultural regions were not developed yet. Over and over the 
parliamentarians acknowledged that true prosperity was to be obtained from agriculture 
and other non-mineral resources which were supposed to be seen as the real measure of 
the Cape’s prosperity.  
6.3 Measures of state indebtedness in the nineteenth century 
A crucial question is whether the Cape Colony was at a critical stage with its accumulated 
public debt. In other words, was there any debt crisis to talk about in the first place or did 
the economic growth make the high levels of debt viable? The answer to this question lies 
in the manner in which debt was negotiated in the first place in terms of yearly interest 
payments. The government bonds were taken out at different times with differing 
interest rates and times to maturity for the payment of the principal amount. Initially 
capital was reluctant and interest rates were higher but over time, with economic 
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buoyancy, access to capital became easier. As long as the Cape was able to service its 
public debt with its own public revenues there could not be any problem or need to cap 
the public debt at a certain level. This section refers to these basic measures of fiscal 
sustainability and here it is important to consider mostly 19th century measures rather 
than modern measures which were not in use then.  
In this period, once a default happened and a country renegotiated its loans, the markets 
inflicted heavy penalties on previous defaulters who would also fall into “the countries 
which would be junk nations in modern terms” (Flandreau & Zumer, 2004, p. 32). The 
Cape, though considered a high risk, was not relegated to that group at any time of its 
existence hence it could go on seeking loans from the London markets. Herein lies the 
source of the public debt trap because as long as investors thought the Cape could 
continue borrowing, since no repayment failure had been recorded, easy access made 
borrowing to continue at the Cape. The Cape’s favourable status with regards to 
borrowing was highlighted by Mr Sprigg in 1900 when he argued that: 
I trust that if we go to the public market we shall find ourselves as well served 
as we have been in the past. I recollect the period of three years ago when the 
securities of this country stood the highest in the world, next to the British 
consols and I look forward hopefully to the time when we shall again occupy 
that distinguished position. At the present time our securities stand fairly well 
in the public market but I hope in a short time they will stand higher (House 
of Assembly budget debates, 1900, p. 262).  
Measures of indebtedness in the19th century were different from what is used in modern 
times and assessments of indebtedness have to come from the use of various measures 
which may be less popular in modern times but were important then. The information 
set available to investors was limited in the nineteenth century and miscalculations were 
unavoidable because of the information asymmetry which was also worsened by the 
sheer distance and rudimentary communication systems between capital markets and 
colonies on the periphery. The Crown Agents helped to solve this information asymmetry 
problem and helped to promote colonial borrowing. They helped the colonies from the 
1860s onwards and were a “semi-autonomous body which acted as a general commissary 
service for colonial administration…and were active in trying to ensure the marketability 
of colonial loan issues” (Gardner, 2017, p. 245). 
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One measure to be considered was the debt/GDP ratio whose threshold has been recently 
contested between various economists (Taylor, 2013). The debt/GDP ratio is used here 
in retrospect because GDP numbers were not compiled yet at that time. As such, these 
ratios are meaningful for us today but played no role in debt assessment then. Figure 6.2 
shows the Cape’s debt/GDP ratio. What is revealed here is that the debt/GDP ratio 
reached its peak during the diamond crisis in the mid-1880s. As a ratio this simply means 
that GDP, as a denominator, declined while debt remained on an upward trend.  
Figure 6. 2 The Cape Colony’s debt to GDP ratio, 1860-1910 
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Sources: Blue books (1860-1910); Verhoef et al. (2014, pp. 29–30) 
The ratio entails that high levels of public debt in the face of slow economic growth may 
be problematic. Comparatively no other colonial territory had reached this level (200%) 
before WWI making the debt of the Cape Colony exceptionally high. Australia’s debt/GDP 
ratio rose steadily between 1850 and 1900 but only reached 120% in 1895 and dropped 
below 100% post 1900 (Taylor, 2013, p. 5). Canada’s debt/GDP ratio barely rose beyond 
40% between 1870 and 1910 and only exceeded 100% during WWII (Taylor, 2013, p. 6). 
The UK’s debt/GDP ratio exceeded 200% before 1815 because of the Napoleonic wars 
and declined to less than 60% in 1875 (Taylor, 2013, p. 18). In light of this comparative 
perspective with colonial Canada and Australia and Britain, the Cape Colony debt/GDP 
ratio in the period 1880 -1885 was exceptionally high considering that it was peace time. 
With the benefit of this recently compiled GDP series, this comparative view suggests that 
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the Cape Colony’s debt was exceptional by prevailing norms in other dominions. 
According to Taylor (2013, p. 22): 
 Even if high debt does not spark a financial crisis, high Debt/GDP ratios can 
constrain economic growth making it more difficult to break the burden of the 
debt. Above all, politics determines who bears the costs. With low interest 
rates or economic growth, politicians can continue to run deficits. The interest 
groups with the least political influence are the ones who will pay the price. 
Although Taylor’s argument was written in modern times, it does depict that to some 
extent the debt/GDP ratio can give tell-tale signs of financial problems. If politics 
determined who bore the risk in the nineteenth century, the colonial government knew 
that there was an implicit guarantee. Because of the issues around the debt/GDP ratio as 
an inadequate measure of indebtedness, other measures may be useful so that the actual 
assessment is done with a large compendium of information (Flandreau & Zumer, 2004, 
p. 30).   
Other measures are important for a more comprehensive picture and one such measure 
is the public debt/revenue ration which traces changes in the level of debt as a share of 
annual revenue (figure 6.3). Although there was no standard threshold, a comparative 
picture helps to place the Cape in the context of the other dominions in the 19th century. 
With this ratio the Cape compares relatively better than the other dominions. 
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Figure 6. 3 Public debt/revenue, 1880-1910 
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Sources: Blue books (1830-1910) and Accominotti et al. (2011) 
A better and more precise measure is debt servicing as a share of the yearly revenues. 
This measure traces the burden faced each year by the government by comparing what 
the government is paying for servicing its debt to the actual government revenue raised 
each year. If this ratio is one or 100% it means that all the country’s public revenue goes 
to debt servicing and this is not a good position, while zero means that the country had 
no debt to service. As a rule of thumb: 
Whenever the interest service to government revenue ratio is lower than 35%, 
the greatest prudence is in order, and creditors can still feel reasonably 
confident. Above 45% the situation starts looking bleak. But when one reaches 
55 or 60%, the slightest problem shall induce the opening of negotiations with 
creditors … No sovereign bankruptcy has ever occurred with this ratio 
standing below 40% (Flandreau & Zumer, 2004, p. 52). 
Figure 6.4 shows the Cape Colony’s debt burden measured as interest service to 
government revenue, also known as the tax test (Flandreau & Zumer, 2004, p. 37). The 
graph also shows how the Cape Colony compared to other dominions from 1880. The tax 
test also indirectly measured the efficiency of the state managed monopolies and 
companies because their losses entailed less state revenue realised. The graph shows that 
from the 1880s the Cape Colony’s ratio rose to 40%, the level considered to be safe by the 
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contemporary standards as argued above. The dependent colonies, Jamaica, Ceylon and 
Mauritius, were generally less indebted than the self-governing colonies and they were 
less burdened using this measure.  
Figure 6. 4 The Cape’s tax test (debt servicing /total revenues) 
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Sources: Blue books (1830-1910) and Accominotti et al. (2011) 
When viewed with respect to other colonies, the Cape Colony’s ratio was consistent with 
the declining trends of other colonies towards and during the early 20th century. While 
this is not a bleak picture for the colonies, it should be viewed with the totality in mind 
because there is a missing variable that would have ballooned this ratio to a potentially 
unsustainable level. The colonies shied away from their responsibility for defence which 
was throughout history a fundamental feature of state formation and this differentiated 
the borrowing of the sovereign nations from that of colonies (Holtfrerich, 2013, p. 3). This 
means that spurts of wars or conflicts, which the colonial authorities paid for, would have 
easily inflated the public debt through extraordinary war time borrowing. More critical 
is the ramification of war or conflicts for the sustainability of government revenues since 
the economic conditions would decline and drastically affect public revenue. Had the 
Cape paid in full the costs of its defence, the debt burden would have been very high and 
defeats in wars or unresolved conflicts would have meant an even worse scenario. During 
the South African war the British exchequer suffered a huge dent in its finances, about £1 
500 000 a week (Military report, 1903, p. 6). While the Cape was not fully responsible for 
the war, there is evidence that the Cape government did spend significant amounts on 
some wars. This was reflected in its expenditure when Mr Sprigg reported that “For 1901-
2 the extraordinary expenditures were £249 597 for the plague (rinderpest) and £2 600 
000 for the war (House of Assembly budget debates, 1902, p. 158).  
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Another useful way of measuring indebtedness is by using the trading activities of the 
colonies and this was known as trade test measured as debt services as a ratio of exports. 
The argument was that countries with high export values possessed commodities other 
countries needed. Exports denoted trade openness which was good for economic 
progress. This measure is consistent with the argument in this chapter in that exports 
were mainly the commodities which each colony had in abundance and thus public debt 
servicing would, presumably, have been easier for countries with higher export values. 
The colonial economy at this stage was mainly export based so the debt/export ratio 
provides a rough measure of the size of the debt relative to that of the economy. The 
argument for the trade test was put forth by Nash in 1889 who argued in line with views 
at the time that:  
There is perhaps no better test of a nation’s wealth than its foreign trade for, 
as a rule, countries which are rich have those things which other nations covet, 
and countries which are poor have not” (quoted in Flandreau and Zumer, 
2004, p. 48). 
Figure 6.5 shows the Cape’s debt/export ratio in a comparative perspective. Given the 
threshold was suggested to be 0.4, this ratio shows the Cape and other economies were 
doing well.  
Figure 6. 5 Trade test (debt servicing/exports), 1830-1910 
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
CAN CAP NZL AUS  
Sources: Blue books (1830-1910) and Accominotti et al. (2011)  
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Natural resource exports influenced this ratio and it does remain a rough measure. The 
increase around 1900 is noticeable for the Cape due to the South African war which 
affected exports. The fact that this ratio was used only until the 1890s shows that it was 
imprecise and needed to be replaced by the tax test. For the Cape Colony, trade was soon 
to be affected by rivalry from the use of other ports in Lourenço Marques and Natal. Two 
major sources of government revenue were to be hugely affected because losing the 
position of the preferred port of entry entailed losing both railway traffic and customs as 
goods were imported through elsewhere. Van der Poel (1933, p. 139) shed more light on 
the difficult position of not only the Cape but Natal as trade moved away from these two 
British maritime colonies:  
The Cape ports having been sucked as dry as natural conditions would permit. 
The accumulated poverty of five lean years had thrown Natal and the Cape into 
a sort of querulous despondency. They were weary of their financial burdens 
and ready to lay them upon a united South Africa but at the same time they 
were jealous of the rich Transvaal and suspiciously watchful of their 
remaining interests, seeing that the union was yet to be achieved.  
The public debt had not been reduced when this happened and the means of servicing 
the loans by the Cape government was limited after ports had ‘dried’ and railway revenue 
dwindled. The unification of the four South African colonies would be the only means for 
the Cape to lay its financial burdens upon a united South Africa (Van der Poel, 1933, p. 
139). How the debt was dealt with upon the union formation is another interesting 
subject beyond this study but the financial difficulties were apparent at the end of the 
Cape Colony’s existence. Using total debt and total revenue shows that in the time of 
diminishing revenues, such as during the second half of the 1880s and the second half of 
the first decade of the 20th century, the public debt of the Cape was in a dire state. The 
Cape government would have needed seven times its annual revenue to retire all 
outstanding debt simultaneously. Of course, this was a most unlikely scenario. While 
there is no threshold or benchmark for this ratio, the trends portrayed shows that if debt 
increases and the government does not become more creative with fiscal capacity, 
revenues become incapable of servicing the accumulated debt. By 1909 the Cape needed 
to commit about 25% of its dwindling revenue on servicing debt. 
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If only there were no huge public debt obligations, cutting back expenditures would be 
possible to alleviate the financial problems of the Cape Colony but the debt remained a 
huge external obligation which could not be wished away. By this time, in addition, the 
ordinary expenditures had also grown through the public employees’ wage bill since the 
government owned most of the key parastatals and the government could not avoid 
retrenching workers.47 High public debt in the Cape Colony signalled the need for the 
increase in taxes in the future for government to raise enough revenue to service interest 
payments. This was difficult or almost impossible given the fact that capital was shifting 
towards goldmining in Transvaal. The business environment became less buoyant in the 
Cape, as Johannesburg became the most important business centre, meaning that the tax 
base was eroded and this was worsened by the fact that the Cape had relied heavily on 
easy-to-collect customs revenues and did not invest in exploiting other forms of direct 
taxes. The budget deficits also give an idea of the ability to deal with debt issues. Figure 
6.6 below shows the Cape in an unstable pattern compared to Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia.  
Being the most unstable colony with more deficits than surpluses and the worst debt to 
GDP ratio suggest that the Cape’s debt level was not sustainable. New Zealand and Canada 
had less debt given that over time they accumulated a higher revenue surplus than the 
Cape and Australia which were in the negative most of the time. Australia was particularly 
closer to the Cape because of the strong role played by the state which was heavily 
interventionistic attracting the label of colonial socialism (Attard, 2007; Boot, 1998; 
Gilchrist, 2013; Greasley & Oxley, 1998). All the measures point to the fact that the Cape 
Colony was a risk territory to invest in but it retained the favour of the London investors 
although with a high risk premium. Figure 6.7 shows that the yields of the Cape Colony 
were comparatively higher than those of the other self-governing dominions due to the 
Cape’s risk profile.  
  
                                                 
47 Mr Sauer said that within the year 1908-1909 they had retrenched on railways about 1817 people which 
included white and coloured, clerks and men in the workshops. The saving caused by that amounted to 
£200 000. The next largest item was train mileage which was reduced by 750 000 miles and the saving on 
that was £90 000. These two gave nearly £300 000 saving on the expenditure side (House of Assembly 
budget debates 1909, p. 281).  
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Figure 6. 6 Budget balances in comparative perspectives (£ millions), 1880-1914. 
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Source: Accominotti et al. (2011) and Blue books (1830-1909) 
Figure 6. 7 Bond yields of the Cape Colony and other settler colonies, 1880-1910. 
2.8%
3.2%
3.6%
4.0%
4.4%
4.8%
18
80
18
81
18
82
18
83
18
84
18
85
18
86
18
87
18
88
18
89
18
90
18
91
18
92
18
93
18
94
18
95
18
96
18
97
18
98
18
99
19
00
19
01
19
02
19
03
19
04
19
05
19
06
19
07
19
08
19
09
19
10
19
11
19
12
19
13
AUS CAN CAP NZL  
Source: Accominotti et al (2011) and Blue books (1880-1910) 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 191 
 
Figure 6. 8 Spreads over British consols, 1880-1910 
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Source: Accominotti et al (2011) and Blue books (1880-1910) 
The high returns on the Cape’s bonds implied a risk premium on the public debt of the 
colony. This was not a problem for the Cape government because it had no difficulties 
raising loans through these bonds (House of Assembly budget debates, 1900, p. 262.). 
Therein lay the recipe for a continuous increase in public debt for a colony which was 
evidently not faring well in terms of its public revenues. The reality that yields differed 
across the colonies suggests that investors had at least some sense of risk profiles. The 
British consols are the usual benchmark bond yields used to compare investment returns 
in other sovereign countries and colonies. The spreads over the British consols in figure 
6.8 show that these colonial territories systematically yielded more than what could be 
obtained in the British system. The spreads help to isolate general trends in the Cape and 
global trends of declining yields generally. For instance the spreads show that prior to 
1900 the decline was not as pronounced in the Cape as compared to the general yields 
shown in figure 6.7. This calls for further review of what self-government entailed for the 
Cape Colony which the next section deals with.  
6.4 Contextualising the Cape among the self-governing colonies  
The British Empire was at its zenith in the nineteenth century and the salience of its 
London capital market facilitated easy borrowing by colonies. For the British colonies 
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foreign capital was therefore secured within the British system. The access to capital 
within the Empire was not purely based on free market principles. According to Stone 
(1999, p. 14): 
Despite minimal government interference in the London capital market, there 
was a complete absence of laissez-faire. There were permanent clients for 
certain banks and certain countries relied only on a few specific credit 
providers…Well over 90% of colonial and provincial obligations were issued 
for the governmental bodies within the British Empire. Major borrowers 
included Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand and the Cape. 
This inclination towards the governments within the British Empire implied that other 
sovereign nations could access London capital with limited prospects. For the British 
colonies the Crown Agent was responsible for negotiating all colonial loans but this was 
ended in 1881 by Her Majesty’s government. This was to distance the British government 
from the potential misunderstanding because the investors would assume the imperial 
government was directly responsible for all loans given to its colonies. Sunderland 
(2004)documented in detail how the crown agents were in serious principal agent 
problems when acting on behalf of colonies. The solution was not in getting rid of the self-
governing colonies because they were in many ways still important to the Empire’s 
existence. Investors were well aware of the relationship between the imperial authorities 
and self-governing colonies as sub-units of the Empire. Investors could take recourse to 
the imperial authorities in the event of default by the colonies. This led to the introduction 
of the Colonial Stock Act of 1877 which subjected the governments of the colonial 
territories to the British judiciary system. In the words of Accominotti et al.(2011, p. 396): 
Perhaps most critically, local capitalists holding these (colonial) securities 
could seek the support of Britain, which provided them with legal mechanisms 
for protecting their property rights. As far as debts were concerned, colonial 
legislation was subordinated to English law and imperial arbitration. Self-
governing colonies were fiscally sovereign, but not judicially sovereign.  
These details gave the British investors more reasons to invest in colonial bonds because, 
unlike other sovereign nations, the imperial government assured them that in matters 
concerning colonial bonds they could use the British justice system. Countries borrowing 
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from outside the empire had to prove that their macroeconomic fundamentals (budget 
balances, trade flows, exchange rates, etc.) were strong because these could default while 
default was not an option for the British colonies inside the empire. This, however, was 
problematic and led to huge debts in the colonies whose unscrutinised ability to borrow 
gave way to rising debt as long as default and outright bankruptcy could be hidden under 
the imperial ‘wings’. This makes any study that seeks to compare historical data across 
all countries, including previously colonised countries, superficial if the investigators 
ignore the nuances and structural effects of being in the British Empire (Ferguson & 
Schularick, 2006).  
The fact that colonies which were self-governing or settler colonies had fiscal autonomy 
is a useful point of departure when trying to understand the growth of public debt in the 
nineteenth century. The degree of autonomy that came with self-governance was nearly 
complete and indeed gave the self-governing colonies certain advantages over the 
sovereign nations which had no imperial backing. For instance, the fact that the imperial 
government had to shoulder a huge part of colonial defence meant that self-governing 
colonies were left with room to focus on purely developmental goals while not worrying 
about military defence. This left the self-governing colonies in an enviable position but a 
potentially precarious one because there was a loose sense that the British Government 
guaranteed colonial governments’ debt. This was going to happen through moral hazard 
since the colonial states knew the British authorities would not allow fiscal 
embarrassment, through default, in its key colonies (Vogel, 1887, p. 15).  
The argument being advanced in this chapter is that self-governance was a necessary but 
insufficient ground for the growth of colonial public debts. It was the availability of 
primary resources which altered the public debt terrain of the colonies and not simply 
the fact that a colony was self-governing. This argument is consistent with the resource-
curse literature and the narratives of economic development and underdevelopment of 
the periphery countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America in which primary commodities 
played a key role (Blattman et al., 2007; Thomas , 2003). What has not received enough 
attention is the link between public debt and natural resources and this is important for 
state formation as well as fiscal narratives in the periphery. 
Public debt and therefore the debt servicing burden (the ratio of interest payment over 
government revenue) in self-governing colonies were systematically higher than those of 
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dependent colonies due to more government autonomy to borrow in the former. 
Dependent colonies could not do much to alter their future and in most cases the crown 
agent acted on their behalf through a governor acting as the representative of the 
imperial government. Nominal debt levels shown in figure 6.8 reveal the fact that the self-
governing colonies were in a different league compared to dependent colonies with 
regards to public debt. An important point to make is that besides differences in 
autonomy to borrow shown in figure 6.9, the dominions and dependent colonies were 
also at different levels in terms of the size of their economies. This would also matter in 
the size of nominal debt of these two different sets of colonies.  
Figure 6. 9 Nominal debt, settler vs non settler colonies (£ millions), 1880-1914 
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Source: Accominotti et al. (2011) and Blue books (1880-1910) 
The debt levels of self-governing colonies were stretching towards 100 million pounds 
while those of the dependent colonies hardly exceeded seven million pounds showing a 
systematic and structural difference in these two categories. This confirms the argument 
by Accominotti et al. (2010, p.64) that “India, Ceylon, Jamaica and other dependent 
colonies were slave nations, owed nothing and did not grow. Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada were heavy borrowers, governed themselves and developed.” The high debt 
levels also translated to debt servicing in these two categories of colonies as shown 
previously in figure 6.3.  
Using the Cape Colony as an example in comparative perspective the argument is that 
self-governance led to parliamentary institutional consolidation, growth in public 
revenue and expenditure and stronger autonomy for colonial governments to borrow. 
This is what is generally acknowledged by historians of self-governing colonies. This 
chapter brings the Cape Colony to the fore and argues that borrowing was spurred not 
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only by the autonomy from self-governance but also by the availability of natural 
resources needed by the industrialising countries. With no primary resources or 
endowments, the investors would not be encouraged to invest in places with no economic 
prospects brought by mining. This argument was made by Sunderland (2004, p. 149): 
“Funds were required to build infrastructure, but the very lack of transportation 
networks and economic activity reduced the likelihood that they would be forthcoming 
at a price the colonies could afford”. This was the ‘catch 22’ challenge of colonial 
development faced by the imperial government which desired its colonies to prosper 
{Gardner 2017, p. 238). For the Cape Colony, the discovery of diamonds was an important 
stimulus that unlocked economic activities and helped the colony to be perceived as 
wealthy.  
The prime movers of railway infrastructural development in the 19th century South Africa 
were diamonds and gold just as railways in Chile were linked to nitrate mining (Denoon, 
1983, p. 88). This argument is applicable to self-governing colonies and dependant 
colonies, the difference being that private companies, chartered or not, played more 
important roles in the latter, limiting the benefits of any infrastructural developments to 
private interests. Government borrowing had an advantage of broadly focusing on public 
goods provision compared to private companies whose primary concerns were 
profitability. This does not mean that the government borrowing in settler colonies was 
primary driven by altruistic motives for investment in public good provisioning. The 
Cape’s borrowing regime was underpinned by the minerals-railways complex which 
resisted investments in other sectors and focused on railway construction.  
6.5 Capital chasing primary resources 
The colonial territories were a huge part of the price taking periphery and the 
developments which took place were largely concomitants of the role played by the 
periphery in the industrialising Europe through natural resources. The commodity 
lottery48 argument is influential for public debt because the nature of demand for a given 
commodity determined whether investors would be interested in a particular colony’s 
government bonds or not. The commodities also determined the level of confidence and 
                                                 
48 The concept refers to the nature of available natural resources or commodities. The commodities with 
potential value addition and stable prices provide better prospects for economic expansion than other 
commodities did. It is a lottery whether a country will have a commodity that has potential for value 
addition or not (Blattman et al., 2007).  
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therefore size of the loans colonial governments would reasonably seek. It would have 
alarmed Downing Street if one of its dominions got into a borrowing binge with no 
economic basis. The reasonable size of public debt was assessed from the investor’s 
perspective with the colony’s economic potential in mind –commodities being key. The 
nature of the available commodities also mattered because they differed in importance 
at the global markets and some would become obsolete as time went by. Thomas (2003, 
p. 15) argued that: 
Commodities also differ in terms of their demand characteristics. Some 
products (e.g. cattle), lend themselves naturally to forward linkages through 
further processing for exports, whereas others (e.g., bananas), offer little 
prospect. Others, such as gold, have no close substitute, whereas others, such 
as cotton, face competition from synthetic products…In some products (e.g., 
cocaine), Latin America has a monopoly of world supply; in others (e.g., 
sugar), international competition is fierce. The geographical and geological 
diversity … meant that each republic had only limited choice of commodities 
to export.  
The weakness of the periphery was that public debt was incurred on the basis of the 
commodities most governments had no control over in terms of availability, quality, 
potential for value addition and world prices. Worse still, most governments were not 
directly involved in the trade or extraction of these commodities which spurred public 
borrowing. To the extent that the export led growth happened, it largely depended on 
how the periphery capitalised and adapted to changing world demands. For instance the 
development of refrigeration in New Zealand meant that wool farming, when wool prices 
dropped, was replaced with sheep farming for frozen meat exports alongside butter and 
cheese (Hawke, 1985, p. 5). The Cape Colony on the other hand was lucky because 
dropping wool prices were cushioned by the discovery of diamonds. Overall, the 
commodity lottery entailed that those countries which hit the jackpot of the ‘right 
commodities’ stood a better chance of diversification of their economies, provided their 
governments had foresight, and therefore could easily escape the debt trap. Being stuck 
with less demanded and less economically favoured commodities let alone changing 
global prices could simply lead the governments to become stuck in debt. 
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Table 6.1 shows that of all the recipients of British capital within the British Empire, the 
Cape Colony rose to the 5th position between 1875-9 and to the 3rd position in the1884-5 
period before losing these positions to gold rich Transvaal later. This table shows both 
capital flowing to the private and public sectors but it is clear that the discovery of 
diamonds, self-governance and responsible government between 1867 and 1872 played 
an important role in the ascendancy of the Cape Colony amongst the major recipients of 
British exports of capital. No wonder during this diamond period the Cape Colony could 
attract the description of “a developing powerhouse and a true cornerstone of the 
empire.” (Marks, 1980, p. 1). Capital would not flow to the Cape Colony without this 
mineral resource which made government’s infrastructural goals feasible. 
Table 6. 1 Top recipients of British capital in the Empire (£million), 1860-1914 
 
Source: Stone (1999, p. 418) 
Equally important were other commercial developments such as private banks whose 
activities got traction during this period (Schumann, 1938). This could not be said when 
copper was discovered in Namaqualand in 1854 because it was short-lived and proved 
to be inconsequential from the point of view of broader economic development. When 
only investment of British capital in raw materials is considered, the bulk of which were 
minerals, table 6.2 below shows the ascendency of the Transvaal to the top position in 
worldwide between 1865 and 1914 because of the importance of gold. Transvaal is South 
Africa’s immediate counter-example of economic benefits of being under the imperial 
wings. It illustrates how self-governing colonies in the Empire had more advantages 
1865-9 1870-4 1875-9 1880-4 1885-9 1890-4 1895-9 1900--4 1905--9 1910--14 1865-1914
India 
(32107)
Canada 
(18034)
Australia 
(23385)
Australia 
(49664)
Australia  
(66601)
Australia 
(43637)
India 
(53524)
Transvaal 
(51962)
Canada 
(76928)
Canada 
(191577)
Canada 
(412283)
Australia(
8220)
India  
(18667)
India 
(18667)
India 
(25023)
India 
(40539)
Canada 
(26435)
Australia 
(48275)
India 
(23658)
India 
(46550)
Australia 
(46550)
Australia 
(339001)
Canada 
(3477)
Australia 
(9772)
Canada 
(15462)
The Cape 
(15085)
Canada 
(34204)
india 
(23039)
Transvaal 
(34385)
Australia 
(21294)
Transvaal
(29761)
India 
(36502)
India 
(317174)
New 
Zealand 
(3022)
New 
Zealand 
(5382)
New 
Zealand 
(13559)
Canada 
(14362)
New 
Zealand 
(12662)
Transvaal 
(10399)
Rhodesia 
(17822)
Canada 
(17996)
Australia 
(21911)
South 
Africa 
(26185)
South 
Africa 
(138202)
Asia 
(1025)
Tasmania(1
065)
The Cape 
(8054)
New 
Zealand 
(10735)
Transvaal 
(7497)
New 
Zealand 
(5733)
Canada 
(13808)
The Cape 
(15914)
Rhodesia
(8908)
New 
Zealand 
(16185)
New 
Zealand 
(84495)
91 93 93 89 93 86 82 73 79 84 80
Percentage shares of the top five
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because even with the top position in the raw material category Transvaal never out 
borrowed the Cape Colony government. Transvaal’s railway progress was frustrating and 
very slow due to lack of access to easy borrowing. According to the South African railway 
report:  
The entire revenue of Transvaal was £73862 in 1872 and the Orange Free 
State had £84282 so that there was no question of guaranteeing interest on 
any loan as the Cape Colony had achieved. Even when Mr Burgers reached 
Amsterdam he found out that bankers were not keen to subscribe for such 
hazardous venture in Africa (South African Railways 1947, p.15).  
It was indeed ‘cold’ outside the empire and Transvaal’s failure to speed up its 
infrastructural programmes, for lack of access to capital, was evident and for Transvaal 
even non-British capital and other financial markets were difficult to access.  
Table 6. 2 Top recipients of British investments in raw material (£million), 1860-1914 
 
Sources: Stone (1999, p. 390) 
Being a self-governing colony of the British Empire was thus important for public 
borrowing. In many ways several benefits of the gold mining in Transvaal accrued to the 
Cape Colony economy because it had developed ports, railroads and commercial banks. 
The benefits accrued to the Cape most importantly because it was a self-governing colony, 
the first to construct a railway line to Transvaal’s gold fields. This was primarily because 
it could access capital markets more easily than Transvaal. With no superior imperial 
authority to report to, Transvaal unlike the Cape Colony had feeble parliamentary 
1865-9 1870-4 1875-9 1880-4 1885-9 1890-4 1895-9 1900--4 1905--9 1910--14 1865-1914
U.S.A 
(870) U.S.A (7527)
U.S.A   
(878)
U.S.A   
(4947)
U.S.A   
(6181)
Transvaal 
(5816)
Transvaal 
(29789)
Transvaal 
(15463)
Transvaal 
(14265)
South 
Africa 
(10947)
Transvaal 
(74530)
India 
(851)
Spain 
(1725)
Spain  
(574)
Spain  
(4460)
Transvaal 
(5654)
U.S.A   
(4091)
Australia 
(22517)
Gold Coast 
(5419)
Australia 
(5799)
U.S.A   
(10482)
U.S.A   
(45821)
Ceylon 
(451) Italy    (828)
India   
(417)
India   
(3899)
Australia 
(4769)
Australia 
(2314)
Rhodesia 
(11415)
Rhodesia 
(5328)
U.S.A   
(4684)
Malaya 
(9380)
Australia 
(45333)
Brazil 
(243)
Canada 
(819)
Canada 
(308)
Venezuela 
(1863)
Chile     
(4507)
Chile     
(1761)
India   
(5413)
Australia 
(4785)
Rhodesia 
(3501)
Russia 
(8230)
Rhodesia 
(27274)
Australia 
(224) India  (730)
France 
(180)
Transvaal 
(1511)
Mexico 
(2241)
India   
(1382)
U.S.A   
(4967)
Canada 
(2146)
Malaya 
(2781)
Rhodesia 
(6686)
India  
(18867)
67 71 70 69 68 71 73 71 56 46 52
Percentage shares of the top five
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 199 
 
institutions which made accountability difficult and this was not good for the 
government’s credit profile. Public debt would not grow to the extent it did in the Cape 
Colony whose responsible governance status worked as a badge of good behaviour and 
credibility to London investors. With no domestic refinery and mint, raw gold bullion was 
Transvaal’s only export commodity (Gilbert, 1933) and the Transvaal could only obtain 
revenue from gold tax and concessions to mining companies. This makes the label 
“banana republic of classical perfection” a close description of the affairs of Transvaal 
(Denoon, 1983, p. 92). After the British takeover, post Anglo-Boer war, this was soon to 
be different because Transvaal was brought under the British Empire’s wings and capital 
could be accessed easily.  
The dominance of the settler colonies, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the 
Cape Colony, in receiving British capital exports is evident in table 6.3. The table shows 
capital exports to governments or reflect which colonies were leading in the public 
borrowing from the British capital markets.  
Table 6. 3 Top five British investments in colonial governments (£million), 1860-1914 
 
Sources: Stone (1999, p. 384) 
This supports the notion that investors in London had categorised the settler colonies as 
safe. According to Accominotti et al. (2011, p. 387) “…the main ‘effect’ of being a settler 
colony was not a marginal reduction of borrowing costs ‘other things being equal’. The 
‘empire effect’ was a structural change in the way colonies were perceived by investors.” 
1865-9 1870-4 1875-9 1880-4 1885-9 1890-4 1895-9 1900--4 1905--9 1910--14 1865-1914
Australia 
(7151)
Canada 
(7027)
Australia 
(19256)
Australia 
(36012)
Australia 
(44983)
Australia 
(28539)
India 
(32087)
Transvaal 
(32811)
India 
(24176)
Australia 
(33082)
Australia 
(214917)
Canada 
(2478)
Australia 
(5351)
India 
(12098)
The Cape 
(11135)
India 
(17848)
India 
(15650)
Australia 
(13396)
Australia 
(13439)
Canada 
(16417)
Canada 
(27888)
India 
(142351)
New 
Zealand 
(2461) India (4825)
Canada 
(9584)
India 
(8126)
Argentina 
(14265)
Canada 
(7066)
The Cape 
(4400)
The Cape 
(10368)
Australia 
(13705)
India 
(17585)
Canada 
(86822)
Mauritius
(800)
New 
Zealand 
(4627)
New 
Zealand 
(9010)
New 
Zealand 
(5260)
Canada 
(9545)
Natal 
(2833)
U.S.A 
(3012) India (9956)
Brazil 
(7359)
New 
Zealand 
(12508)
New 
Zealand 
(46943)
U.S.A 
(664)
Argentina(3
215)
The Cape 
(7329)
Argentina(
4827)
New 
Zealand 
(7112)
The Cape 
(2212)
Canda 
(2516) Natal (8761)
The Cape 
(5684)
South 
Africa 
(10840)
The Cape 
(42243)
94 86 94 86 94 89 88 89 73 84 76
Percentage shares of the top five
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Table 6.3 also reveals that the Cape Colony Government was one of the largest public 
borrowers and the table further reveals the importance of the Cape as one of the key 
dominions. Between 1865 and 1914, if India is omitted, the Cape was ranked fourth after 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia in terms of government-bound capital exports from 
the British capital markets. India only features because of the sheer size of its population 
which made its government related borrowing comparable to the settler colonies.   
6.6 Conclusion  
The first major finding of this chapter is that public debt grew rapidly in the Cape Colony 
from the 1870s onwards. Several factors such as self-governance, responsible 
governance, discovery of minerals and state ownership of the railway system and the 
telegraphic system caused the growth in public debt. The growth of the public debt was 
favoured by some and abhorred by others in the colonial government. The fact that public 
debt was primarily benefiting railway construction caused those who criticised 
government expenditure to criticize borrowing for the same reasons that it was biased 
towards the minerals-railways complex. The colonial government found itself with huge 
accumulated debt and burdensome debt servicing and by the end of the Cape’s existence 
it was clear that the dwindling revenues would not sustain debt servicing. With all the 
measures of indebtedness explored the evidence suggests that public debt was among 
the key financial challenges of the Cape Colony before it joined the Union of South Africa 
in 1910.   
Fiscal miscalculations and lack of long term fiscal strategy may lead to financial disaster. 
This is what this chapter has demonstrated. Public debt growth of the Cape was pushed 
with more zeal than careful planning and undeniably the politicians with interests in 
mining distorted the political process towards debt driven public investments beneficial 
to them. The colonial government’s interests, by virtue of the business men, famers and 
popular colonists being in parliament, were not necessarily separable from private 
business interests because a thin line existed between the two groups. Fiscal foresight 
was therefore sacrificed at the altar of short term profitability and extractive institutional 
apparatus which distorted the political process for private gains. It is important to note 
that this was subtle because most of public investments such as railways were passed or 
voted for as good for economic progress and for public good while in actual fact these 
immediately benefited mining houses and businesses in general by reducing transport 
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and other costs of doing business. In other words, for the Cape, what is generally termed 
‘public investment’ in the 19th century was very much beneficial to the private sector’s 
interests at the expense of a broader development focus. It is therefore superficial to 
regard the growth of public debt in the Cape as growth-promoting without exposing that 
it was unbalanced and biased towards mining. And it becomes problematic when 
investments in economic infrastructure are skewed by private interests which, in the 
Cape, it was the mining sector at the neglect of agriculture and other key sectors.  
Having established that the Cape was very much among the self-governing and key 
responsibly governed colonies, the public debt evolution elevates the salience of natural 
commodities in 19th century colonial state formation. The self-governing colonies were 
structurally at an advantage when accessing British capital markets yet self-governance 
alone was not sufficient though necessary for growth in public debt. The assumption, of 
course, is that growing and permanent public debt is a fundamental feature of colonial 
fiscal states just like permanent debt was an important feature of state formation in 
Europe. Commodity availability was central to how this permanent public debt came to 
be since commodities determined the business and economic orientation of these 
colonies. Exports of British capital also prove this fact because dominions with natural 
resource endowment were always amongst the top recipients of British capital. This 
differentiates state formation in sovereign nations and state formation in the colonial 
territories on the periphery. Wars and armed peace were central to the formation of 
modern fiscal states in the former while these were not central to the colonial world 
where imperial authorities considered defence for their colonies important.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
7.1 Summary of the study  
Colonial history will continue to be a contested subject and the narratives will continue 
to be questioned based on what assumptions are made and what evidence is used. In 
South Africa, to use Shula Marks’s words “there will always be a need to maintain a 
healthy air of scepticism” as colonial historical research accumulates 49(Davis, 2012, p. 1). 
Colonial history has social, economic and political implications which exceed the 
competences of any single researcher. It is clear that our understanding of the past does 
not come from catch-all narratives but has to be built up over time from a multiplicity of 
studies which focus on different aspects of the past. This does not entail unidimensional 
history but it elevates the relevance of more focused studies which, individually, will 
contribute to the bigger picture of the past. This study has endeavoured to contribute to 
literature and debates on the colonial state and its role by looking at the public revenues, 
expenditures and public debt of the British Cape Colony from 1820 to 1910.   
This study has used Blue books to reconstitute public revenues, expenditures and public 
debt of the British Cape Colony in the nineteenth century. To complement the patterns 
observed in the data obtained from the Blue books, other quantitative and qualitative 
records were used. These include archival documents from the Cape Archives, 
Stellenbosch University Library and the British National Archives in Kew. The primary 
budget speeches and debates were also analysed for the years from 1820 to 1910. The 
use of the foregoing various sources, including secondary literature, has allowed for a 
comprehensive historical study of the Cape’s fiscal history development.  
The study has been located in global and focused literature on state formation in 
sovereign and colonial territories (chapter 2). Both strands of literature emphasise the 
diversity of paths to fiscal modernity in sovereign and colonial states and no universal 
theory has been used to explain the rise of states. This was important for setting the 
context for the Cape Colony state as it demonstrated different phases of state 
transformation until the late 1870s when it had attained fundamental features of modern 
                                                 
49 According to Davis (2012, p. 1), “Anyone who takes on the task (of writing South African history) must 
presumably gird their loins in defence of accusations of non-inclusiveness, political bias and cultural 
relativism. Perhaps as a result of this, there have been few of these kinds of works produced before now.” 
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states such as permanent debt, centralised revenues, commitment to social spending and 
limited democracy (He, 2013). Being a colonial state, the Cape relied heavily on the 
imperial government for military spending. When this is considered, the imperial tie 
represented an ‘umbilical cord’ that kept the colonial state strong but nonetheless 
potentially weak if the imperial tie was to be cut. This, as Cooper (2002) argued, was the 
fundamental problem of the colonial state which relied heavily on the imperial 
government for one of the defining features of states, namely external protection 
(Hoffman, 2015; Yun-Casalilla, 2012). From this angle the Cape and other colonial states 
are to be seen as having some sense of incompleteness or artificialness.   
The events and developments in the Cape Colony shaped the nature of the evolution of 
the colonial state. Chapter 3 has demonstrated key political features that shaped the 
public finances of the Cape from the autocratic phase (1800-1840s), towards 
representative government (1854-1872) and to responsible government (1872 -1910). 
This had a huge bearing on the public finances because as the parliamentary institutions 
became more transparent over time, so was the handling of public finances through 
reforms brought about by the financial system overhaul that allowed better monitoring 
and auditing. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1867 was a huge economic 
shock that shifted the economy and therefore public finances onto a higher equilibrium. 
Responsible governance was granted in 1872 and it coincided with and was partly 
influenced by the mineral led economic buoyance.  
The fiscal developments of the Cape were not spontaneous and did not self-evolve as time 
went by but the windfall in the form of the discovery of diamonds was key in how public 
finance institutions developed. There was a clear bargaining process that underpinned 
the type of taxes and expenditure policies which eventually prevailed. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that the tax regime was biased against the agricultural sector, small 
manufacturing firms and black Africans. This feature of an elite driven tax structure was 
also observed in Latin America. Sokoloff and Zolt (2007, p. 131) for instance 
acknowledged that inequality amongst citizens makes progressive tax structures difficult 
to design and adopt in the face of opposition from elites. The political and business 
interests controlled the mining sector and demonstrated that they never bore their fair 
share of taxes by continuously resisting them in parliament. This was despite the fact that 
the mining sector absorbed 70% of total expenditures in railway links to the mining 
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fields. While the available data did not allow relative tax burdens to be precisely 
measured, the patterns reveal that indirect taxes were more prevalent as compared to 
direct taxes which mainly remained land quitrent and hut taxes; income tax only came in 
1904. The non-tax revenues bolstered the fiscal outlook of the Cape because of the use of 
a general ‘pot’ approach that meant all revenues were brought to the central government 
coffers. Fiscal capacity diversification was, therefore, underdeveloped as the Cape relied 
heavily on customs revenues and railway receipts which dwindled heavily exposing this 
weak fiscal position from 1900 to 1910.  
The expenditure side (chapter 5) exposed the power of the elite control in the Cape 
government because the same elite who controlled mining demonstrated strong 
bargaining power to influence spending policies. It was clear that expenditure benefited 
a minority who relentlessly used many ways to get the government to spend more on 
railway infrastructure as a means to access the mining fields easily. This mineral-railway 
complex, as the study posits, was at the centre of the Cape Colony’s expenditure policies 
and generally shaped economic progress. The government ownership of key parastatals 
such as the telegraphic system, railway system and post office entailed that private 
interests from within the state could steer government towards certain ‘public’ 
expenditure policies meant to benefit them.  
Most expenditure projects were impossible without public borrowing (chapter 6). To 
start with, even the change of ownership of railways and the telegraphic system 
happened through the use of public debt. The government had no other means of paying 
for these huge purchases. Chapter 6 cements the argument about the ability of private 
interests to use the government for meeting their private ends. Public debt accumulation 
was ever increasing and borrowing was biased to finance mainly railway projects. Given 
that during the time there was no mineral beneficiation, the public debt simply created a 
conducive infrastructural apparatus for the extraction of the minerals. By the end of the 
Cape’s existence, public debt was imposing a huge burden on dwindling revenues which 
were underpinned by an unsustainable fiscal path. Comparatively the Cape over-
borrowed more than other dominions and this meant that it was left with a huge debt. 
While outright debt crises did not occur, it was clear that public debt was one key feature 
of the Cape’s financial problems just before the Union of South Africa was formed.  
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7.2 Key conclusions 
The British colonial government, unlike the preceding company government, managed to 
fully utilise the coastal location by unlocking the Cape’s potential through a liberal trade 
regime. With the growth of trade, especially imports, came easy access to an indirect 
revenue source for the government in the form of customs duties. This was not unique 
because other coastal colonies portrayed the same reliance on trade taxes since the 
limited number of ports meant that modest administrative capacity was required 
(Gardner, 2012). Due to lower administrative requirements, customs revenue was 
cheaper to collect and politically less problematic because it was a less obvious burden 
on citizens than more direct forms of taxation were. State ownership of the railway and 
telegraphic systems affected the fiscal capacity building at the Cape by limiting the scope 
and need for diversification of revenue sources. Railway receipts became the second 
major source of public revenue after customs and direct receipts from railway traffic also 
constituted another less administratively burdensome or costly source of revenue. Few 
officers on the few lines in operation meant an easy and cheaper way of revenue raising 
using the railway system. 
Reliance on customs and railway receipts exposed the vulnerability of the Cape’s fiscal 
capacity because revenue grew over time although this was not accompanied by a 
necessary diversification of the fiscal capacity. It would seem that the VOC had a more 
diversified fiscal system given the range of taxes it imposed and pursued, many of which 
were abolished during the British occupation. Serious consideration for income taxes or 
more direct forms of taxation came up in the parliamentary debates in the 1870s but 
income tax was only imposed in 1904. In essence the Cape enjoyed huge public revenue 
flows because it had developed better ports into ‘South Africa’ and was the first colony to 
develop railway lines reaching the interior and specifically the mining fields (Herranz-
Loncan & Fourie, 2017). As soon as Natal developed its lines and Transvaal developed its 
lines to Lourenco Marques, the Cape’s ports were considered less preferable because the 
journey was shorter to the mining fields from its rival colonies. In essence being a coastal 
colony helped the Cape as long as no other ports were developed elsewhere with shorter 
distances to the interior of ‘South Africa’. The Cape therefore had to compete not only for 
traffic for its lines but customs revenue was inextricably linked to the railways because 
goods were now imported through other ports.  
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The expenditure regime and public debt were linked because much of the infrastructural 
developments were due to the fact that the government could borrow in London. The 
study reveals two important aspects when considering colonial governments and their 
fiscal history. The first aspect is what can be considered as the simplistic view. This is in 
line with neoclassical development economics and for the Cape it would argue that the 
Cape Colony had diamonds as the abundant natural resource, and therefore there was an 
inevitable need for large investments in the transportation system to make mining 
accessible. This is also in line with comparative advantage arguments because diamonds 
were in demand worldwide hence the Cape economy had to focus on diamond mining 
after wool farming declined in the late 1870s. This argument sees the bias towards 
railway construction as natural and high level of public debt as inevitable for a colony 
that had to develop its resources. The role of the elite or actors is ignored in most of this 
first simplistic view and this study elevates the role of actors. It does so without 
dismissing the simplistic view because the lesser is contained in the greater. The second, 
greater, view is that which encompasses the political economy because public revenues 
and expenditures were not merely devised for the provisions of public goods. Figure 7.1 
encapsulates the central argument and conclusion of this study.  
Figure 7. 1 The Cape Colony’s self-reinforcing minerals-railways complex (MRC) 
 
Source: Author’s formulation  
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Figure 7.1 shows that there was, at the Cape Colony, a self-reinforcing minerals–railways 
complex (MRC)50 underpinning the revenues, expenditures and public debt. This could 
have been a minerals-infrastructural complex but there was, throughout parliamentary 
debates, a resistance to more roads, light railways for agriculture and expansion of 
harbours in other coastal towns such as Port Elizabeth and East London. For main roads, 
harbours and anchorages and anything which was not seen as pro-mining the message to 
the petitioners was that “these people must put their hands into their pockets and pay for 
them” (Merriman in House of Assembly budget debates, 1884, p. 227). This makes the 
minerals-railways complex an apt description of the forces underpinning the public 
finances of the Cape Colony and its economic development in general. The triggering 
point was the discovery minerals (1) which needed heavy infrastructural development. 
The mining interests then penetrated the colonial state and influenced it towards the 
investment in railway construction through public debt (2). With railway lines 
constructed (3), revenue was boosted through railway receipts and customs receipts (4) 
which were invested in further development and extension of the railways (5). An 
important point to note is that the government, when it took ownership of the railways 
in 1872, wanted to “suspend the works or curtail the expenditure on them in adverse 
times whenever it suited its convenience” (Barkly, 1871, p. 1). This could not be the case 
anymore when the MRC was at full force because the railway project grew consistently 
without halting projects in unfavourable economic times. For instance, the diamond crisis 
in the first half of 1880 saw an increase in borrowing for railway extensions, instead of 
curtailment or halting of railway projects as the government had envisioned for such 
times. What the study unpacks is therefore not a case of a planned dominance by the elite 
but weak state institutions exploited for private ends. 
At face value the MRC could be seen as a virtuous cycle of mining =>railways=>revenue 
(customs and railway receipts) that kept the colonial fiscal state afloat. The “virtuous-
trade revenue cycles” have been observed for other coastal French and British colonies 
where customs revenue allowed investment in infrastructure that boosted commerce 
and trade and therefore increased customs revenues (van Waijenburg, 2015). This study, 
                                                 
50 A qualification is important here. The argument that elevates the MRC does not deny that other issues 
than railways and mining were important in the fiscal history of the Cape. The MRC was the main driving 
force of public expenditures, public debt and taxation policies in a particular period of the colony’s 
existence.  
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moving from the foregoing generalised proposition, undertakes a closer examination of 
the Cape and argues that what was observed was beyond a clean ‘virtuous-trade-revenue 
cycle’ but a vicious cycle of extraction of minerals by an elite group that controlled the 
state.  
Mining activities attracted state railway development which boosted revenues through 
direct earnings and increased customs revenue. This was so at the surface but the truth 
was that the MRC was cutting deeper while placating the government with the balance 
which existed in the revenue and expenditure side of the complex. The balance was that 
on the revenue side government seemed to benefit from customs and railway receipts 
and other forms of taxes accompanying these two major sources. The fact that the railway 
system was seen as chief among revenue sources made it irresistible for government to 
undertake the railway projects pushed by the private interests. The mining interests, well 
represented in parliament, arm-twisted the state towards massive railway projects 
benefiting the mining industry while they completely resisted any form of taxation.  
The developed ports and railways system meant that the Cape became a carrying nation 
due to high volumes of imports going to the mining fields. This gave the Cape government 
a desire to incur further debt when gold was discovered in the Transvaal to extend the 
railways to the goldfields for the MRC cycle to continue. The state was bent on maximising 
revenue cheaply from these two major sources while the elite wanted to maximise 
private profit by shifting major costs to the state. It appeared to be a positive sum game 
until early 1900 when the unsustainable fiscal path was exposed. This is consistent with 
early observers of imperial and colonial history. For instance, Davis and Huttenback 
(1986, p. 142) argued that in most colonial territories “the British warped the political 
process to bolster the profit of their business community (mainly local and not British 
businesses)”. The burden which was gradually growing was the debt servicing burden. 
Borrowing is inconsequential if done for someone else. This is exactly what happened 
when private interest interests borrowed unsustainably on behalf of the state which was 
to be responsible for yearly interest payments from its revenues. The railway 
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expenditures progressed with enthusiasm rather than careful consideration.51 It was 
Merriman who in 1902 acknowledged that “I am afraid if we keep going on with railways 
in a reckless manner we will find ourselves burdened with many useless lines.” 
Accumulation of railway mileage in the face of dwindling traffic was going to be costly in 
the sense that most of the loans had many years to maturity and this meant a long period 
of servicing the debt. When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, there is every 
evidence that the Cape was heavily indebted. South Africa, after 1910, benefited from the 
railway lines when the economy eventually expanded but the Cape did not experience 
many benefits during its existence as a colony.  
It is important to note that by elevating the MRC the study does not trivialise the 
important work done by the Cape Colony in other key areas of public goods provisioning 
such as social spending, other public works (such as roads, bridges, etc.) and securing 
property rights. Notable was the increase in education expenditure from 1900 onwards 
although it was biased against the Africans. The late introduction and expansion of 
education expenditure was consistent with developments in England as discussed in 
section 2.3.1. Pensions were a feature of social spending in the Cape throughout its 
existence and the archival records reveal a strong concern growing in the aftermath of 
the South African war concerning ‘poor whites’. This may point to the suggestion of a 
fledgling ‘racist welfare state’ which gave some legitimacy to the prevailing racial order 
as argued by Mkandawire (2010, p. 1651). The MRC was, however, at the centre of public 
policy that kept other sectors at the periphery receiving meagre portions of the budget 
which primarily paid for railway construction and debt servicing as leading outlays 
throughout the period from the 1870s. In any case the budgetary allocation for other state 
functions remained meagre and was never going to be a source of public debate or 
contention. The budget debates show that anything that could rival mining oriented 
railways in terms of magnitude was easily defeated in parliament.  
                                                 
51 There was a misconception hidden in the fact that railway receipts were brought to the coffers because 
it then appeared as if railways were the biggest contributor yet the net revenues (revenue less expenditure) 
show a moderate picture. Bringing the railway earnings to the general ‘pot’ was thus problematic and gave 
a false sense of prosperity. If the railway minister was allowed to only bring net revenues, the story would 
have been different. The decision makers were mainly driven by revenue and not by the costs which were 
covered mainly through borrowing.   
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A key question would be if the Cape’s experience differed from those of other 19th century 
colonies or dominions. The answer to this question may extend beyond the scope of this 
study but reliance on customs revenue, concentration on railway infrastructure 
expenditure and reliance on economic staples such as wheat, cotton and minerals was 
common place. The MRC helps to unpack the fact that railway projects, though they can 
be regarded as a commonplace in colonial environments, brought uniqueness to the state 
and its operations. The interaction between mining interests and the state run railways 
system gave the state certain attributes that became relevant in impeding or promoting 
long run economic development.  
Control of labour and the gradual disenfranchisement of the black Africans narrowed the 
state’s mandate to serving those who qualified to vote. For instance, the demographic 
diversity of the Cape meant that the state became indifferent to what Trapido (1970, p. 
15) called the ‘quasi militarization’ of the control of the African labour in mining barracks. 
This became entrenched by legislation that systematically reduced the Cape franchise 
legitimising and being a foundation of the official policy of segregation and apartheid in 
20th century South Africa (Thompson, 1960; Wolpe, 1972). In so far as the Cape’s public 
finances reveal 19th century features observed elsewhere it was not unique but the 
manner in which this happened is crucial for our understanding of state formation 
outside Europe. This follows the argument that state formation processes outside Europe 
were not merely failed versions of the European experience (Tilly, 1990). State formation 
in many developing countries in Africa and elsewhere is complicated by colonial history 
and in many instances modern governments simply built upon the colonial states’ 
remnants. Understanding the colonial state formation process becomes an important 
part of fully understanding the variants of states outside Europe.  
Another key issue is how governments in developing countries handle natural resource 
discoveries and political change processes. When states ‘hit a jackpot’ of natural 
resources it is difficult to predict what happens because the outcomes depend on the pre-
existing institutions. For the Cape, the discovery of diamonds coincided with weak 
institutions which allowed the mining interests to distort fiscal institutions to meet their 
private ends. This is consistent with Latin American economic history where tax 
structures favoured the landed elite who ended up having enormous power causing the 
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state to become a mere ‘paper leviathan’52 (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2016). The state 
under the sway of the powerful interest groups lacks capacity and resoluteness for its 
development policies and, in the event of economic windfalls, ‘grabber institutions’ 
flourish rather than production oriented ones (Mehlum et al., 2005).  
7.3 Implications of the study  
On public finances, pre-1910 South Africa has not been investigated before in a 
systematic way save for the recent study by Fourie et al. (2013) which investigated public 
finances of the Dutch period up to 1800. The British Cape Colony from 1800-1910 has not 
been investigated on the fiscal front. Many of the existing works done in the past have 
given glimpses into the state finances which could not allow a full understanding of public 
finances (Davenport & Saunders, 2000; De Kiewiet, 1957; De Kock, 1924; Goodfellow, 
1931a; Houghton & Dagut, 1973; Marks, 1980; Pretorius, 2014a; Schumann, 1938). In 
their texts, these scholars have given compelling accounts of South Africa’s social, 
political and economic history. With varying degrees of focus, they reflected upon some 
issues affecting public finance mentioning major economic events such as the discovery 
of minerals, trade, agriculture and the interactions between Europeans and the black 
Africans. Where an attempt is made to talk about fiscal matters these studies give 
snippets of the fiscal regime of the 19th century South Africa which leave many questions 
unanswered.  
This study is, therefore, a significant contribution that not only investigates the under-
studied 19th century Cape and therefore a big part of South Africa’s fiscal history but 
makes available a systematically reconstituted data series for the entire existence of the 
Cape Colony. This data, see appendices A, B, and C, will allow future studies to continue 
using a fully developed dataset that allows various issues to be investigated for the Cape 
Colony as a key colony whose institutional apparatus was bequeathed to the Union of 
South Africa in 1910. With the recently compiled GDP series of the Cape Colony by 
Greyling and Verhoef (2015), the Cape public revenues, expenditures and debt becomes 
a major complementary contribution that overcomes the general lack of data for South 
Africa’s past. The ongoing transformation debates on undoing the legacies of the past and 
                                                 
52 The example used of a ‘paper leviathan’ is Colombia which lacks the monopoly of violence, fiscal 
resources, and bureaucratic capacity and is structurally unable to provide basic services such as a census 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2016, p. 23). Although their argument refers to modern Colombia, there is a strong 
parallel with the Cape colonial state which was heeding most of the short term desires of private interest 
groups at the expense of a long term development strategy.  
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what has been termed ‘decolonisation’ will benefit fundamentally from this study. This is 
so because the colonial past is fully understood through the policies pursued, polices 
reneged on and various ways in which the colonial government pragmatically navigated 
the challenges it confronted in pursuit of its desired ends. The myths about colonialism 
being good or bad are also exposed by such systematic studies which follow both patterns 
in data and political economy of budgeting by the colonial government. 
Given the importance of the Cape Colony as a bigger settler colony in terms of the number 
of Europeans settlers on the African continent, this study is significant for the narratives 
of colonial fiscal regimes in Africa. It thus is an important contribution to how we can 
begin to understand state formation processes in the global south. The influence of the 
colonial dynamics of the Cape on the Southern African region has been established and a 
good example is how the Cape’s Cecil John Rhodes established Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia with his British South African Company (BSAC). The Cape settler colony 
represented an earlier form of a settler colony that influenced the British colonial 
traditions across colonial Southern Africa in the 20th century. Hut tax and poll tax, for 
instance, were originally levied at the Cape in 1859 and they became not only an 
important source of revenue in most African colonies but a major coercive institutional 
tool to force Africans into wage labour. This became easy when hut tax was used in 
conjunction with other legislation such as the raising of franchise qualifications and the 
Glen Grey Act which controlled where Africans could work and stay. The study of the 19th 
century Cape provides a foundational and fundamental first mover case of the settler 
colonies in Africa. The data provided will also allow future studies to have wider 
comparisons which have hitherto excluded the Cape Colony for lack of data.  
Of importance is the fact that the Cape was the 19th century’s most advanced colonial 
fiscal state in Africa and was in the league of Britain’s major self-governing colonies such 
as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The brief comparative picture given in chapter 6 
proves this point. This means that when the colonial state in Africa is discussed, the Cape 
was the prime example of settler colonies in Africa in the 19th century which influenced 
20th century colonial developments, especially in Southern Africa. One important fact the 
study unveils is the difficulty of describing the colonial states as only extractive, 
developmental or benevolent among other names. They were more complex and often 
with many facets which generic descriptions of development or extraction fail to capture. 
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The African colonial state, the Cape being the prime example, could not easily fit into 
these generalised archetypes because the state itself changed over time.  
Even when the modern features of fiscal states were visible in the late 1870s, such as 
centralised revenues, welfare commitment, permanent public debt and limited 
democracy, no single word suffices to capture the many facets of the colonial state. On 
one side it was brutal for the black Africans who were forced to pay hut taxes and 
confined through complementary coercive policies such as the Glen Grey Act and 
continual disenfranchisement through various legislative measures (Trapido, 1971). On 
the other hand, it was ‘developmental’ to the few in the mining business who benefited 
most from the infrastructure projects and arguably for the Western Cape farmers, 
coloured workers and all who were in the vicinity of the lines. On the other hand, those 
non-propertied remained on the fringes and for these it would seem the state was 
extractive in nature. How one defines the colonial state, therefore, depends on the 
position one decides to take and what one chooses to ignore about the reality of colonial 
policies. 
The global or international implications of the study are also important besides the local 
and African perspectives alluded to above. It has been argued that “the British Empire 
was founded in a fit of absence of mind, and that the largely ad hoc development of 
overseas extensions owed itself to traditional British pragmatism rather than to any 
master plan emanating from corridors of Whitehall” (Davis& Huttenback, 1986, p. 7). The 
implication is that the Cape Colony, “a true cornerstone of the empire” in Africa in the 19th 
century (Marks, 1980, p. 1), is important for the wider debates on imperial history and 
British colonial history. The Cape’s experience with public finances and foreign 
borrowing brings new light to the imperial project on the African continent in the 19th 
century – ‘high age of imperialism’ to use Edelstein’s phrase (Edelstein, 1982). So far the 
Cape features in studies of colonial finances hidden in colonial aggregates when 
comparative studies trace colonial history (Accominotti et al., 2011; Davis& Huttenback, 
1986; Stone, 1999). These studies include the Cape only in the aggregates for dominions 
such as the public debt of all self-governing colonies. This study is complementary to 
these studies whose global orientation allowed no specific in-depth exposition of 
individual colonies.  
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For the international literature, the institutional implications of the study are also 
important. The famous settler and non–settler colonies classification and what to expect 
from each (Acemoglu et al., 2001) is interrogated further in this study by investigating 
the Cape’s fiscal history. The problem here is not so much this distinction but the coupling 
of each category to specific types of institutions. The coupling of each category to specific 
institutions has been found wanting in Africa because extraction has been found to be 
endemic in colonies classified as settler colonies (Bowden, et al 2008; Frankema & van 
Waijenburg, 2012; Frankema & van Waijenburg, 2014).  
This study has exposed how extractive institutional apparatus were formed on the fiscal 
front with policies that favoured a minority even among the settlers themselves. Broadly, 
the Cape Colony thus experienced what has been referred to as ‘extractive economic 
growth’ driven by elite controlled extractive political and economic institutions 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010, 2012, 2016). The Cape colonial state had state capacity to 
enforce property rights and maintain internal order but the fiscal policies were heavily 
controlled by a minority through the state. The fiscal institutions, observed through 
revenue, spending and borrowing policies, reveal a ‘grabber’ friendly orientation which 
eventually left the state heavily indebted. Natural resources with ‘grabber’ institutions 
rather than producer institutions, to use Mehlum et al. (2005)’s terminology, led to poor 
fiscal capacity building and hence poor development outcomes. Fiscal resources could 
have been used to advance agriculture and promote manufacturing, as rightly revealed 
by petitions to the state – a more sustainable economic approach rather than simply 
providing railways for the extraction of mineral resources. 
 A qualification is important here. It is generally understood that South Africa was, in the 
first half of the 20th century, comparatively better than other African countries on many 
development indicators. The corollary of this observation is that the colonial experiences 
had a major positive role to play. I argue that the Cape Colony was a single political entity 
whose development prospects were different from the impending Union of South Africa 
which benefited from pooled resources and unity of the whole geographic region covered 
by the four colonies in the post South African war period. The railways and customs wars 
(Van Der Poel, 1933), driven by desire for economic gains, fought by the four colonies 
points to this argument. Unification was good as it removed unnecessary rivalry on many 
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fronts and the Cape alone had declining prospects had the Union of South Africa not been 
formed. 
7.4 Implications for future studies 
This study has many implications for future studies. The first important one is that by the 
scope of all revenue sources (tax and non-tax revenue), expenditure outlays (summed up 
through the functional classification) and public debt, the study remains more of a bird’s 
eye view. This means that work still needs to continue that further investigates different 
aspects in more detail and expands on what has been done in this foundational study. The 
second most important implication for future studies is the implication of the formation 
of the Union of South Africa into which the Cape was absorbed with all its outstanding 
debt and financial problems. The joining of colonies in closer geographic regions was one 
of the key desires of the imperial government but how outstanding issues were dealt with 
remains to be seen. For the Cape Colony, a study that investigates the formation of the 
union and the financial implications and policies adopted should shed more light on how 
individual colonial debt was handled from 1910 onwards. This is even more important 
because the period of the formation of the union coincided with the era of more formal 
policies, such as import substitution policies, and a more systematic way of dealing with 
public policies.  
With the data obtained on various issues of the Cape Colony, there is now more scope for 
studies that seek to compare different aspects of the Cape’s fiscal development with other 
African or other colonial territories in other regions such as Asian and Latin America. 
Given that the Cape was a prime settler colony in 19th century Africa, it is also interesting 
to investigate continuities and discontinuities of colonial fiscal developments with other 
territories in the 20th century such as Southern and Northern Rhodesia. This will go a long 
way in contributing to debates on whether South African colonial experiences caused the 
infamous ‘South African exceptionalism’ on many fronts. This was critically exposed by 
Mamdani (1996, p. 30) when he argued “The problem with South African studies is that 
it has been a home grown exceptionalism while that of African studies has been a turnkey 
import developed by stargazing academics parched in distant ivory towers” The study 
has shown that on many issues of taxation the experiences in the Cape Colony informed 
colonial practices in other British colonies in Africa given the similarities. Further 
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research will unpack other fiscal differences between South Africa and other Southern 
African countries.   
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 6. 4 Classification of expenditure into various categories  
Human 
Resources  
Colonial 
Administration 
Defence and 
Military 
Law and 
Order 
National 
Debt 
Service 
Public Works & 
Developmental 
Utilities 
-Pensions 
-Education 
-District 
surgeons 
-Public health 
-Public 
worship 
-Hospitals 
(Eastern Cape 
and Somerset) 
 
-Controller and 
Auditor general  
-Agent general 
-Treasury 
-Colonial 
secretary 
-The governor 
-Crown forests 
-Joint 
parliamentary 
services  
-Transkeian 
territories  
-Immigration 
-Rents/ rates/ 
gas/ lights 
-Headman & 
Chiefs allowances 
-Cape Town & 
frontier 
mounted 
rifleman 
-Cape forces 
-Imperial 
military 
expenditure 
-Defence and 
military 
allowances 
-Divisional 
courts 
-Registrar 
of deeds 
-High 
sheriff 
-Superior 
courts 
-Police and 
gaols 
-Convicts 
-Loans 
repaid 
-Public 
debt 
servicing  
-Unpaid 
advances 
from 
previous 
year. 
-Railways 
-Roads & Bridges 
-Works and 
buildings  
-Conveyance of 
mails 
-Telegraph 
-Post office 
-Ports and 
harbours 
-Customs 
-Mines 
-Lands and 
agriculture 
-Surveyor 
general, 
-Engineer and 
inspector of 
works 
-Lighthouse 
-Commissioner 
of public works 
 
Table A 1 Cape Colony revenue by sources (£) 
YEAR 
Total 
Revenue Customs  
Transfer 
Duty 
Excise 
Duty 
Stamp 
Duty 
Auction 
Duty 
Mining 
Tax 
Bank 
Notes 
Duty 
Succession 
Duty  Hut Tax 
1827 149834 17739 19253   12113 12414         
1828 162396 17889 12720   18972 12414         
1829 179370 20066 6563   16642 9757         
1830 203971 25945 6940   15784 10974         
1831 205033 19358 6250   17262 11258         
1832 267865 15225 7227   16742 11993         
1833 317387 17211 8161   17501 12265         
1834 321091 14673 9422   16465 10808         
1835 312275 19898 8330   14614 8422         
1836 381090 26683 11750   15826 11913         
1837 441706 34985 18190   19995 13490         
1838 456746 45340 24345   21241 19423         
1839 423966 51968 20472   20603 18906         
1840 395748 41807 16921   16719 16385         
1841 216130 32649 14224   14064 8686         
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1842 323231 56485 20343   19288 11627         
1843 350648 75190 18498   18887 12910         
1844 466847 75358 16769   19638 11750         
1845 244709 82372 16679   21247 13065         
1846 191231 102099 16590   18679 10993         
1847 187387 101735 23050   18040 15470         
1848 226974 105458 24505   19497 16583         
1849 245821 84256 20714   17949 17257         
1850 269193 102173 24928   18447 17079         
1851 256947 111259 23993   16403 15666         
1852 328794 152281 31551   19420 21185         
1853 318870 134595 42119   21312 25499         
1854 266802 129402 44124   21239 24603         
1855 268137 134354 36291   20856 23805         
1856 305231 173080 43076   21365 23783         
1857 452202 254178 47658   23821 24490         
1858 468097 260322 34887   25924 23703         
1859 665389 262801 43137   30079 19982       1615 
1860 734635 270328 46860   31579 21223       1272 
1861 725218 278585 44863   34353 20516       1197 
1862 695422 274538 57167   34472 20517       1698 
1863 770416 243764 55722   37533 17924       1630 
1864 597636 299503 53198   49975 14425     1023 1680 
1865 856140 275558 47321   58668 15213   1365 1039 1140 
1866 517701 285056 44851   58798 14743   3937 1102 2786 
1867 818732 330242 46110   55218 14013   3916 3153 4215 
1868 590936 283023 40808   60112 11636   4028 3432 6181 
1869 574511 295661 39122   60861 11167   3299 6389 6897 
1870 804962 341992 35238   65463 12301   3247 4776 8384 
1871 801260 384808 35667   67601 12053   4130 4066 11052 
1872 1068624 601586 52540   76737 17488   7983 6969 10656 
1873 1838425 683472 84415   83034 18776   15036 4386 12273 
1874 1755315 733513 92223   92417 25243   15387 6251 11816 
1875 1504779 735379 92625   96759 25758   14889 8896 14857 
1876 1371542 395504 41743   70812 12917   12179 2343 14065 
1877 1251069 601800 77367   95354 20993   8135 6192 13337 
1878 1537862 770616 72082   99980 19651   6957 7221 3864 
1879 2834629 911490 86703 63522 118872 26959   8387 7565 30263 
1880 2482930 972477 98936 74103 138121 24732   9306 8456 30441 
1881 2967646 1184074 129063 49066 181950 32503   13081 7659 21898 
1882 3450462 1341481 146603 58293 213433 34617 22919 18731 11351 24927 
1883 3271082 1106443 123441 43102 219463 31284 26036 15739 12530 23168 
1884 2985984 897426 99966 19468 214121 21078 37628 11066 11637 40945 
1885 3468977 1073372 93797 94685 250147 18295 24271 9980 12999 31912 
1886 3215176 950601 74117 5994 237247 17644 31699 8025 10403 26049 
1887 3381169 930408 69257 12316 237743 16164 37638 14536 11511 37781 
1888 3616618 1006334 60150 2360 248262 14169 44513 7287 11715 39622 
1889 4010483 1132661 70124 123 251259 14651 36684 6236 10242 48971 
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1890 4631416 1353751 100449 695 250797 17012 43953 7196 12858 49141 
1891 4283554 1243392 103882 1678 250723 17479 27063 7632 13098 50172 
1892 4646872 1328840 119756 216 255288 17623 24842 7010 12572 52213 
1893 5197178 1408176 120245 169 136218 18567 23016 7132 16883 58022 
1894 6684648 1532371 108667 362 260828 18965 23672 7006 18056 57358 
1895 5766228 1465259 112439 578 277260 19389 21161 6059 16243 62195 
1896 7364115 1922516 150046 327 148229 16939 29574 5907 17904 78875 
1897 8343411 2437678 129278 9829 323738   30507 7267 17260 78503 
1898 7017882 1803316 122478 7873 349372   27303 8216 19630 81474 
1899 8695646 1856685 114947 6870 345513   28550 8144 25634 80720 
1900 6326274 1879408 144724 4860 328789   18766 9392 30271 79402 
1901 7957499 2376341 128645 3725 373521   29777 12966 40481 85458 
1902 9050371 2710118 195141 3661 423217   29504 14677 31105 94396 
1903 11575331 3503479 302136 36501 533932   32028 15388 37160 96605 
1904 9807254 2396684 222222 269012 534822  28491 13508 160055 97004 
1905 8381202 1925879 144695 284506 500541  27689 10788 13999 102292 
1906 8148311 1870956 134871 337464 473305  45112 11010 40404 105070 
1907 7537337 1763400 134515 242892 462636  21700 11761 36104 106130 
1908 6833323 1543088 106269 287216 422421  24122 11135 28374 104128 
1909 7081203 1253051 112820 321046 450203  38515 9316 112820 105094 
 
Table A 2 Cape Colony revenue by sources (£) (continued) 
YEAR 
Total 
Revenue 
Land 
quitrent 
Post 
Office Railway Telegraph 
Property 
sales  
Office 
fees 
Fines and 
Forfeitures Rents  
1827 149834 7313 2083       4268     
1828 162396 1588 3274       5824 1917   
1829 179370 1719 3540       5366 725   
1830 203971 944 3629       5168 788   
1831 205033 840 3636       5258 980   
1832 267865 718 3808       5323 933   
1833 317387 663 3719       5419 921   
1834 321091 8910 3965       5247 1163   
1835 312275 7791 3933       3678 1027   
1836 381090 10252 4927       2908 1074   
1837 441706 13343 5967       2487 1112   
1838 456746 13233 5918       3739 1202   
1839 423966 9893 5591       3768 828   
1840 395748 12092 6119       3023 1397   
1841 216130 1040 4314       3264 924   
1842 323231 1680 6454       3810 889   
1843 350648 1597 8018       3968 1202   
1844 466847 2023 8323       3823 1167   
1845 244709 1678 8889       3694 1076   
1846 191231 2093 8260       2949 881   
1847 187387 1482 9724       3453 1162   
1848 226974 1512 10936       4686 1086   
1849 245821 14516 16087     160 1979 4779 731 
1850 269193 22267 11541     89 1940 4256 573 
1851 256947 11852 13652     474 1729 4595 475 
1852 328794 17617 14364     612 2112 4964 290 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 220 
 
1853 318870 25248 14045     709 2751 6124 556 
1854 266802 23032 13893     373 2900 4785 503 
1855 268137 23091 14626     535 2986 5279 534 
1856 305231 21197 13227     852 3200 6677 1507 
1857 452202 22989 15602     361 3593 7121 640 
1858 468097 27314 15334     799 3614 7549 298 
1859 665389 33083 17510     1005 4467 9634 9005 
1860 734635 24303 19203     1439 4991 8449 9530 
1861 725218 26800 21029     5485 4624 9453 10994 
1862 695422 26057 22793     3227 5072 10306 7841 
1863 770416 27737 24521     2585 5362 12537 9536 
1864 597636 27160 23418     966 5110 11161 9972 
1865 856140 24701 24922     838 4674 11739 1734 
1866 517701 32796 26801     479 4402 13000 521 
1867 818732 46378 28209     2002 4422 10919 250 
1868 590936 43020 28430     458 4297 12480 141 
1869 574511 50445 25478     991 4085 11387 1017 
1870 804962 57550 26479     1014 4680 12619 982 
1871 801260 69354 28397     866 3995 11044 1241 
1872 1068624 93623 32440     629 4731 12268 1421 
1873 1838425 102092 41478 63949 3361 3534 6193 12669 1737 
1874 1755315 96748 48566 84376 9575 1834 6299 16485 2031 
1875 1504779 105221 53128 104378 10099 1794 7750 23253 1183 
1876 1371542 57446 28594 89049 9491 185 3735 9779 1163 
1877 1251069 100771 30305 186439 21658 3165 8078 17894 2373 
1878 1537862 86460 61481 274544 23418 2744 5990 15673 2630 
1879 2834629 108466 70541 396162 29632 11942 15112 13740 8951 
1880 2482930 147977 77630 564532 35836 1458 3296 15156 7994 
1881 2967646 139236 92088 739205 54740 1700 6744 18566 19405 
1882 3450462 155211 109886 966856 63223 2726 10562 24792 31433 
1883 3271082 170254 106530 941508 52271 1272 6599 24950 23275 
1884 2985984 159642 114619 920066 50809 931 6408 21348 20435 
1885 3468977 160727 128574 1027029 52300 796 5148 16577 19648 
1886 3215176 145898 124669 1001768 48600 787 5867 16821 12853 
1887 3381169 169058 128355 1184753 50661 559 6610 13409 11047 
1888 3616618 162424 140819 1379454 61119 10247 7415 10934 12508 
1889 4010483 145886 142783 1538659 85026 32205 6248 11119 13027 
1890 4631416 132756 159523 1950762 85652 24100 5354 13965 2028 
1891 4283554 135176 165415 1772751 69627 33666 1068 17984 1138 
1892 4646872 136661 174264 2002039 67236 41484 1048 19350 2825 
1893 5197178 133658 183578 2332266 72092 54084 1252 18401 2616 
1894 6684648 129021 200816 2528296 67700 62279 1094 21241 2518 
1895 5766228 139938 219491 2672854 84240 45490 2615 19739 1773 
1896 7364115 132231 242919 3463372 115320 53066 2625 18215 2211 
1897 8343411 130090 294069 3496763 129890 50667 2605 22617 7906 
1898 7017882 143389 327737 3101818 150971 68387 2532 24154 8619 
1899 8695646 127166 303640 2907730 137923 70550 2042 23661 10178 
1900 6326274 118053 302092 2864880 164001 82576 2232 27131 10320 
1901 7957499 108245 410086 3668023 233679 78748 3134 40727 10744 
1902 9050371 115056 484916 4106998 323941 147987 2285 60451 10423 
1903 11575331 124455 506392 3617867 297662 82492 2882 83712 16729 
1904 9807254 112610 502308 3120261 232895 49715 3437 71438 16730 
1905 8381202 109974 477479 4033039 210661 49274 3015 50829 14883 
1906 8148311 116164 256067 3940788 206917 88086 2930 50739 14587 
1907 7537337 113967 351338 3065379 184971 96324 3757 39227 12241 
1908 6833323 116311 339214 3094444 167764 83805 2868 43886 12429 
1909 7081203 117130 451624 3662533 175099 78657 3409 48616 13682 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 221 
 
Table A 3 Cape Colony revenue (£) by different categories 
YEAR 
GDP(Greyling 
and Verhoef, 
2015) 
Total 
Revenue 
Total 
tax 
Revenue 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Non-Tax 
Revenue 
1827   149834 68832 7313 61519 6351 
1828   162396 63583 1588 61995 11015 
1829   179370 54747 1719 53028 9631 
1830   203971 60587 944 59643 9585 
1831   205033 54968 840 54128 9874 
1832   267865 51905 718 51187 10064 
1833   317387 55801 663 55138 10059 
1834   321091 60278 8910 51368 10375 
1835   312275 59055 7791 51264 8638 
1836   381090 76424 10252 66172 8909 
1837   441706 100003 13343 86660 9566 
1838   456746 123582 13233 110349 10859 
1839   423966 121842 9893 111949 10187 
1840   395748 103924 12092 91832 7516 
1841   216130 70663 1040 69623 8502 
1842   323231 109423 1680 107743 7343 
1843   350648 127082 1597 125485 13188 
1844   466847 125538 2023 123515 13313 
1845   244709 135041 1678 133363 13659 
1846   191231 150454 2093 148361 12090 
1847   187387 159777 1482 158295 14339 
1848   226974 167555 1512 166043 16708 
1849   245821 154692 14516 140176 23736 
1850   269193 184894 22267 162627 18399 
1851   256947 179173 11852 167321 7273 
1852   328794 242054 17617 224437 22342 
1853   318870 248773 25248 223525 24185 
1854   266802 242400 23032 219368 22454 
1855   268137 238397 23091 215306 23960 
1856 1366943 305231 282501 21197 261304 25463 
1857 2100061 452202 373136 22989 350147 27317 
1858 2170094 468097 372150 27314 344836 27594 
1859 2579330 665389 390697 34698 355999 41621 
1860 2613463 734635 395565 25575 369990 43612 
1861 2603041 725218 406314 27997 378317 51585 
1862 2329002 695422 414449 27755 386694 49239 
1863 2715721 770416 382710 27767 354943 54541 
1864 3211465 597636 444942 27840 417102 50627 
1865 3122328 856140 425005 25841 399164 43907 
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1866 3113155 517701 444069 35582 408487 45203 
1867 2954512 818732 503245 50593 452652 45802 
1868 2670042 590936 452240 49201 403039 45806 
1869 2745527 574511 473841 57342 416499 42958 
1870 3148006 804962 528951 65934 463017 45774 
1871 4078762 801260 588731 80406 508325 45543 
1872 6268783 1068624 867582 104279 763303 50068 
1873 6545195 1838425 1003484 114365 889119 132921 
1874 6221279 1755315 1073598 108564 965034 169166 
1875 7513411 1504779 1094384 120078 974306 201585 
1876 8087325 1371542 592944 57446 535498 141996 
1877 8435931 1251069 923949 114108 809841 269912 
1878 8686692 1537862 1066831 90324 976507 386480 
1879 9808802 2834629 1331964 108466 1223498 546080 
1880 12457422 2482930 1504549 178418 1326131 705902 
1881 13449291 2967646 1758530 161134 1597396 932448 
1882 13640295 3450462 2027566 180138 1847428 1209478 
1883 11284961 3271082 1771460 193422 1578038 1156405 
1884 10616592 2985984 1512977 200587 1312390 1134616 
1885 9580308 3468977 1770185 192639 1577546 1250072 
1886 10877906 3215176 1507677 171947 1335730 1211365 
1887 11536825 3381169 1536412 206839 1329573 1395394 
1888 12754579 3616618 1596836 202046 1394790 1622496 
1889 14290269 4010483 1710601 194857 1515744 1829067 
1890 15975670 4631416 1961412 181897 1779515 2241384 
1891 16850616 4283554 1842663 185348 1657315 2061649 
1892 17194588 4646872 1930388 188874 1741514 2308246 
1893 18707123 5197178 1896387 191680 1704707 2664289 
1894 19598633 6684648 2130335 186379 1943956 2883944 
1895 24248797 5766228 2120521 202133 1918388 3046202 
1896 25944219 7364115 2502548 211106 2291442 3897728 
1897 27720257 8343411 3164150 208593 2955557 4004517 
1898 32838889 7017882 2563051 224863 2338188 3684218 
1899 30799352 8695646 2587359 207886 2379473 3455724 
1900 15813851 6326274 2608805 197455 2411350 3453232 
1901 20192713 7957499 3159159 193703 2965456 4445141 
1902 27104104 9050371 3616875 209452 3407423 5137001 
1903 33422622 11575331 4645183 221060 4424123 4607736 
1904 35713220 9807254 3565396 209614 3355782 3996784 
1905 41545068 8381202 3120363 212266 2908097 4839180 
1906 51132249 8148311 3134356 221234 2913122 4560114 
1907 51588282 7537337 2893105 220097 2673008 3753237 
1908 47515800 6833323 2643064 220439 2422625 3744410 
1909 50438180 7081203 2519995 222224 2297771 4433620 
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Table B 1 The Cape Colony expenditures (£) 
YEAR  
Total 
Expenditure 
National 
Debt 
Servicing 
Total 
Railways 
Roads & 
Bridges 
Works & 
Buildings 
Divisional 
Courts 
Registrar 
of Deeds 
High 
Sheriff 
Superior 
Courts 
1827 93682       7793         
1828 113935       11082         
1829 120896 1404     7410         
1830 112874 462     5031         
1831 108969 360     4392         
1832 115582 211     4399         
1833 126023 223   2313 5695         
1834 127875 1403   4877 4995     861 9812 
1835 139112 19158   4254 4897     800 8944 
1836 137088 10687   4536 2326     716 8014 
1837 132822 4166   5718 3640     699 7863 
1838 151982 20418   4419 3662     694 7771 
1839 162637 25005   7473 7533     654 7309 
1840 150559 17536   8254 6889   971 642 7166 
1841 146375 9755   2910 5542   1004 494 5546 
1842 207943 29984   4502 7133   1363 712 7932 
1843 258702 37380   3333 5791   1775 802 8821 
1844 230992 30023   14840 9589   1802 734 7934 
1845 221267 51752   24962 3469   1562 707 7629 
1846 179726 6262   20872 5166   1290 662 7217 
1847 163480 10934   22902 2248   1155 589 6248 
1848 238216 15952   22152 8703   857 734 7173 
1849 283479 30036   33183 10443   961 1080 8536 
1850 269050 19055   35758 11917   1093 1190 10069 
1851 244073 20560   34590 5134   1082 1206 8569 
1852 286784 21619   40207 3989   1148 1266 8831 
1853 277148 7646   47019 3964   1136 1188 8107 
1854 281881 8865   41368 4210   1086 1052 7043 
1855 315464 29106   33921 5782 13508 1049 957 7179 
1856 291904 24807   15575 8752 19175 1008 768 8227 
1857 423822 91169   21698 9277 20108 1362 746 8520 
1858 500427 56235   41606 20623 21710 1468 886 10545 
1859 679414 55424   99212 13450 32945 1514 910 9781 
1860 721843 78438 1821 72942 78624 43109 1762 805 10100 
1861 739134 96138 10497 78883 68411 40908 1794 801 9764 
1862 676439 83567 8885 81940 43964 41621 1875 1099 10040 
1863 698040 101103 424 71132 21518 42887 1960 1174 10296 
1864 655305 115172 10441 60280 19463 44748 1976 1300 10386 
1865 889424 318406 38030 29145 13974 42387 1968 1183 13706 
1866 669888 49726 600 21996 17990 41435 2038 1145 12409 
1867 806317 287744 879 16017 9885 41630 1758 1069 11270 
1868 614639 10960 209 17832 9091 28066 1782 1083 11203 
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1869 628246 116813 456 16921 8422 37823 1905 1150 12219 
1870 632728 266640 897 11549 6303 27217 1942 1164 11469 
1871 609044 154173 1763 12698 22639 34438 1914 1160 11639 
1872 591849 348052 5249 14024 26656 25079 1864 1108 14065 
1873 856005 474360 133969 20848 55691 31838 1775 1062 11408 
1874 830954 311306 226024 31065 53337 38514 2140 1285 13449 
1875 1039118 240075 1062241 41055 72686 33568 2658 1451 14364 
1876 1694443 72323 599289 39919 27783 22921 1197 682 6910 
1877 1520666 216877 188197 62206 35892 37964 3082 2482 22556 
1878 1640053 314163 233017 32827 35970 59941 2857 3736 21343 
1879 1939361 453807 337507 36891 23449 68703 3001 2797 23687 
1880 2210227 459148 448863 72294 29530 72826 2965 2858 24867 
1881 2777631 661904 558538 69957 76044 79502 2989 3459 34171 
1882 3211079 786166 735413 68308 93787 91644 3143 4649 33096 
1883 3650311 924861 742043 70247 113054 96720 3455 4293 41154 
1884 3543100 1145799 617961 36538 57753 96784 3532 6110 41148 
1885 3532405 1237284 659060 20405 29201 98460 3544 4800 39067 
1886 3595040 1251896 704175 22611 31512 96152 3716 4947 37949 
1887 3368563 1233678 691320 11614 25667 158860 3787 4637 37504 
1888 3435243 1151184 756959 29255 46049 158621 4054 4258 36907 
1889 3569759 1097198 835351 41607 56808 101356 38924 3937 36212 
1890 4055240 1111610 1037075 76689 110084 100857 400 5319 38572 
1891 4376976 1262636 1136556 71529 142960 98442 4325 4784 38515 
1892 4429297 1205683 1236260 48845 85898 102120 4605 5711 38994 
1893 4880052 1268350 1269153 65148 67859 108125 4721 5483 41569 
1894 5263546 1303260 1326096 81030 84000 113115 5062   49586 
1895 5511157 1331591 1273070 114283 121225 117628 5303   53610 
1896 6116728 1346233 1503318 114105 94202 129853 5991   54248 
1897 7246201 1327370 1807219 164851 224627 142287 6681   56192 
1898 7489281 1320463 2101200 202200 232523 154627 6958   52904 
1899 7112270 1370012 2083907 118414 179775 156644 6927   57661 
1900 6677651 1415684 1966448 70076 95172 149310 6263   51706 
1901 7990161 1429231 2512237 55531 115860 170676 7499   67690 
1902 8617626 1513716 3178841 52686 106358 175520 7032   76535 
1903 11077562 1610270 4270376 88526 215547 208915 8071   98916 
1904 10746061 1668905 4208303 92846 146819 210914 8908   72222 
1905 9051116 1820540 2920486 53507 57865 174064 8664   63013 
1906 8143206 1893612 2598903 32541 32541 163214 8545   59425 
1907 8171671 1916859 2564313 35223 24337 160164 8518   61319 
1908 7804073 1988361 2264936 18755 17659 154801 9332   59267 
1909 7438737 1866166 1926472 22169 14132 145503 8962   54503 
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Table B 2 The Cape Colony expenditures (£) (continued) 
YEAR  
Conveyance 
of mails Telegraph 
Post 
Office 
Ports 
and 
Harbours Customs Pensions 
Education 
Natives 
Education 
Non- 
Natives 
District 
Surgeons 
1827         5792         
1828         16649 4511       
1829     3680   16139 4384   1813   
1830     4882   14345 4146   1537   
1831     3705   12871 4083   1636   
1832     4045 451 13574 4150   1607   
1833     3796 1780 14480 4270   1605   
1834     4614 2212 4564 6414   2094   
1835     4250 1838 3785 7081   1901   
1836     3735 1741 3109 6185   1300   
1837     4104 1835 2809 6629   1568   
1838     3931 1608 2570 6251   1275   
1839     4121 1674 4651 6187   1592   
1840     4991 1465 4230 6334   1664   
1841     3585 955 2688 4244   1550   
1842     5736 1566 5602 6789   4235   
1843     5701 1805 6343 7200   4834   
1844     5969 1814 5525 6376   3683   
1845     5519 1821 6783 6335   3573   
1846     8122 2489 7011 5400   4914   
1847     8023 1766 6140 4576   4285   
1848     11790 2263 7347 5213   5398   
1849 9717   2190 2878 13044 9892   6826   
1850 10320   2245 3136 12985 8743   8676   
1851 9792   2702 3070 8213 7065   7829   
1852 21620   4675 3278 8525 9244   9050   
1853 24597   4564 2782 9877 7736   7540   
1854 20828   3726 5254 7273 6797   6848   
1855 19316   4087 2886 11805 8246   7022   
1856 19077   4080 3140 6950 7462   7272   
1857 20468   4892 3423 8639 8175   9204   
1858 26201   6309 3700 20072 11214   11268   
1859 30543   7858 4310 14185 17046   13102   
1860 31263   8380 4560 12957 14969   9189   
1861 49350   8406 4402 12129 14149   10166   
1862 42507   9168 4832 13586 13587   11596   
1863 40705   9742 5828 16380 14342   13885   
1864 39378   10162 5046 14340 15480   15497   
1865 35293   10678 5195 17477 17743   16279   
1866 39906   10475 7130 14648 15660   16910   
1867 31629   9226 5801 17645 18088   16534   
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1868 30699   9013 6360 17690 20794   17681   
1869 30176   9031 5698 18542 21109   17985   
1870 28510   8668 5582 13292 22675   17990   
1871 28160   8658 6227 12909 23526   17755   
1872 26341   9116 6061 19797 19217   17780   
1873 45465 1963 10548 4646 13950 20298   19884   
1874 69834 28416 13544 5227 23192 21182   23194   
1875 82148 50360 15248 5253 30369 22030   28885   
1876 84865 38364 51363 2924 13827 10429   21458 7140 
1877 89764 48122 17638 8404 41447 25839 2461 48102 4655 
1878 117621 28894 19136 12209 34484 26717 3292 48441 5166 
1879 163644 31773 19825 13590 36561 32147 4472 61323 5386 
1880 170879 42095 21065 11724 26278 35646 5356 67534 5339 
1881 163757 63428 26384 13997 48323 37450 5224 74187 5186 
1882 186405 68038 34140 10525 31279 39883 75345 85089 6518 
1883 197162 73703 41010 12248 32429 43059 12574 82984 67801 
1884 179753 79216 42134 10816 32357 38916 12719 86750 7509 
1885 153359 71052 48689 8753 37851 42765 12250 87768 7731 
1886 152111 67730 49163 8116 36568 44726 10445 86486 7716 
1887 143807 64315 48785 7919 36942 45102 9235 84040 7853 
1888 143500 70575 49605 7610 40271 47668 8844 89596 7933 
1889 117332 97315 52606 7719 42003 47588 9337 99754 8031 
1890 119315 110398 60752 7392 84976 50060 11422 123464 8547 
1891 123411 102244 68715 6926 140641 49769 11821 140220 8752 
1892 125932 107520 72939 6981 150474 52770 13070 124942 8785 
1893 124798 108730 80655 7761 151317 57296 14969 140125 9300 
1894 142746 128513 87954 5922 156131 58555 16733 169265 9357 
1895 166195 120481 96741 3569 175534 58727 18909 174737 9782 
1896 172447 140854 106064 3388 199980 80553 20762 192827 10084 
1897 176729 223025 123464 4128 214271 90086 16300 200208 11124 
1898 184251 222352 138325 3945 215016 94618 22063 228663 11485 
1899 186272 177601 145516 4169 212952 101391 24314 249645 17310 
1900 178246 193377 148883 3858 150430 95716 26582 240335 16256 
1901 210534 222000 177797 4342 72186 109381 28926 248725 16529 
1902 228939 259159 214215 5129 95601 114428 30511 257035 16711 
1903 259392 283567 241806 5484 124875 1125744 33421 277958 18033 
1904 262040 280056 263667 8726 133410 144494 48168 326236 19036 
1905 261970 303403 265699 11430 137184 167330 49788 393390 18664 
1906 257969 313877 252149 6286 92459 187120 51770 425711 17673 
1907 269078 317929 260733 6521 105472 177348 52889 473499 17391 
1908 265635 296410 261644 5116 92511 187604 50669 515551 18962 
1909 260971 245775 241475 4902 79050 216854 48851 456363 17544 
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Table B 3 The Cape Colony expenditure (£) (continued) 
YEAR  
Public 
Health 
Cape Town 
& frontier 
Mounted 
riflemen 
Police and 
Gaol 
Convicts 
and Prisons 
Public 
Worship 
Eastern 
Cape 
hospital 
and lepers 
Somerset , 
old and new 
Hospital  
Robben 
Island 
1827     6924   1882       
1828     603023 4704 5675       
1829     5446 6706 7272   2741   
1830     4808 7388 5361   2833   
1831     4392 5101 4865   2531 167 
1832     4841 5762 5624   2571 180 
1833     5006 8342 6105   3019 205 
1834     6401 8868 8483   3731 223 
1835     5389 8623 6592   3612 317 
1836     4927 9079 6045   4003 1174 
1837     5801 9327 7304   3846 1082 
1838     5047 13232 5891   3780 1863 
1839     5519 13117 6739   3877 2314 
1840     4958 12465 6365   3385 2464 
1841     3297 6020 4581   1834 1122 
1842     5392 11338 7405   3022 1220 
1843     8703 13244 8570   2455 2022 
1844     8750 9823 9347   2214 2914 
1845     8439 7413 8825   1948 1961 
1846     7957 5912 8662   1036 1680 
1847     6853 8049 7620   290 1551 
1848     5893 17324 9083   781 2373 
1849     21883 10563 12507   2369 1603 
1850     24997 11632 13904   5178 1763 
1851     26583 12891 13442   5038 1836 
1852     30520 14361 14475   6357 1596 
1853     28081 16358 13855   5114 1635 
1854 4941 28508 24389 18638 15230   1823 1289 
1855 5368 26619 22020 120120 14504   855 1061 
1856 5431 24795 22753 16523 13360   828 1153 
1857 6692 29905 26717 19931 14418   933 1295 
1858 8701 38746 43063 22765 15816   1150 1507 
1859 11644 55909 53241 39229 15669 3218 1255 1585 
1860 13323 43865 52499 949 14948 3409 1192 1789 
1861 10832 47028 48725 48780 14923 3264 1191 1711 
1862 10047 53256 48866 32323 15105 3611 1490 1832 
1863 20605 53699 62171 38104 16013 3589 1648 2813 
1864 15379 54592 51850 37549 15810 3621 1552 2734 
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1865 14960 50746 49336 36173 15704 3718 1468 2747 
1866 17626 49756 55982 46998 14726 4401 1555 2836 
1867 26967 45459 55384 41824 13720 3351 1643 4671 
1868 22297 48461 49235 46325 14151 5002 1707 3647 
1869 23138 44858 47627 33685 14843 4950 1549 4048 
1870 22052 50525 38649 22557 14941 5027 1598 3840 
1871 27562 46532 34826 26921 14842 5005 1856 3875 
1872 18130 66375 35992 20499 14146 4390 1879 4028 
1873 22487 59985 41742 20190 13824 4934 2027 3808 
1874 25105 62517 56498 32754 13801 4921 2387 4713 
1875   63222 70866 25591 13670 17301 6710 10664 
1876 16037 44460 36839 14759 6976 10893 5671 12036 
1877   101556 78512 28702 14139 8082 12724 13799 
1878 19963 137930 93051 36904 14447 8991 12792 15023 
1879 11727 115463 121461 59645 14941 10838 14904 17348 
1880   107866 120529 62756 14594 9546 13051 18211 
1881   119774 183966 52684 11897 9598 12219 17580 
1882   129625 210810 52068 11402 10636 12894 18038 
1883   120810 274365 62768 10654 12821 14477 17066 
1884   126911 334804 71398 10113 13767 14550 15937 
1885   99096 288947 69728 10432 12508 14799 14096 
1886   92705 264040 80459 9953 11756 11750 14517 
1887   99144 203890 85875 9617 10137 10360 12677 
1888   109163 183423 73744 9139 9203 13242 13330 
1889   102725 190058 71988 8716 12298 9807 13616 
1890 43712 130138 192248 96636 8278 13799 11238 19762 
1891 49180 130718 212532 98336 7673 14991 12893 25155 
1892 45181 128556 213373 91781 7572 12813 13409 30668 
1893 52252 128430 235400 115250 7412 16741 13312 38901 
1894 51278 140600 254032 128399 7278 19601 16506 44578 
1895 61068 141905 284187 147467 7212 20676 16780 42917 
1896 71445 162910 319893 158962 7046 26392 16185 53914 
1897 71888 354771 394113 183471 6668 28642 16039 46723 
1898 82917 470063 499975 194046 6390 30933 16725 46842 
1899 102509 221595 437175 181128 6211 31073 8067 50124 
1900 116541 179039 453682 149626 5472 31404 9121 44873 
1901 307381 446225 586845 159745 5358 33815 8713 47205 
1902 337148 155988 622157 166677 5255 32513 7464 49133 
1903 198540 550900 981617 170849 5335 36991 9117 65603 
1904 164934 213670 831000 161421 5058 39446 8165 61343 
1905 145346 153565 328246 212692 4168 40237 117547 82848 
1906 129301 138157 286868 174075 3728 38477 9960 80094 
1907 116572 136134 284061 170562 3295 40653 10356 77074 
1908 37608 128910 256826 159292 2849 41368 10563 75459 
1909 25570 108568 260103 160958 2171 40893 11036 72639 
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Table B 4 The Cape Colony expenditures (£) (continued) 
YEAR  
Colonial 
Secretary 
The 
Governor 
Imperial 
Military 
Expenditure 
Crown 
Forests 
Joint 
parliamentary 
expenses 
Transkeian 
territories 
1827   5202         
1828   5236         
1829   5195         
1830   5783         
1831   5269         
1832   5631         
1833   6305         
1834 3983 6783         
1835 3484 5171         
1836 3136 4699         
1837 3135 4568         
1838 3367 5007         
1839 3209 4473         
1840 3105 4393         
1841 2075 3274         
1842 2798 4859         
1843 3617 5381   212     
1844 3672 7769   207     
1845 3740 5924   239     
1846 3475 4608   361     
1847 3263 5471   335     
1848 4058 6687   375     
1849 5298 5807   382     
1850 5943 6145   643     
1851 5848 6142   570     
1852 5408 6401   553     
1853 4029 6010   580 1666   
1854 4181 4103   507 10559   
1855 4957 5405   451 8304   
1856 5052 4964   815 7766   
1857 5136 5061   781 6872   
1858 6978 5753   943 10445   
1859 7233 5640   1087 11040   
1860 6967 5886   1126 9633   
1861 6973 4737   1144 9249   
1862 7076 6372   1201 9342   
1863 6845 5782   1323 8581   
1864 6962 5772   1292 14808   
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1865 6774 5761   1289 13967   
1866 6515 5506   1218 92725   
1867 5590 5096   1245 12093   
1868 5963 4975   1270 15609   
1869 6514 5313   1395 11781   
1870 6194 4945   1370 11069   
1871 6167 5521   1305 11536   
1872 5996 5261   1214 13142   
1873 4750 5471   1207 9655   
1874 5514 5807   1565 13992   
1875 5755 6465   1742 12716   
1876 2969 3225   2358 9361   
1877 6663 6700   3827 6332   
1878 7861 10178   3975 12518   
1879 8538 8287   4346 16192   
1880 9341 8174   6131 16961 61761 
1881 8743 11110   5886 28933 70512 
1882 8510 7312   6601 18938 63872 
1883 9774 7587   8068 12870 79455 
1884 9954 7333 89727 14078 18678 51257 
1885 10176 7952 113582 11573 20039 47361 
1886 10296 8073 131065 11582 30228 47424 
1887 9488 9207 137523 13662 9391 39775 
1888 9988 9970 135441 13972 20517 42743 
1889 9627 8982 121322 14641 23442 43011 
1890 10111 11614 132222 19961 27284 45847 
1891 10851 11432 143097 21244 26146 54379 
1892 11604 13475 142380 21945 28040 49073 
1893 11481 12484 146190 34456 32605 49087 
1894 11217 13641 131247 38762 34106 52046 
1895 14013 12843 147992 42265 34367 62510 
1896 17797 13869 228662 49705 32633 69061 
1897 16602 12430 291306 54426 42017 72168 
1898 16008 15303 323912 56179 28958 78428 
1899 22628 12941   58150 31974 80061 
1900 23763 12754   48104 33425 84337 
1901 24468 13041   49843 28479 86787 
1902 25527 13960   54631 11377 81404 
1903 28882 16655   58857 33859 84974 
1904 36617 15290 1229070 72932 60191 106937 
1905 37476 13181   65042 44865 88848 
1906 40641 15462   56321 16542 71029 
1907 36551 16031   3484 40816 74492 
1908 26437 12796   371 46350 79115 
1909 18818 11625   3707 42213 78307 
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Table B 5 The Cape Colony expenditure (£) (continued) 
YEAR  Mines 
Rents, 
rates, 
insurance, 
gas , 
electric 
light 
Surveyor 
general 
Commissioner 
for public 
works 
Headman 
& chiefs 
allowances 
Defence 
and colonial 
military 
allowance 
1827           12857 
1828           3464 
1829           709 
1830           502 
1831           457 
1832           471 
1833           506 
1834     2877       
1835     2932       
1836     2648       
1837     2508       
1838     2414       
1839     2795       
1840     2263       
1841     1657       
1842     2556       
1843     3520     162 
1844     3477       
1845     2734       
1846     2232       
1847     2162       
1848     1783       
1849   2652 2266   2900   
1850   3212 2388   3377   
1851   3193 2329   1458   
1852   3203 2927   1140   
1853   2634 2275   992   
1854   2753 2176   929   
1855   2706 2058   960   
1856   3507 2098   6033   
1857   4277 2697   7588   
1858   5107 3284   9193   
1859   7594 4111   7228   
1860   6907 4122   7323   
1861   6466 4000   7948 9684 
1862   6309 4318   7191 9892 
1863   6319 4492   5900 15633 
1864   6508 4319   6899 15280 
1865   6497 3765   5738 15333 
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1866   6707 4114   5087 9684 
1867   6867 4114   1811 18218 
1868   7601 3647   12173 10569 
1869   7001 3894   9413 9684 
1870   6670 3517   10292 9684 
1871   6148 3480   9932 9463 
1872   5307 3463   9026 6892 
1873   6990 3475 1748 8505 6540 
1874   7234 4139 2462 4366 5065 
1875   7773 4895 3366 4656 57657 
1876   0 2368 1697 4456 926 
1877   0 12403 3907 4185 63544 
1878   8929 20592 4224 4055 50443 
1879   10548 28636 5071 3569 146596 
1880   10962 30504 6045 2960 17086 
1881   11109 28165 6226 2748 16078 
1882 6640 12314 28176 7316 2925 16796 
1883 9569 13633 40863 8269 3080 11698 
1884 9049 13916 49851 8495 3039 10928 
1885 8118 13531 45255 8890 3050 14663 
1886 8228 12743 37204 9257 2846 21309 
1887 5768 12440 31637 8940 2793 9101 
1888 6147 11266 21493 8629 2636 19956 
1889 5997 11748 21836 8013 2423 26241 
1890 5305 11296 12525 8010 2660   
1891 4958 11619 22120 8294 2763   
1892 3165 17297 17875 9777 2833   
1893 4024 18693 23751 5512 3013   
1894 4111 19541 19072 5041 2912   
1895 3859 21698 22831 5595 2979   
1896 4599 22885 18194 7855 2695   
1897 4047 26128 18831 10156 2869   
1898 4302 27548 11491 11272 2813   
1899 4707 28820 18596 10868 3034   
1900 3251 30789 18856 11163 2783   
1901 3401 37511 18617 11078 2855   
1902 3459 37734 14502 11841 2722   
1903 5641 41464 23668 14793 2837   
1904 3815 46593 23402 16980 2789   
1905 3699 59022 28026 14935 2787   
1906 5454 53112 66684 18359 2631   
1907 5607 45071 28307 40892 2765   
1908 6059 41941 29797 35234 2813   
1909 5340 33651 24995 20871 2918   
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Table C 1 Cape Colony’s public debt and debt servicing (£) 
Year 
GDP 
(Greyling & 
Verhoef, 
2015) 
General 
government 
Harbour 
boards 
Total 
public debt 
National 
debt 
servicing  
1859 2579330 101269   101269 55424 
1860 2613463 120050 200000 320050 78438 
1861 2603041 565056 200000 765056 96138 
1862 2329002 577560 257000 834560 83567 
1863 2715721 751550 258000 1009550 101103 
1864 3211465 751550 288000 1039550 115172 
1865 3122328 916630 288000 1204630 318406 
1866 3113155 928159 288000 1216159 49726 
1867 2954512 1178150 368000 1546150 287744 
1868 2670042 1178150 368000 1546150 10960 
1869 2745527 1178150 368000 1546150 116813 
1870 3148006 1182957 387900 1570857 266640 
1871 4078762 1199898 387900 1587798 154173 
1872 6268783 1484641 366459 1851100 348052 
1873 6545195 1832441 370150 2202591 474360 
1874 6221279 2116558 368250 2484808 311306 
1875 7513411 2405328 364850 2770178 240075 
1876 8087325 4068158 464350 4532508 72323 
1877 8435931 6028259 464050 6492309 216877 
1878 8686692 6980359 462750 7443109 314163 
1879 9808802 9527459 801150 10328609 453807 
1880 12457422 10583759 808059 11391818 459148 
1881 13449291 12460559 801150 13261709 661904 
1882 13640295 12302759 795650 13098409 786166 
1883 11284961 19671859 1139150 20811009 924861 
1884 10616592 19658267 1145865 20804132 1145799 
1885 9580308 20417227 1254035 21671262 1237284 
1886 10877906 21194286 1323776 22518062 1251896 
1887 11536825 21194286 1289439 22483725 1233678 
1888 12754579 20971201 1323833 22295034 1151184 
1889 14290269 21120784 1369717 22490501 1097198 
1890 15975670 22114159 1634762 23748921 1111610 
1891 16850616 23206206 1632962 24839168 1262636 
1892 17194588 24289606 1717162 26006768 1205683 
1893 18707123 25118738 1680141 26798879 1268350 
1894 19598633 24999761 2675417 27675178 1303260 
1895 24248797 24861401 2672517 27533918 1331591 
1896 25944219 24728188 2668617 27396805 1346233 
1897 27720257 24615788 2666617 27282405 1327370 
1898 32838889 25277445 3106477 28383922 1320463 
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1899 30799352 27884078 3525677 31409755 1370012 
1900 15813851 27613947 3483878 31097825 1415684 
1901 20192713 27922657 3470778 31393435 1429231 
1902 27104104 32329151 4641778 36970929 1513716 
1903 33422622 31841371 4627878 36469249 1610270 
1904 35713220 34171053 5214651 39385704 1668905 
1905 41545068 36820385 5289177 42109562 1820540 
1906 51132249 37901226 6078886 43980112 1893612 
1907 51588282 40773590 5488700 46262290 1916859 
1908 47515800 42948263 5483539 48431802 1988361 
1909 50438180 42834752 5480039 48314791 1866166 
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